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1Introduction
The 2008 fi nancial crisis is signifi cant not only from the point of 
view of the deep recession it has generated, but also because of the 
problems in the governance of the economy it has revealed. It is an 
extraordinary opportunity to change the governance of the economy 
and the way economists represent it.
The aim of this book is to refl ect on the lessons that can be drawn 
from the crisis for the analysis, defi nition and implementation of 
industrial policy. We do not propose new rules for the economy or 
new forms of capitalism, but we do suggest a research programme 
for a new approach to the analysis of industrial development. This 
approach centres around an analysis of the organisation of produc-
tion and stresses the importance of industrial development for the 
wealth of nations, taken to mean not only rising income, but also 
civil development (the wider goals of economic development con-
sidered by classical authors). We thus suggest that returning to a 
political economy framework may be extremely useful for economic 
analysis.
This book is not a review of the work of classical economists, 
which we would only perform badly because we are not economic 
historians. However, we use classical works in order to defi ne a 
framework for the analysis of industrial policy. In this book, we 
defi ne industry as the capacity to organise production, to transform 
inputs into outputs. We do not reduce industry to manufacturing 
but consider industry as all productive sectors, including agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. This is important not only because 
many goods are now bundled with services in their production (fi rms 
in the manufacturing sector extensively using business services), but 
also because considering all value production is important.
Industrial policy has various defi nitions in the literature. Broadly, 
two types of defi nitions can be identifi ed. One is restricted and con-
siders industrial policy as selective interventions that favour specifi c 
fi rms or specifi c domestic industries. These intervention policies 
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generally distort competition by favouring some fi rms at the expense 
of others. Wider defi nitions also exist that consider industrial policy 
as a set of instruments promoting industrial restructuring and indus-
trial development. Promoting industrial development supports the 
emergence of new industries, be they science- based or based on other 
types of innovations (such as new goods or new design), and helps 
older industries restructure.
We consider industrial policy in a broad sense, not only because it 
aims to correct market failures and promote industrial change, but 
also because it is envisaged as a strategic policy, which is essential to 
broader economic growth and also to social and civil development. 
Industrial policy is not about picking winners and protecting them 
so that they can be competitive. It is about defi ning a vision of indus-
trial development and determining the rules and resources that can 
best channel this development. We thus adopt a holistic approach 
to industrial policy decision- making. Industrial development occurs 
in a complex web of interactions between diff erent spheres of the 
economy. As a result of globalisation the economy has become even 
more complex, with fi rms organising worldwide production proc-
esses and interacting in a variety of ways in overlapping networks.
Industrial policy before the crisis consisted of a set of actions in 
various fi elds, including trade, competition, research and techno-
logical development, implemented at regional, national and supra-
national level, that provided conditions for business to prosper. 
The problem was that the diff erent actions tended to lack coherence 
because of a lack of long- term vision. Industrial policy after the 
crisis primarily consists of defi ning this vision at the political level 
so that the set of actions that are pursued become complementary 
and integrated, putting the economy in a coherent and sustainable 
industrial development path. In order to defi ne this long- term vision, 
a holistic approach is necessary that considers the whole system in 
which a particular industry or region is part. Such a comprehensive 
approach can identify a coherent industrial development path and 
the  appropriate levers to promote such development.
Given this background, we argue in the book that the major 
implications of the 2008 fi nancial crisis, in terms of industrial devel-
opment, are for the dominant regulation model. The crisis revealed 
this model as inadequate to face the deep structural changes that 
have been occurring since the 1980s, often summarised in the term 
‘globalisation’.
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Globalisation is not only an economic phenomenon whereby 
fi nancial fl ows, trade of goods and services and foreign direct invest-
ment rise on a worldwide basis. It is also, and primarily, a political 
phenomenon whereby the bipolar world of the post- World War II 
era, dominated by US hegemony, no longer exists. Globalisation 
is clearing the scene for a multipolar world where many powers of 
the past return: China, India, Brazil and Russia (although the latter 
was, as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one of the two 
world powers of the post- war era). China particularly is growing 
in strength and infl uence and is expected to overtake the US and 
become the biggest economic power within ten to 20 years1 (O’Neill 
and Stupnytskz, 2009).
The emergence of new powerful economies will undermine the 
‘old’ powers’ economic dominance. More fundamentally, the rise of 
new powers may also lead to questions about the system of values on 
which the Western world is built and rooted. Democracy, respect for 
human rights, fair trade, health and fair standards of living for the 
whole population, are the pillars of the Western world.
China has a long history, a strong tradition and specifi c values, 
but the key question raised by its emergence as the biggest world 
power is what values it will directly or indirectly impose on the rest 
of the world. China has gained a strong competitive advantage 
essentially by maintaining very low production costs, supported 
by poor working conditions. As shown by Rodrik (2008), Western 
consumers, when informed about the labour and social conditions 
supporting particular goods’ quality and prices, are not willing to 
sacrifi ce ethical values for lower prices. Can we sustain trade with 
Chinese products manufactured by workers in poor conditions with 
long hours and very low salaries? Taken in a broad sense, industrial 
policy is also concerned with these issues.
In this context, political and ethical values can no longer be 
ignored by economists advising policymakers. This is what Robbins 
was already emphasising at the beginning of the 1980s (Robbins, 
1981). Industrial policy as a long- term vision of industrial develop-
ment needs to ease these structural changes and make development 
sustainable – that is socially and environmentally coherent.
Seen as the rise of new powers, globalisation has had deep 
structural eff ects on industries. Competition has become more 
intense with new rivals challenging existing market incumbents. As 
explained in Chapter 2, this has induced production re- organisation 
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whereby production processes have become more intensive users 
of intangible assets, primarily knowledge, together with the spatial 
fragmentation of production phases – not only between diff erent 
fi rms, in networks of suppliers, but also between diff erent geographi-
cal spaces, with diff erent suppliers located in diff erent parts of the 
world. The creation of ‘global value chains’ or ‘global production 
networks’ is a structural change that has important implications 
for the competitiveness of industry in diff erent countries, and has, 
especially since the beginning of the century, started new debates on 
industrial policy (Bianchi and Labory, 2006b).
Therefore, beyond the macroeconomic mechanisms at play in 
the 2008 fi nancial crisis, deeper roots can be found in the struc-
tural changes in industry over the last 20 years; changes that have 
not been properly addressed by the dominant regulatory model of 
neo- liberalism. As we show in Chapter 1, the crisis revealed that the 
capacity of markets to self- regulate is limited, with excessive short- 
termism leading to increasing stress in the world economic system, 
and ultimately to the crisis.
In economics, the long- term is seen as a logical time period where 
all adjustments are automatic, so the questions of how and when 
adjustment processes take place can be ignored. In fact, adjustment 
processes take time and involve diff erent costs that must be exam-
ined to formulate appropriate industrial policies. Short- term macro-
economic stabilisation is not suffi  cient to make structural changes 
sustainable.
Industrial development has profound implications not only on 
economic growth, measured by real gross domestic product (GDP) 
increases and improvements in income levels, but also on the living 
conditions of citizens. Individuals’ nature of work determines their 
income, their capacity to learn, their open- mindedness, and brings 
about social improvements; their capacity to learn determines cul-
tural development. The fact that people learn new skills, new ways 
of working, get higher income, and access diff erent types of products 
and services, all have social, economic and political consequences. In 
turn, industrial development is determined by the characteristics of 
societies. To give a straightforward example, in societies with strong 
class or ethnic divisions, where certain classes or ethnicities may be 
precluded from access to education or other public goods, industrial 
development may arise but be confi ned to certain parts of society 
and not use all resources in the country fully.
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So industrial and economic development should be seen as instru-
ments for cultural and social development, which is what classical 
authors such as Adam Smith had in mind. In this perspective, the 
current debate on justice and happiness – on what should be the 
appropriate measures of the development level of countries – is 
highly relevant. This wider view implies that the sustainability of 
industrial development, in the sense of social cohesion and environ-
mental preservation for future generations, is important to take into 
account.
The work of classical economists is also useful to analyse the 
structural changes induced by globalisation, as we show in Chapter 
3. The organisation of production is labour division. The division of 
labour depends on the extent of the market and thus upon capital 
accumulation. The division of labour increases labour productivity 
because the dexterity of workers improves, there are time savings 
from specialisation, and specifi c machinery is invented. Smith, in 
The Wealth of Nations, gives examples of the division of labour 
within fi rms but ‘some of the activities which were originally a part 
of the division of labour within the fi rm may eventually become a 
diff erent “trade” or “business”, so that the division of labour within 
the fi rm is but a step towards the division of labour amongst fi rms’ 
(Heinz and Salvadori, 2003, p. 111). The division of labour proceeds 
within and between fi rms, and in the process new ‘trades’ are created. 
New technical knowledge is constantly created and scientifi c knowl-
edge is increasingly used in the production process, opening new 
markets and enlarging existing ones, thereby acting as the driving 
force of economic and social development.
The changing division of labour has deep social and political 
implications. The nature of work changes so that workers may have 
to develop new skills, particularly their capacity to communicate to 
others and work with others. Their status in society may also change 
as a result. For instance, if a large parts of workers are employed on 
short- term contracts rather than permanent contracts not only does 
their well- being change (as they face more uncertainty about their 
future income and cannot realise long- term plans, such as building 
a family) but also their social status changes. The decision of a fi rm 
to delocalise part of the production process has implications on the 
local community, which may fi nd itself facing a high unemployment 
rate.
Thus the decisions made by fi rms have important social and 
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political implications. This fact raises two issues. First, governments 
should care about what fi rms decide and what the implications are 
for local and national communities. Second, fi rms should be viewed 
as political entities and not merely private players. When a fi rm 
decides to drop waste into a river near its factory it may not take the 
external cost of its activity into account, but it is making a political 
decision to ruin the local environment and adversely aff ect future 
generations.
A holistic approach to industrial policy therefore primarily 
addresses systemic failures in economic development, that is failures 
of the economic system that lead to inappropriate development 
paths.2 Market and government failures are also taken into account, 
in that specifi c measures may be adopted to address specifi c failures 
of the market and to provide appropriate incentives for all actors 
to support the industrial strategy. However, an additional aim of 
a holistic approach to industrial policy is to provide coherence to 
the diff erent actions implemented in diff erent areas and at diff erent 
levels, thanks to the political defi nition of a long- term vision, which 
is translated into a long- term strategy for industrial development.
The book is structured as follows. The fi rst chapter analyses the 
crisis and its implications for industrial development and industrial 
policy. The chapter argues that what the crisis reveals most vividly is 
the need for long- term visions to govern the economy; that markets 
do not self- regulate; and that the crisis has deep structural roots and 
is not just an accident causing superfi cial injuries that will heal to 
leave the world as it was before.
The second chapter examines these structural changes in more 
detail, looking deep into the system and the organisation of produc-
tion. An analysis of what ‘globalisation’ is and implies for industrial 
systems is undertaken, showing the transformation of productive 
organisations. The phenomenon of global value chains or ‘second 
unbundling’ in the words of Baldwin (2006) is shown to constitute 
one of the most important such structural changes. We relate this 
change to the consolidation of the knowledge- based economy and 
the growing importance of intangible assets. We conclude from this 
chapter that the economy forms a complex system where all sectors 
are interrelated to diff erent degrees. The organisation of produc-
tion is a fundamental aspect that needs to be analysed in order to 
understand this complexity and to point out where markets may not 
always automatically generate equilibrium.
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Given these structural elements, the third chapter starts formu-
lating a political economy framework for the analysis of industrial 
policy, or at least a research programme aiming at this formulation. 
For this purpose, we go back to an analysis of Adam Smith centred 
on the role of labour division in industrial and economic develop-
ment, where The wealth of nations is primarily determined by the 
division of labour, in the sense of the organisation of production 
and the distribution of working activities between all members in 
a society. We argue that the second unbundling can be analysed 
in terms of changing labour division, extending the study made by 
Smith of production processes in his pin factory metaphor. We also 
argue that these changing production processes result from globali-
sation and the consequent intensifi cation of worldwide competition, 
implying the necessity for a higher knowledge content of products 
and production processes that more intensively use intangible 
assets. We suggest that more research is needed on production pro-
cesses in order both to defi ne which tasks are more and less likely 
to be off shored, and to check whether non- ‘off shorable’ tasks are 
those more intensive in intangible assets and producing more value 
added.
The fourth chapter consequently develops a framework for indus-
trial policy as a long- term vision of industrial development. We show 
the limits of the view of industrial policy as correcting specifi c failures 
(although this is useful), essentially because this approach leads to a 
fragmentation of industrial policy actions without comprehensive 
and integrated objectives for industrial development. The approach 
based on systemic failures is less limited, given that development is 
considered as occurring in systemic and dynamic processes.
We identify four major levers that industrial policy after the crisis 
should take into account. These are resources (especially human 
capital), entitlements (rights or capabilities in Sen’s wording), inno-
vation (as a dynamic element of development) and territory (embed-
dedness of development processes within communities, in the sense 
of regional and social cohesion).3 All these levers should be included 
in the long- term strategy of industrial development, at the diff erent 
levels of implementation. Coherence is therefore key to defi ning a 
successful vision; coherence not only between the diff erent areas of 
action, but also between the diff erent levels of implementation (local, 
regional, national and supranational).
Industrial policy is then a dynamic process whereby policymakers 
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identify possible industrial development paths and defi ne gears and 
levers to orientate development in appropriate ways. The dynamics 
of the framework we propose in Chapter 4 is determined essentially 
by the learning capacity of the system, in turn determined by social 
mechanisms underlying work organisation and labour. Policy has 
an important role to play in favouring the dynamics of the system, 
by providing entitlements and provisions, implementing actions 
towards the territory (determining its capacity to valorise competen-
cies and skills) and innovation (actions favouring knowledge crea-
tion) which all aff ect the individual and collective learning capacity 
of the system. These actions in turn infl uence the “skill, dexterity and 
judgment” of labour and the evolution of production organisation.
The fi fth chapter illustrates the framework in a number of country 
cases, namely China (and the Shenzhen region in particular), Brazil 
(very briefl y), South Africa and two European countries, Ireland 
and Finland, interesting for the very rapid economic growth they 
experienced in the 1990s, although with very diff erent approaches 
to industrial policy. In each case the long- term vision of industrial 
development (or lack of) is shown, together with the main elements 
of the strategy, concluding with an assessment of its completeness 
and coherence, as well as its sustainability.
The sixth and last chapter analyses the European experience of 
industrial policy. It shows that the European integration process 
has, from its beginning, been guided by a long- term vision of indus-
trial development where the economic integration process itself has 
been proposed as the main industrial policy for members of the 
European Community, now European Union (EU). The chapter 
also analyses the programme of industrial development that was 
proposed at the beginning of the twenty- fi rst century in the Lisbon 
Strategy, and shows how it constituted an industrial policy in the 
sense we intend. However, the lack of political commitment that has 
characterised the attitude of member states since the end of the 1990s 
has led to the failure of the Lisbon Strategy. We conclude that the 
new strategy defi ned for the period 2010 to 2020 could, if member 
states truly adhered to it, constitute a new industrial policy project 
that, mobilises national industrial development and the pursuit of 
the economic integration process. However, recent post- crisis events, 
and in particular the attitude of eurozone countries facing the Greek 
crisis, raises doubts about the EU’s ability to end the crisis and mobi-
lise itself to remain a world economic power.
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We therefore suggest that going back to a political economy 
framework which, in the words of Dahrendorf (2008), takes into 
account entitlements and not only provisions (see Chapter 4), would 
be useful to improve the capacity of economies to avoid crises. We 
therefore add a (modest) contribution to calls that have been made 
by some of the most prominent economists since the beginning of the 
crisis for a return to a political economy framework for economic 
analysis. Thus Stiglitz (2010) argues that we have to change capital-
ism, returning to moral responsibility, trust and collective action. 
Fitoussi and Laurent (2008) call for a return to a political economy 
framework to design sustainable economic policies. Rodrik (2008) 
also calls for a consideration of the political space in order to design 
appropriate development policies.
Our aim in this book is to relate the analysis of the actual crisis, 
the consideration of production organisation as central to the 
understanding of economic phenomena, and the role of the state in 
globalisation. In our view the fundamental link lies in people. In fact, 
in the 1990s much stress was put on the importance of knowledge in 
economic phenomena. What we wish to underline is that knowledge 
means people: people living in institutional and social contexts, that 
can be modifi ed by public action either to restrict the rights and 
freedom or to valorise their capacities and competencies and their 
rights.
NOTES
1. See for example, Global Economics Paper no. 192 by Goldman Sachs (J. O’Neill 
and A. Stupaytska) (2009).
2. The concept of systemic failures has been defi ned in evolutionary theory to denote 
the failures of innovation systems (Von Tunzelmann, 2010). We consider here 
systemic failures in the whole economic system.
3. See proposed the concept of capabilities, focusing on positive freedom, in the 
book Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (1981).
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1. The 2008 fi nancial crisis1
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 fi nancial crisis has been a shock to many actors in, and 
observers of, the economy. This is not so much because it came as 
a surprise but because it implied a real questioning of many ideas 
and rules previously thought to be certain and universal, as well as 
a profound rethinking about the relationship between the state and 
the market.
The crisis is fi rst and foremost a crisis of trust; consumers no 
longer having trust in the stability of the economic system. The crisis 
stemmed from an unforeseen collapse of the fi nancial and housing 
markets in the US that spread to the whole world economy through 
a mechanistic reduction in the value of savings. This transformed 
the fi nancial crisis into a real crisis with a negative eff ect on expecta-
tions and a complete stop in demand growth. The implosion of the 
US housing market, due to unsustainable sub- prime mortgages, 
led to a crisis of the banks, the dispersion of savings, a drastic fall 
in US demand followed by a fall in US production and a fall in US 
imports, causing the contagion of the crisis to the rest of the world: 
fi rst to Europe and then to China and emerging markets.
The crisis saw an enormous bubble burst, a bubble created from 
three main ingredients. First, there was the abundant liquidity in 
world capital markets fed by the large payment imbalances between 
countries (a current account defi cit in the US Fed by capital coming 
from emerging and oil- exporting countries) and the expansionary 
monetary policy pursued in the US since 2000, which kept interest 
rates low. Second was the credit boom, which led to unsustainable 
leverage (housing market). The third ingredient was fi nancial inno-
vations such as securitisation and derivative contracts that eased the 
growth in fi nancial intermediation. The loose monetary policy con-
ducted by the Fed led fi nancial operators to expect a continuously 
accommodating policy and created prevailing expectations that 
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regardless of mistakes or developments, fi nancial operators would 
be rescued by monetary authorities. As a result speculation could 
continue without brakes.
The crisis led to a return of state intervention, as a guarantee 
against the weaknesses of the economic system. States around 
the world have massively intervened in markets, pouring in huge 
amounts of money to sustain banks. This intervention has marked 
the end of the liberal wave started in the late 1980s, as the ideology of 
laissez- faire has shown its many limits. However, this intervention is 
not a return to protectionism, which has many limits as well.
Beyond the dynamics of the crisis itself and the short- term reac-
tions of states aiming to reduce its negative eff ects and prepare 
the grounds for recovery as early as possible, the deep roots of the 
crisis lie in the inadequacy of the regulatory model of the post- war 
era to deal with the new world order emerging with globalisation. 
These deep roots are precisely where the links between the crisis and 
 industrial dynamics and industrial policy originate.
In the last two or three decades of globalisation, an important 
geopolitical transformation has occurred with new powers emerging 
to question the hegemony Western countries had enjoyed for the 
previous century and more. Countries such as Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (the BRICs) are examples of these ‘new’ powers, although 
‘returning’ powers may be a more appropriate term as these coun-
tries have been world powers in the past. The bipolar world of the 
post- World War Two era has ended, leaving a multipolar world in 
transformation where the balance of power between countries and 
world regions is still in the process of adjusting and stabilising. The 
surprise of the crisis is that even the superpower of the post- War era, 
the US, has started to show not only weaknesses but also economic 
and political vulnerability.
The emergence of these new economic powers has had a profound 
impact on business, deeply changing the competitive environment 
and inducing structural adjustments that we analyse in more detail 
in Chapter 2. The current chapter focuses on the analysis of the crisis 
itself and on the inadequacy of the current regulatory order, about 
which many scholars have set out calls for change.2
The second section provides some considerations on both the term 
‘crisis’ itself, in terms of meaning and supposed cyclicality, and on 
the major elements of economic and political evolution in the world 
since 1945. The aim is not to be exhaustive but to outline some of 
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the events we fi nd mostly signifi cant. The third section shows the 
weaknesses of the US economy and the predominant role of this 
country in the 2008 fi nancial crisis. The fourth section briefl y exam-
ines the reaction to the crisis, mentioning fi scal stimulus measures 
and showing the lack of reaction of the EU collectively, although it 
should have constituted an example of international coordination. 
The fi fth section shows the excesses of the neo- liberal model in terms 
of increasing the gap between the fi nancial and real spheres of the 
economy. The fi nal section concludes, by looking into the deeper 
structural changes that partly caused the crisis.
CRISES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
FROM 1945 TO 2009
Refl ection on the Term ‘Crisis’
A crisis is not an exceptional event, exogenous to economic devel-
opment cycles, but rather it is a substantial element of structural 
dynamics. The term ‘crisis’ represents both the point at which a pre-
ceding equilibrium breaks up and the recession phase that follows. 
The term therefore implies separation, break, reasoning and deci-
sions. The Greek roots of the term stress the perception of diff erence 
and the awareness of the critical moment when transformations 
arise. The Latin roots stress the structural break represented by the 
crisis, namely a moment when the phenomenon is a change of route. 
In the Chinese language these latter two aspects are represented in 
the same ideogram, which expresses the term as both a danger and 
an opportunity.
The term crisis has been used for a long time in the medical fi eld, 
indicating the moment at which a diagnosis was made and therefore 
a decision was taken on the treatment to follow. The term took on a 
political meaning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when 
it was used to indicate the transition from old to new regimes, and 
the simultaneous existence of continuity and transformation, on the 
basis of a cyclical and no longer deterministic view of the historical 
process. The French scholar Paul Hazard showed in his book La 
crise de la conscience européenne, 1680–1715 (1935), that the crisis 
of the Ancien régime was fi rst and foremost due to a fundamental 
change in social relations, initiated by cultural transformations 
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and intellectual thoughts that stressed rationalism, doubt, equality 
and freedom instead of obedience to dogma and submission to the 
Church and the King. Capitalism was indeed born and developed in 
years of a strong cultural and social break from the past.
During the expansion of capitalism the very substance of the 
term crisis changes. In the past, crises arose from scarcity – that is, 
a dramatic drop in the availability of resources due not only to land 
fertility problems, but also to wars or to the characteristics of the 
social structure. Within capitalism, the key determinant of economic 
development and well- being is the capacity to reproduce goods. 
Within capitalism, crises are therefore related to overproduction or 
more generally to the disequilibrium between demand and produc-
tion; between the capacity of the market to create demand and the 
capacity of producers to respond with adequate quality and quantity 
of production.
Nevertheless, the economic analysis of crises still rests on the scar-
city problem, as defi ned in the so- called marginalist revolution that 
spurred the creation of the neo- classical school of economics. This 
approach ignores the political sphere (in the sense of cultural, social 
and political aspects of economies), so much so that the double 
meaning of the term crisis disappears – crisis ends up meaning an 
empty moment wherein a recession phase follows a growth phase.
The use of the term crisis therefore recalls a biological, almost 
naturalistic metaphor, where a crisis phase is followed by a phase 
of regeneration and development, in turn followed by a new decline 
and death, which subsequently generates a new life. This metaphor, 
translated into economic terms, becomes an evolution following 
cycles. The length of cyclical phases can be diverse and partly 
depends on the capacity of the various economic agents to manage 
the crisis and so exit and recover in a positive way. The design of 
appropriate institutions is crucial to crisis management and achiev-
ing a positive exit from the crisis. The literature on the cyclicality of 
crises is wide and identifi es diff erent types of cycles, especially long 
cycles unfolding over the course of decades or centuries. Kondratiev 
extensively studied this type, identifying the famous long waves 
of about 50 years’ duration alternating between periods of high 
 structural growth and periods of relatively slow growth.
Kondratiev wrote his theory in 1925 (The Major Economic Cycles) 
by reconstructing the long history of capitalism from its begin-
ning, using English price series over the period 1770 to 1920. 
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Schumpeter in Business Cycles (1939) suggested naming the long 
waves, ‘Kondratiev waves’, in honour of the economist who dis-
covered them. Schumpeter not only recognised the importance of 
Kondratiev’s work but also deepened his analysis by suggesting an 
interpretation of the diff erent phases in the cycles. Schumpeter did 
this according to technical progress (unlike preceding explanations 
focusing on monetary factors) or more precisely, to the emergence of 
a radical innovation: a disruptive technology that was accompanied 
by numerous smaller innovations and technologies. The fi rst wave 
identifi ed by Kondratiev, over the period 1790 to 1850 is that of the 
cotton textile, iron and vapour machine; the second wave covers the 
period 1850 to about 1900 and is characterised by railways and steel; 
and the third wave, from 1900 to 1940 is that of electrical, chemical 
and automobile industries. Studies have been carried out identifying 
new waves – such as that of oil, automobile and mass production – 
in the second half of the twentieth century lasting up to the age of 
information technologies in the 1980s and 1990s, leaving room for a 
new phase after the current crisis.
Of course, the idea that the long- term evolution of economies 
follows cycles of a specifi c time period can be criticised, both because 
the identifi cation of cycles is somehow arbitrary (given the many 
determinants of growth one can identify diff erent cycles depending 
on which determinant is more strongly followed), and because the 
fact that some cycles have been identifi ed in the past does not neces-
sarily imply that a new and similar cycle will follow in the future.
However, the economic cycles defi ned above can be explained 
by specifi c developments. In particular, the diff erent phases corre-
spond to diff erent technological developments, while the cultural, 
social and political contexts interact with these developments in a 
systemic way that slow them down or spur them on. For instance, 
a declining phase started in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
specifi cally in 1848 when a new wave of revolutions occurred across 
Europe (although they ended with the authoritarian leadership of 
Napoleon III), and with the fi rst global confl ict, the Crimean War, 
which occurred in 1856. The recession phase between 1869 and 1883 
is characterised not only by events such as Italy’s unifi cation, the 
creation of the German Reich, the American Civil War and the Meiji 
revolution in Japan, but also by the colonial wars through which 
Great Britain and France built their colonial empires. Thus in the 
crisis years the new world was being prepared.
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   14 25/03/2011   15:50
 The 2008 fi nancial crisis 15
After the First World War the new world advanced in the midst 
of numerous tensions; the last empires ended, often in dramatic 
revolutions, while nation states consolidated, generally establishing 
authoritarian regimes that were in very delicate equilibrium. The 
defeated countries paid a high price for the War. The great crisis 
culminated in 1929, signalling a return to protectionism and even 
autarchic tendencies in many countries. The failure of the League of 
Nations is the clearest sign of a lack of collaboration and coordina-
tion between countries. All these aspects prepared the ground for a 
new global confl ict, the catastrophic Second World War. After these 
long global confl icts, the world ended up strongly and neatly divided 
into two and supported by a very delicate equilibrium in which two 
coherent systems competed and excluded a third one, called the 
Third World, which was characterised by underdevelopment and 
chronic poverty.
A Brief History of Crises from 1945 to the 1980s
Between 1945 and the 1980s/the Western world consisted of the US, 
Canada, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand. The Eastern world was centred around the USSR and its 
satellites, with diffi  cult relationships with China. The frontier between 
the two worlds was sometimes torn or kept in place through suff ering, 
as shown by the Vietnam War or the construction of the Berlin Wall.
The implosion of the Soviet Union and the transition of many 
communist countries to market economies put an end to the politi-
cal system underlying the global economy, opening the way for 
globalisation. Globalisation can be represented by a game in which 
all players play against each other, including new important players 
such as China, India, Brazil and the new Russia, so much so that it 
has become necessary to establish new rules for the game. The old 
rules of the game were established during the Second World War, at 
Bretton Woods. After the disasters caused by the bad rules estab-
lished after the First World War, European countries had learned 
from their mistakes and had new ideas in mind.
Keynes, although very young at the time, criticised the rules estab-
lished at the end of the First World War and reached a new conclusion 
in his books The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), Tract on 
Monetary Reform (1923) and numerous articles, some of which were 
published in Essays in Persuasion (1931). These thoughts led him to 
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argue that after a very strong discontinuity such as a war economy it 
is not useful to try and go back to the situation that existed before, 
but rather it is preferable to concentrate on sustaining the economic 
recovery on the basis of the new conditions. In 1936 Keynes pub-
lished The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money and in 
1940, How to Pay for the War. In that later small tract, he proposed 
compulsory savings and rationing in order to prevent infl ation during 
the war. He was at the Treasury during the war and after thinking 
about measures to accompany the war economy, he focused on eco-
nomic measures for the post- war era. He formulated a proposal for 
‘Bancor’, an international clearing union, in 1943 and led the British 
delegation at the international conference of Bretton Woods in 1944. 
But his proposal was rejected in favour of a US alternative which 
pegged currencies against the dollar and the dollar against gold.
Keynes stressed the importance both of an active role for the 
state in order to sustain investments, and of international economic 
liberalisation, regulated by international institutions that could 
manage the transformation of economies. This illuminated view, 
however, was not accepted at Bretton Woods, where the American 
economy imposed itself at the centre of the new world order, with its 
currency becoming the basis of the international monetary system. 
Keynes had highlighted the risks of such a system and had proposed 
the Bancor as a composite currency made up of diff erent national 
currencies, which would support an international monetary system 
based on the stability of numerous economies rather than just one.
The strength of the American economy was supported by a 
complex public action which had at its core the military industrial 
complex. Strong public spending on defence contributed to domestic 
demand, but the largest contribution stemmed from mass consump-
tion and low imports. For many years this system was consolidated 
by the decreasing costs of both raw material and labour, labour 
supply being fed by immigration, in a regime of fi xed exchange 
rates and capital costs. European countries started to grow again in 
the mid- 1950s, thanks to the opening of the internal market within 
the European trade area and the common external tariff  protecting 
European economies from US imports. This situation continued 
through the economic boom of the early 1960s.
All European countries, winners and losers, had to reconstruct 
their economies after World War Two. France, the UK, Belgium 
and the Netherlands also had to end the colonialism which had 
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supported their growth prior to the war but was explosed as unsus-
tainable in the new world order. Exports increasingly contributed to 
growth, fi rst within the European Economic Community and then 
in the US. Japan experienced a similar history of reconstruction and 
economic boom.
After the 1960s, however, the international economic system 
based on a strong American economy started to show weaknesses as 
the American economy showed signs of diffi  culties, primarily linked 
to the Korean and Vietnam wars. In 1971 President Nixon declared 
the end of the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The long crisis 
that has taken place from the 1970s to the 1990s, although with ups 
and downs, reveals the incapacity of the system to forecast and regu-
late a structural break. The end of the fi xed exchange rates regime, 
the steep rise in oil and raw material prices, the endless labour con-
fl icts, and the high infl ation that for years accompanied economic 
stagnation shows again, as pointed out by Keynes, the need to iden-
tify adequate levels of governance in the world economy ahead of 
changes that aff ect its political organisation.
In the 1980s and 1990s only Europe attempted an institutional 
innovation, by deepening regional integration to elevate collective 
action beyond national borders. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
political unilateralism was relaunched, dubbed the Washington 
Consensus, whereby the American economy remained the point of 
reference for the world order and pushed for trade opening without 
rules, and the rapid transformation of some countries (both in transi-
tion and emerging) to support the integration of the world economy.
The new economic phase was characterised by the collapse of com-
munist countries, due to the inability of centrally- planned economies 
to adapt to the increasing complexity of the world economic frame-
work. The bipolar world established from the middle of the twenti-
eth century gradually faded in the two decades from 1990 to 2010, 
leaving room for a multipolar world characterised by a return of the 
Asian powers, particularly India and China. Their increasing infl u-
ence is primarily due to their rapid economic growth and the rapid 
increase in their wealth (Figure 1.1). The infl uence of the US has 
reduced in relative terms to these returning powers, but also due to 
internal problems, highlighted in the next section. After a very diffi  -
cult transition, Russia also reasserted itself as a world power, mainly 
thanks to its large reserves of natural resources, especially oil and gas.
However, as shown by Figure 1.2, the growth of China as a world 
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power, in terms of percentage of world GDP, is striking, since it is 
rapidly reaching the absolute level of US GDP (through not yet per 
capita) and seems to be heading for even higher levels.
The lack of adjustments to the world economic system has trans-
lated into various crises, that Krugman identifi es in his 2008 book 
The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. He recalls 
the warning signals of crises in several Latin American countries, 
the Japanese and then the Asian crises, and the speculative waves 
that have characterised the world economy over the last years of the 
1990s; all these were tremors that signalled the arrival of a bigger 
earthquake, the fi nancial crisis of 2008. The earthquake is having 
devastating eff ects because the epicentre is no longer at the margin of 
the world economy, but at its centre, in the US economy.
Macroeconomic Evolution since the 1980s
World economic growth has experienced ups and downs since the 
1980s, and the analysis of this data helps understand the roots of the 
crisis. Figure 1.3 shows real GDP growth for the whole world, for 
advanced economies and emerging and developing countries, since 
1980.
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Figure 1.1  Real GDP growth of BRIC and advanced countries (per 
cent per year), 1980 to 2014
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From the mid- 1980s there was a fi rst economic cycle characterised 
by growth up to 1988, followed by a reduction of GDP growth rates 
up to the period 1992–94. A new cycle followed, of accelerating 
growth up to 2000 (apart from the 1997 crisis), followed by a sudden 
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Figure 1.2 GDP level in PPP as per cent of world GDP, 1992 to 2014
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reduction in growth rates in 2001, and then the actual development 
phase until the current crisis. The most striking point illustrated 
by the graph is the growing distance between emerging countries’ 
growth rates and those of advanced countries. The latter have been 
hit most by the actual crisis – almost going back to the growth 
levels of the early 1980s. World growth is now entirely driven by the 
 economies of emerging countries.
The growing tendency of emerging countries to drive world 
growth can be dated back to the early 1990s. This corresponds to 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end, from a political point of view, 
of bipolarism. This divergence of growth levels accelerated with the 
Twin Towers disaster on 11 September 2001.
Between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers 
disaster many changes occured. The EU deepened integration 
with economic monetary union (EMU) and the adoption of a 
common currency between some core member countries. Notice 
that European countries thereby follow Keynes’s advice to base 
their international monetary system on a composite currency, 
making stability the responsibility of all members. Much has been 
written on the euro, some of it arguing before found that the new 
currency would be too weak. After its inception it was revealed 
to be too strong. In any case, during the current crisis the single 
currency has demonstrated an element of stability and strength for 
European countries, even though the EU is still adjusting to the 
most important enlargement of its history (in terms of number of 
new members) after the entry of Central and Eastern European 
countries. Of course, EMU is not without problems (Bianchi and 
Labory, 2009).
Such enlargement has consolidated the growth of these transi-
tional countries, not only attracting capital from abroad, but also 
acquiring productive activities from Western Europe, thereby gen-
erating export economies that could restructure, and allowing the 
extension of supply networks across the whole European continent. 
The rapid growth of Eastern European countries also spurred the 
growth of Western ones, so that benefi ts were shared among old and 
new members of the EU.
In other emerging countries, growth was very high during the 
whole period, especially in China. At the end of the 1970s, modernis-
ers led by Deng Xsiao Ping were governing the country. The policy 
of Deng was characterised as opening China to the world economy, 
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   20 25/03/2011   15:50
 The 2008 fi nancial crisis 21
attracting capital fi rst to the area of Shenzhen between Canton and 
Hong Kong (see case study in Chapter 5), then to the rest of the 
country, basing industrial development on low cost production for 
the external market. This opening also produced demands from 
the Chinese people for greater democracy that the regime did not 
sustain. The Tienanmen Square slaughter (4 June 1989) made clear 
that the only way to support economic opening without correspond-
ing political reforms is via high growth rates and growing incomes 
for the population.
Since then China has kept high growth rates, delivered by export 
growth and internal demand growth, together with a competitive 
exchange rate. In the same years, all Asian countries, except for 
Japan, experienced rapid growth, barring the 1997 crisis that hit 
Japan fi rst and foremost.
The Japanese economy has experienced extraordinary develop-
ment since 1945 based on exports and internal demand. In the 1990s, 
while internal demand growth slowed, exports were also increasingly 
rivalled by producers in other Asian countries. A stop- and- go policy 
was implemented to reduce infl ation but also to support exports. A 
speculative bubble was created, which shifted savings and invest-
ments towards activities with high short- term returns, at the expense 
of productive investments.
Eventually the speculative bubble exploded, showing that the 
stock and housing markets’ values did not correspond to the real 
economy. This resulted in huge losses for families and the banking 
sector, followed by a fall in consumption and industrial investment 
and a growing public defi cit. The government intervened with strong 
public spending to sustain the economy, increasing the budget defi cit 
to more than 10 per cent of GDP and debt to 100 per cent of GDP. 
On top of this massive action was necessary to save the banking 
system. The Japanese economy only recovered in 2003, thanks to 
growth in world demand and growing exports (of intermediary 
goods) to the Chinese economy. However, the Japanese economy 
still contains weaknesses, with an ageing population and mature 
industrial system.
This ‘Japanese disease’ has been somewhat shared in other Asian 
countries where rapid economic development led to the World Bank 
in the mid- 1990s defi ning them as ‘the Far East miracle’. In 1997 the 
devaluation of the Thai currency started a period of fi nancial crisis 
that extended across the whole of Asia. Thailand is a small economy 
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and very open; so much so that its recession is rapidly extended to 
the other Asian countries.
On the other side of the world, Latin America also experienced 
big trouble, again mainly due to the disparity between the fi nancial 
and productive spheres of the economy. Indeed, the search for short- 
term profi ts led the fi nancial markets to expand rapidly, attracting 
all savings, at the expense of the productive sectors which had diffi  -
culties in investing and the government sector, where defi cits tended 
to increase. This disparity grew up to the point where fi nancial assets 
became too overvalued and the bubble exploded.
In the same manner, in many Latin American countries, after 
the so- called Decada Perdida (last decade) of dominant dictator-
ships, strong infl ationary tendencies strained the return to democ-
racy. Argentina and the other countries pegged their currencies 
to the dollar, reducing infl ation but also bringing drastic internal 
restructuring that forced less competitive fi rms out of the market 
in a regime of open trade and an overvalued currency. Here again a 
bubble in the fi nancial and housing markets shifted resources away 
from the productive sectors and brought about a new dramatic crisis 
in 2001.
In these years the only two countries that did not experience a 
major crisis were China and India. India implemented a series of 
reforms during the 1990s that allowed the country to consolidate 
growth based on the development of a competitive industrial sector, 
supported by investment in human capital.
Various crises took place elsewhere in the world with similar 
scenarios to Latin America – namely the development of economic 
weakness accelerated by fi nancial and housing booms that crowded 
out sectors of the real economy. To this one must add the rigidity 
of international institutions which only believed in and applied the 
so- called Washington Consensus. They forced a drastic reduction 
in the role of the state, with a reduction in interest rates, so that 
the capacity of the government to intervene with monetary policy 
was reduced. Alongside this was privatisation and liberalisation of 
fi nancial markets as part of trade opening and the rapid integration 
of capital markets. These events were considered local, ignoring their 
systematic nature across diff erent parts of the world – until they also 
hit the American economy.
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THE 2008 CRISIS
The Problems of the American Economy
The signals of the productive crisis in the US are not recent at all. 
From 1991, the US balance of payments continuously and dra-
matically worsened, especially relative to that of China. While the 
balance of payments was worsening, unemployment went down 
from 8 to 4 per cent, essentially due to the development of tertiary 
activities that were seen as necessary for the American economy.
While new fi rms were created in new sectors, a new fi nancial sector 
was also developing that brought these fi rms to very high capitalisa-
tion levels. The housing market also expanded greatly, with capi-
talisation eff ects similar to those of the fi nancial sector. Financial 
innovations sustained a booming market and the rapid development 
of the tertiary sector, but this experienced its fi rst internal crisis in 
2000. The 11 September tragedy hit a US economy already in crisis, 
with the unemployment rate rapidly rising to above 6 per cent.
The extraordinary growth of the fi nancial sector was not sup-
ported by a growth in the real economy, however, but by an enor-
mous increase in public and private debt. In the private sector 
economy, the negative eff ects of stagnating wages on internal 
demand was compensated for by the encouragement of household 
debt. Innovations in the fi nancial sector allowed fi nancial institu-
tions to propose and sustain loans to a growing part of the popu-
lation, even those in the lowest income classes. Internal demand 
continued to experience a sustained growth (from $4.5 trillion in 
1988, to $6.1 trillion in 1998 and $8.3 trillion in 2008, according to 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics) while wages in the lowest and 
middle income classes stagnated.3
In the public sector of the US economy, after 2001 there was a 
strong recovery thanks to the boom in public military spending. 
Although the dollar was undervalued, the balance of payments kept 
worsening because of rising imports of consumer goods from Asia. 
In a situation characterised by cheap money and the boom of new 
fi nancial instruments, the housing market continued to boom, incor-
porating the infl ationary expectations of an increasingly indebted 
economy, in both the public and the private sectors.
This mix allowed the economy to expand thanks to the contriving 
reductions in interest rates and ever rising public debt. In October 
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2008 the federal public defi cit reached $10.5 trillion, rising by an 
average of $3.88 billion per day. This corresponds to public debt of 
$34,555 per capita.
The fi nancial sector meanwhile literally boomed, as shown in Figure 
1.4 by the evolution of US corporate profi ts in the last ten years. The 
trend of corporate profi ts in the fi nancial sector has clearly grown, 
more than doubling from about $150 billion in 1998 to almost $350 
billion in 2009, while the trend of corporate profi ts in the manufactur-
ing sector has slightly decreased, from the same level as the fi nancial 
sector in 1998 ($150 billion) to $136 billion in 2009 (Figure 1.4).
The recovery of the American economy after 2001 was therefore 
partly based on traditional public intervention in the defence sector. 
However, this increased public debt without a corresponding devel-
opment in the industrial sector which faced international competi-
tion but saw fi nancial resources dragged away, either to the military 
sector or to the fi nancial and housing sectors. Indeed, investment in 
manufacturing fell in the mid- 1990s and has remained at lower levels 
from 2000 onwards (Figure 1.5).
Chinese imports have been compensated by Chinese authorities 
purchasing American public debt, thereby allowing a dangerous 
liaison between the two economies. The result is a disaster. The 
American economy needs to be restructured, with a redefi nition of 
the role of the state in order to base growth on healthy foundations. 
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Barack Obama won the 2008 election with a programme aimed at 
redefi ning the rules of the game between the state and the market, 
boosting internal demand through a variety of state action and 
forcing a restructuring of industry.
One of these actions was the proposal to re- establish the principles 
of the Glass- Steagall Act of 1933 (repeated in 1999), which imposed 
the separation of bank types according to their business (investment 
and commercial banks). After a lengthy process, banking reform 
measures were fi nally adopted in the US in July 2010. Known as 
the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, the measures have been presented as the fi rst major fi nancial 
reforms since the Great Depression, and include new regulation on 
 derivatives, regulatory oversight and large banks in diffi  culties.
A Brief Chronology of the Crisis
The key date in the collapse of US fi nancial institutions was 14 
September 2008, the day when Lehman Brothers, one of the most 
important and prestigious American fi nancial institutions, went 
bankrupt. However, signs of the weakening of economic and fi nan-
cial structures had already emerged before this.
On 7 February 2007, the US Senate strongly recalled the high 
risk of subprimes; on 22 February 2007, HSBC Bank USA declared 
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about $10 billion in losses; and New Century Financial went bank-
rupt on 2 April 2007, American Home Mortgage on 6 August and 
Ameriquest on 31 August. Already in that period, companies with 
hedge funds were quickly selling or liquidating them. In the mean-
time, most banking institutions in the US announced huge losses. In 
October 2007 the crisis reached Germany and the UK with a crisis in 
those banks most exposed in the US. In mid- November, Goldman 
Sachs estimated that potential losses from the subprime crisis were 
already more than $400 billion.
On 20 November Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation) and Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage 
Association) announced signifi cant losses. These institutions had 
been two pillars of the American dream. Fannie Mae was created 
by Roosevelt in 1938 so that American families could aff ord to 
buy a house using loans provided by a private company but with 
government support (quoted on the stock exchange since 1968). 
Similarly, Freddie Mac was created in 1975 to guarantee the savings 
of American families.
On 5 December 2007, the Attorney General of New York sum-
moned large investment banks as part of the inquiry into the 
securitisation of subprime mortgages. While fi nancial institutions 
announced enormous losses one after the other, President Bush, who 
had long thought that the crisis would be temporary, had to present 
a plan to avoid the foreclosure of more than one million homes. 
Only at that point in time did the Fed implement its fi rst action to 
reduce interest rates and launch new credit lines for banks at risk. 
On 14 December 2007, fi ve central banks, the US Federal Reserve, 
the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the national 
Banks of Canada and Switzerland announced that they would make 
$110 billion available in loans.
In January 2008, major banking institutions announced huge 
losses. These included Bear Sterns, Citigroup and Lehman Brothers 
in the US, but also Société Générale and UBS in Europe. On 13 
February 2008, President Bush signed the Economic Stimulus Act 
providing $100 billion dollars of tax abatements and $50 billion of 
investment incentives. Northern Rock (a UK bank) was nationalised 
by the British government only three days later. On 7 March the Fed 
provided a further $200 billion to rescue banks while the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York agreed to guarantee the operations of 
fi nancial institutions and arranged the acquisition by JP Morgan 
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Chase of Bear Sterns, the fi fth largest US bank, for $240 million. A 
year before, the bank was valued at $18 billion.
Among the many events it is worth noting that on 14 March 2008 
Carlyle Capital, the fund linked to the fi nancial institutions managed 
by the Bush family, went into default – a similar destiny to that of 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a fund investing in high 
risk activities that had gone bankrupt in 1998 and was subsequently 
rescued. Created in 1994, LTCM had, among its board members 
Myron Scholes and Robert Merton who had received the Nobel 
prize for their studies on derivatives.
While the Fed and the Bank of England continued injecting 
liquidity into the system, Indy Mac went bankrupt on 13 July 
2008, while Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were rescued. On 30 
July 2008, President Bush promulgated the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act in order to allow the government to directly inter-
vene in the banking system. On 5 September the Bush government 
nationalised Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. On 14 September 2008, 
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt with $768 billion in debt. Merill 
Lynch seemed to be heading for the same end but Bank of America 
acquired it. On 16 and 17 September the government intervened to 
rescue AIG, the leader of the US insurance sector.
Meanwhile, central banks all around the world were injecting 
liquidity to sustain the fi nancial system. The Paulson Plan was 
announced in the US on 19 September, creating a $700 billion fund 
to remove illiquid assets, but the US Congress rejected the plan. On 1 
October Congress approved the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act that allowed the government to buy bad assets up to the limit of 
the fund.
In autumn EU governments were unable to agree on a common 
fund to tackle the crisis, and had to make do with the coordination 
of national eff orts. Each European government decided on excep-
tional measures to rescue or sustain its national fi nancial sector. 
Thus the Dutch government nationalised two major banks, Fortis 
and ABN Amro, in October 2008. Financial markets in Russia, 
Ukraine, Romania and Iceland were closed.
On 4 November 2008, Barack Obama won the US elections. On 14 
February 2009, the US Congress approved an act aimed at sustain-
ing the economy by injecting a further $787 billion into the banking 
system. On 30 March a plan to relaunch Chrysler was approved, 
while GM was subsequently rescued.
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Among all the declarations that were made during these dramatic 
days, the most embarrassing was that of Alan Greenspan who, in 
October 2008, in front of a Congress Commission, admitted ‘a fl aw’ 
in his ideology according to which markets always self- regulate. 
Many eminent scholars, such as Joe Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, had 
argued before the crisis that this ‘hyper- liberalism’ could not go on 
forever. The crisis seemed to put an end to it, but the diffi  culties in 
adopting measures to redefi ne the regulation of the fi nancial sector, 
at national and global levels, has shown that the transitional phase 
towards a new order might be long and diffi  cult.
REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS
Fiscal Stimulus Measures
Every country in the world implemented a fi scal stimulus package 
to face the crisis and soften its impact on fi nancial and productive 
sectors. The total amount of stimulus in the G- 20 countries was 
about $692 billion in 2009 (IMF, 2009), or about 1.1 per cent of 
global GDP. The IMF called for a stimulus of about 2 per cent of 
global GDP for the world economy to be eff ectively relaunched.4 
Within the global eff ort to stimulate economies, some countries 
have made bigger eff orts. Thus the US implemented 39 per cent of 
the global stimulus, China 13 per cent and Japan 10 per cent. At the 
national level, the US stimulus amounted to about 1.9 per cent of 
GDP, in China it amounted to about 2.1 per cent, and in Japan to 
1.4 per cent. All other countries’ stimuli amounted to about 1 per 
cent of their GDP.
The composition of the stimuli has varied greatly across countries: 
some countries have almost entirely devoted their stimulus to tax 
cuts (Brazil, Russia and the UK), while others have almost entirely 
devoted it to spending (Argentina, China and India). Others have 
implemented it in several waves, like Germany which fi rst imple-
mented tax cuts and then spending. The major part of stimulus is 
generally composed of spending. Most countries concentrated the 
stimulus eff ort fi rst on public consumption and transfers and second 
on investment. While China’s stimulus was essentially focused on 
investment, Italy’s had no investment at all and is the country with 
the largest tax cut on labour.
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   28 25/03/2011   15:50
 The 2008 fi nancial crisis 29
At the time of writing in January 2010 these fi scal stimulus eff orts 
seem to have been eff ective in avoiding a recession across the whole 
world economy, although at the cost of worsening public defi cits. 
Parallel to, or as part of these stimulus measures, some countries have 
had to implement some sort of national champions policy whereby 
some domestic fi rms, especially in the fi nancial sector, have been 
rescued. There are positive signs that growth rates are recovering, 
and the main discussions on macroeconomic policies are now about 
the timing and extent of exit strategies and the coordination of poli-
cies among G- 20 countries (Pisani- Ferry and Von Weizsäcker, 2010).
The European Union as a Prototype of International Coordination?
The fi nancial crisis has aff ected Europe at a time of deep transfor-
mation. The fall of the Berlin Wall is the symbolic element of this 
transformation. The collapse of communist regimes opened the way 
to a very deep re- organisation of those economies and of the politi-
cal life of those countries. At the same time, older members of the 
EU were pushing forward the fi nal phases of economic integration, 
namely economic and monetary union, but were also refl ecting on 
the political identity of the EU: adopting symbols and making it 
more  democratic (through the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties).
The transition of Central and Eastern European countries towards 
market economies created many internal crises. Economic transition 
can be made rapidly but the transformation of society takes more 
time. Economic growth rates have varied across Central and Eastern 
European countries, both in levels and in times, but overall the 
trend has been that of a dramatic increase throughout the 1990s and 
through the fi rst decade of the new century. However, all Central 
and Eastern European countries have been badly hit by the fi nancial 
crisis.
All Central and Eastern European countries benefi ted, from the 
1990s onwards, from their anchoring to the EU and from EU aid 
and support. Multinationals invested heavily in these countries, 
building factories that would serve the markets of the old member 
states but take advantage of the lower labour costs in the Eastern 
part of Europe. Among the multinationals investing in Central and 
Eastern European countries most are German. In fact, industrial 
production in these countries appears to be correlated with that of 
Germany.
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Table 1.1 shows the eff ects of the crisis on GDP growth in EU 
countries. The eurozone has been particularly hard hit by the crisis, 
as well as the UK. However, while the UK was expected to recover in 
2011 to pre- crisis levels, the eurozone will take more time to recover. 
Of the four major European countries in terms of size – namely 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK – France appears to have been 
the least hard hit by the crisis, with the lowest growth level dipping 
to −2.4 per cent in absolute value compared to −4 and −5 per cent at 
the peak of the recession in Germany, Italy and the UK.
In addition, some of the EU economies that were booming prior 
to the crisis have also been the hardest hit. This is true in particular 
Table 1.1 Real GDP in EU countries, 2000–11, per cent change
2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011
Austria 3.7 2.5 2 −3.8 0.3 1.6
Belgium 3.8 2.2 1 −3.2 0 1.6
Bulgaria 5.4 6.2 6 −6.5 −2.5 2
Czech Rep. 3.6 6.3 2.7 −4.3 1.3 2.5
Denmark 3.5 2.4 −1.2 −2.4 0.9 1.5
Estonia 10 9.4 −3.6 −14 −2.6 1.4
Finland 5.1 2.8 1 −6.4 0.9 2
France 4.1 1.9 0.3 −2.4 0.9 1.8
Germany 3.2 0.7 1.2 −5.3 0.3 1.5
Greece 4.5 2.9 2.9 −0.8 −0.1 0.7
Hungary 5.2 4 0.6 −6.7 −0.9 3.2
Ireland 9.4 6.2 −3 −7.5 −2.5 1
Italy 3.7 0.7 −1 −5.1 0.2 0.7
Luxembourg 8.4 5.2 0.7 −4.8 −0.2 2.6
Netherlands 3.9 2 2 −4.2 0.7 0.6
Poland 4.3 3.6 4.9 1 2.2 4
Portugal 3.9 0.9 0 −3 0.4 0.9
Romania 2.9 4.1 7.1 −8.5 0.5 4.6
Slovakia 1.4 6.5 6.4 −4.7 3.7 5.2
Slovenia 4.4 4.3 3.5 −4.7 0.6 3.8
Spain 5.1 3.6 0.9 −3.8 −0.7 0.9
Sweden 4.4 3.3 −0.2 −4.8 1.2 2.5
UK 3.9 2.2 0.7 −4.4 0.9 2.5
EU 4 2.2 1 −4.2 0.5 1.8
Source: IMF Data Mapper, www.imf.org.
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for Ireland, where GDP shrank by 8 per cent almost at the depth 
of the recession. All economies, including Ireland, were expected to 
recover from 2011 to pre- crisis levels, although Ireland is likely to 
settle down at lower GDP growth levels.
From 2000 all new EU member countries seemed to stabilise at 
high growth levels, without many ups and downs before the crisis. 
These new members are also expected to recover and to continue 
driving EU GDP growth during the 2010–20 decade. However, dis-
parities are better outlined by looking at GDP per capita, as shown 
in Table 1.2.
While in 2000 GDP per capita ranged from about 80 to 135 
(excluding Luxembourg with a very high level of 244), in 2007, 
after enlargement, GDP per capita ranged from 38 to 146 (276 for 
Luxembourg), showing a sharp increase in economic disparities 
within the EU. Between 2000 and 2007, most new members saw their 
GDP per capita rise substantially, while it remained roughly con-
stant for old members, apart from a few exceptions such as Ireland 
(rising from 131 to 146) and Italy (dropping from 117 to 101).
These disparities have created diffi  culties for the coordination of 
economic policies within the EU. These diffi  culties were clearly appar-
ent in the lead up to the crisis. First was the failure of the ratifi cation 
of the European Constitution (with the French and Dutch voting ‘no’ 
in their respective referenda in 2005) and the very diffi  cult ratifi ca-
tion of the simplifi ed Lisbon Treaty between 2007 and 2009. Second 
was the failure of the Lisbon Strategy that was announced in 2000 
and aimed to make the EU the most competitive knowledge- based 
economy by the year 2010. This objective failed mainly because of the 
lack of coordination between national eff orts and the lack of politi-
cal commitment to the strategy (Bianchi and Labory, 2010). Third 
were the diffi  culties of the countries of the eurozone and the lack of 
 coordination of fi scal policies within it (Bianchi and Labory, 2009).
The EU’s diffi  culties reached a peak between February and May 
2010 during the Greek crisis, which was ostensibly caused by the 
lack of solidarity in the eurozone: budget defi cits and debt in the 
eurozone are among the lowest in the world, and certainly much 
lower than in the US or Japan. The main problem that the Greek 
crisis revealed was the lack of solidarity among eurozone members- 
highlighting the credibility problems of a monetary union without 
an underlying unifi ed nation- state. This lack of credibility led to 
strong speculative attacks. Greece has a large defi cit (−13.6 per cent 
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in 2009), but Ireland has a higher one (−14.3 per cent); yet Ireland 
has not been subject to speculative attack.
The solution to this crisis is not to increase the budget constraints 
in the eurozone by strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact even 
more. The main lesson from this crisis is that in order for EMU to 
be more credible, member states have to show more solidarity and 
better coordination of their eff orts. The fact that EU countries took 
Table 1.2 GDP per capita in the EU, EU- 27 = 100
Country 2000 2007
Euro Area (15 countries) 114 110
Austria 131 123
Belgium 126 115
Bulgaria 28 40
Cyprus 89 93
Czech Republic 68 80
Denmark 131 121
Estonia 45 70
Finland 117 118
France 115 108
Germany 118 116
Greece 84 92
Hungary 55 62
Ireland 131 147
Italy 117 103
Latvia 37 56
Lithuania 39 59
Luxembourg 245 275
Malta 84 77
Netherlands 134 133
Poland 48 54
Portugal 81 78
Romania 26 42
Slovakia 50 67
Slovenia 80 88
Spain 97 105
Sweden 128 125
United Kingdom 119 117
Source: Eurostat (www.eurostat.eu)
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more than two months to react to the Greek crisis only illustrates this 
lack of solidarity. The best way of guaranteeing better coordination 
may be to set up a European institution, the function of which would 
be the governance of the eurozone and ensuring the macroeconomic 
stability of the EU. Increasing the European budget and making it 
more independent (by lowering member states’ contributions and 
increasing independent sources such as a European carbon tax) 
may constitute a useful fi rst step in this direction by allowing more 
European public goods to be provided. More political  commitment 
to the integration process is needed in Europe.
Economic disparities within the EU may be a major impediment 
for this, all the more so as they are coupled with political and social 
disparities. New EU members, still in transition to democratic and 
market economy regimes, are experiencing deep transformations 
not only from an economic point of view, but also from a social, 
political and cultural point of view. These countries have to assert 
their new national identities before being able to truly commit to 
 supranational and external constraints.
In this context, only a two- speed or multi- speed EU is possible, 
whereby some countries deepen some aspect of integration because 
they are ready and have similar development levels, while others stay 
out with the possibility to opt in at later stages (Prodi, 2008).
THE GAP BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL AND THE 
PRODUCTIVE SPHERES OF THE ECONOMY
An important eff ect of the crisis for our purpose is the revelation of 
the increasing gap between the fi nancial and the productive sectors 
of the economy. The fi nancial sector has boomed in an extraordi-
nary manner over the last 20 to 30 years, without a corresponding 
expansion in the productive sphere. Thus trade on the global foreign 
exchange market is estimated at $3.2 trillion per day, according to 
the Bank of International Settlements (78th annual report, 2008). 
Between 2001 and 2007, foreign exchange turnover increased by an 
average of 18 per cent per annum, to an average daily level of $3.5 
trillion, which is a bit less than Germany’s annual GDP. The ratio 
of the volume of transactions on foreign exchange markets to world 
trade in goods and services was 2 to 1 in 1973, 10 to 1 in 1981, 50 
to 1 in 1992 and 100 to 1 in 2006 (El Mouhoud and Plihon, 2009). 
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Financial fl ows are unevenly distributed across the world, with 
developed countries and especially the US concentrating a large part 
of these fl ows. Among fi rms, multinationals have been the dominant 
actors in terms of fi nancial fl ows, with their global volume of mergers 
and acquisitions representing $85 billion in 1991, $558 billion in 1998 
and $45 trillion in 2007 (according to Thomson Financial).
Financial investors are essentially institutional investors (pension, 
insurance and mutual funds), private equity funds, hedge funds, 
exchange traded funds and sovereign wealth funds. In 2008, these 
funds represented a value of $90 trillion, down 17 per cent from the 
previous year, due to the fi nancial crisis.
Investors, especially in private equity and hedge funds, tend to 
push fi rms to increase profi ts in the short term. These profi ts are not 
invested but distributed to shareholders and to managers in the form 
of very high remuneration. Crotty (2003) estimates that well over 
half of the cash fl ow of non- fi nancial corporations went to fi nancial 
markets (in interest and dividends for example) from 1984 to 2000 
(peaking at about 74 per cent in 1998). This percentage had been 30 
per cent from the mid- 1960s to the end of the 1970s.
The very high remuneration provided to managers in all fi rms, but 
especially in fi nancial fi rms, has raised an important debate during 
this fi nancial crisis. Excessive pay in the fi nancial sector has been 
blamed for further pushing actors to pursue short- term profi ts at 
the expense of long- term investments. Not only do these investors 
push fi rms to short- termism, but they also create shareholdings 
that are no longer dispersed, as in the 1970s. Models of corporate 
governance have shown the advantages of the separation of owner-
ship and control, and the superiority of a model of capitalism based 
on fi rms listed on stock exchanges rather than linked with banks or 
governments for corporate control and fi nancial resources, but these 
models rely on the dispersion of shareholding. This dispersion no 
longer exists and owners have a strong infl uence over managers.
Countries where family ownership or state ownership does prevail, 
such as in Italy, appear to have suff ered less during the crisis, at least 
in terms of the level of public spending needed to rescue fi nancial 
organisations. In addition, at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
excluding the exceptional period of fi nancial crisis, the US Treasury 
has spent six times more than the French state rescuing savings 
banks’, and the Japanese state 20 times more to saving large banks.
Hence the European model of capitalism, based predominantly 
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on family and state ownership (in Italy and France) or bank- fi rm 
relationships (in Germany), might have been benefi cial during the 
crisis. In any case, the crisis made it clear that the advantages and 
disadvantages of various forms of capitalism must be re- examined in 
the current context.
In 2008 it was clear that the crisis in the subprime market in the 
US and the associated liquidity squeeze was having a major impact 
on fi nancial institutions and banks in many countries. Bear Stearns 
had been taken over by JP Morgan with the help of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, while other banks were trying to raise 
assets to cover their important losses: Citibank and Merrill Lynch 
in the US; UBS, Crédit Suisse, Barclays and Société Générale in the 
EU. In the UK, Northern Rock was nationalised. In Germany, IKB 
and Sachsenbank (state- owned) were rescued. At the end of 2008, 
the crisis deepened, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
The crisis has revealed important problems in the model of corpo-
rate governance based on the separation of ownership and control, as 
shown by the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Finance (OECD, 
2009). Expansive monetary policies in many countries drove inter-
est rates down, inducing investors to look for yields without paying 
due attention to risks. Competition in the banking sector increased 
and led banks to create new fi nancial assets, such as derivatives, or 
to move to housing fi nance. Kirkpatrick (2009, p. 7) argues that 
‘despite the importance given to risk management by regulators and 
corporate governance principles, the fi nancial turmoil has revealed 
severe shortcomings in practices both in internal management and 
in the role of the board in overseeing risk management systems at a 
number of banks’. Alan Greenspan himself recognised the problem 
when talking to the US Congress in October 2008: ‘Those of us who 
looked to the self- interest of lending institutions, to protect share-
holders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief’.
This problem appears to have been mainly driven by incen-
tive systems in fi nancial organisations that encouraged risk- taking 
without appropriate control by their boards. For instance, infor-
mation about exposure to risks did not always reach boards and in 
some cases boards did not adequately monitor the activities of man-
agers. The OECD has called for more transparent and monitored 
risk- management (OECD, 2009).
More generally, in fi nancial and non- fi nancial fi rms managers had 
too much infl uence on the design of incentive schemes and could 
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manipulate them to their advantage without revealing all relevant 
information to their board. The OECD therefore has recommended 
more transparency and control in corporate governance, and a 
greater link between pay and performance in particular.
This lack of control of management has led to short- termist atti-
tudes in many fi rms – such as looking for short- term profi ts and 
taking high risks – which has served the interests of managers at the 
expense of shareholders.
CONCLUSIONS
This crisis has arisen principally because of a lack of adjustment to 
economic and political changes occurring over the last 20 to 30 years; 
this globalisation has meant the end of the bipolar world in favour of 
multipolarity. The weaknesses of the US economy, fi rst and foremost 
its enormous public debt, increasingly became vulnerabilities as its 
hegemony weakened in the face of other powers, primarily China, 
which started to fi nance the American economy. In the meantime, 
multipolarity has led to increased intensity in worldwide competi-
tion, with new rivals in markets forcing structural adjustment, quality 
improvement and internationalisation in fi rms in many sectors.
However, the dominant economic regulatory model of the last 20 
to 30 years, neo- liberalism, has led to an increasing gap between the 
fi nancial and productive spheres of the economy that has impeded 
the necessary structural adjustment, since resources were dragged 
away from the productive spheres of the economy to the fi nancial 
and housing sectors.
These drawbacks of neo- liberalism primarily stem from its false 
assertion that markets self- regulate. Rather, as already stressed 
by Keynes, activities in the productive sphere can be hampered by 
excessive speculation in the fi nancial sphere. The fi nancial sector 
experienced important innovations from the 1980s onwards, invent-
ing new fi nancial products such as derivatives that led to high risk- 
taking that eventually went against the interests of shareholders and 
fi rms themselves.
The second fl aw in the neo- liberal model is its short- term perspec-
tive. In fact, an important point revealed by the crisis is the impor-
tance of the long- term perspective. Firms in all sectors have to make 
long- term investments in order to improve processes and products. 
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When short- term interests prevail, these investments are no longer 
made, putting at risk both the long- term survival of the fi rm and the 
employees’ jobs.
Long- term and broad perspectives are also necessary from a 
macroeconomic policy point of view. Reducing interest rates is a 
short- term policy that looks for immediate stabilisation; assuming 
that markets will self- regulate means failing to consider the long- 
term consequences of present tendencies. Many economists looking 
at the longer term, predicted that the US situation could not go on 
forever as it was.
In fact, we argue that globalisation, defi ned as the acceleration of 
world exchange and trade in the last 20 to 30 years, is essentially due 
to a geopolitical change in the world order, namely the emergence 
of new economic powers. This has had a profound impact on the 
world’s competitive context. Firms in all sectors have had to adjust 
to the implicit or real threat from competitors located in China or in 
India, or in other emerging countries. The prevailing neo- liberal reg-
ulatory model turned out to be incapable of helping this  adjustment, 
leading to crisis.
Microeconomic and macroeconomic phenomena are deeply 
related in the economic system. A macroeconomic policy using 
savings to favour investment in capital in the industrial sector 
has an important impact on industry. A macroeconomic policy 
sustaining increasing indebtedness inevitably also has a cost in 
the long- term. This is the third main point revealed by the crisis. 
Bailey and Cowling (2006) deepen this analysis by arguing that a 
capitalism dominated by giant corporations inevitably leads to the 
predominance of their interests at the expense of the interests of 
communities. They argue that large corporations shape consumers’ 
behaviour by raising their propensity to consume at the expense of 
savings, thereby exacerbating ‘short- termist pressures in capitalism, 
in that present needs become more pressing, and making allowance 
for future needs can be postponed’ (Bailey and Cowling, 2006, p. 
6). This is likely to have contributed to the vulnerability of the US 
economy prior to the crisis, by feeding the dynamics of increasing 
indebtedness. According to these authors, short- term macro poli-
cies are not suffi  cient to reduce this vulnerability. Instead, industrial 
policy that regulates the power of giant corporations, by ensuring 
that the interests of society are taken into account alongside those of 
elites in corporations, is key to avoid ‘strategic failures’.
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Indeed, the analysis of industry matters and is essential to design 
proper economic policies. By industry we mean the capacity to 
organise production in order to produce goods and services. Industry 
in our view therefore comprises all productive sectors, manufactur-
ing and services together. As argued by Adam Smith, the wealth of 
nations is primarily determined by the division of labour that allows 
industrial development. The structure and characteristics of the 
various sectors of the economy are key determinants of the wealth of 
nations, as well as the interrelations between sectors. Thus a business 
services sector has developed extensively in the last decades, largely 
because manufacturing fi rms were changing their organisation of 
production and outsourced many functions that became business 
services. Financial services are key to the development of the 
economy, since they provide the necessary capital to make invest-
ment, whether in new factories or in research and development that 
can lead to technological progress, process and product innovations. 
But the rapid development of the fi nancial sector without any con-
nection to the ‘real’ sectors of the economy should be regarded with 
suspicion and closely monitored.
It may be that a closer look at the separate evolution of the fi nan-
cial and real sectors would have raised doubts and pointed to some 
necessary controls and regulations; but not when the dominant ide-
ology is that markets are bright enough to self- regulate and serve the 
interests of the most deserving.
In our view the analysis of productive industry (all sectors, and 
not just manufacturing) and the design of industrial policy as a 
long- term vision of industrial development are essential in order to 
avoid crises and, above all, to ensure growth (using ‘growth’ in the 
wide sense of classical economists). This is what we aim to show in 
the remaining chapters of this book. In particular, the next chapter 
provides a more detailed analysis of the deeper roots of the crisis, 
namely the structural adjustments required by the changing world 
context of globalisation.
NOTES
1. This chapter constitutes an extension of our refl ections published in Bianchi P., 
Labory S. (2010).
2. Many prominent scholars stress this need for change. Among these, Stiglitz (2010) 
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claims that ‘I believe that markets lie at the heart of every successful economy but 
that markets do not work well on their own’. In Europe, Fitoussi and Laurent 
(2008) also argue against laissez- faire and propose a political economy project 
that would support sustainable economic development, in the sense of taking 
future generations into account.
3. http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_405.htm
4. Http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/surveys/so/2008/INT122908.htm
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   39 25/03/2011   15:50
40
2.  Globalisation and the 
organisation of production
The deep, structural roots of the current crisis lie in the extensive 
transformations that have occurred in the world since the 1970s. 
Many factors have brought about deep economic, political and 
social changes – primarily the oil crisis and the fi rst crisis of the inter-
national monetary system, but also the end of dollar convertibility 
into gold, which showed the fi rst sign of weakness of the world order 
based on bipolarism, and a crisis of the mass production system.
Consumers started to ask for more varieties of products, more 
care for the environment and more room for leisure, in contrast to 
the mentality of the post- war period up to the 1960s that was based 
on hard work for later pleasures. This has contributed, at least 
in developed countries, to a booming services sector. Advertising 
by large corporations has also certainly infl uenced this changing 
 propensity to consume (Bailey and Cowling, 2006).
Demography in developed countries has started to change with 
ageing populations, implying new social security needs and new 
 products and services, especially those related to health care and 
leisure. Technological progress has brought about important 
changes  in the potential to produce and to live, from the elec-
tronics revolution to the development of the information society. 
Globalisation is often claimed to be a phenomenon arising in the 
1990s, but it started much earlier and has been determined by many 
economic,  technological, political and social changes.
From the 1980s onwards, the fi nancial sector started to develop 
rapidly, and above all in a manner distinct from the real economy, 
as new fi nancial instruments were invented enabling huge fi nancial 
gains from speculation. The enabling regulatory system was a factor 
in its development.
The nature and extent of the market has therefore fundamen-
tally changed. For goods, the extent of the market has increasingly 
become global, with fi rms trying to sell their products all over the 
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world and organising production on a global scale to reap cost 
reductions wherever possible. The market for services has grown 
tremendously: services for individuals (many relating to an ageing 
population); business services as fi rms outsourced many functions to 
raise productivity; and fi nancial services.
In the fi rst chapter, we argued that the crisis is essentially due to 
a lack of adjustment to deep structural transformations related to 
the emergence of new economic and political powers (the multipolar 
world), and the dominant regulatory model not addressing these 
structural changes. In this chapter, we analyse these structural 
transformations in more depth and show that they imply, especially 
after the crisis, a need for industrial policy as a long- term vision of 
development.
THE GLOBALISATION PHENOMENON
Globalisation has dramatically increased the extent of the market 
and profoundly changed the organisation of production and the 
nature of work. The phenomenon can be illustrated by the graph 
in Figure 2.1, showing the growth in world exports in selected years 
from 1948 to 2008.
Table 2.1 not only shows the dramatic increase in world exports 
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Figure 2.1 World merchandise exports, $ billions
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occurring since 1948, and especially since the 1980s (acceleration 
which led to the defi nition of the term globalisation), but also the 
change in participation of the various regions and countries in the 
world. US export share has gone down by two-thirds between 1948 
and 2008, from 21.7 per cent of world exports in 1948 to 8.2 per cent 
in 2008. This shows the decline of the economic hegemony of the 
USA.
Europe’s share in world exports increases over the period, but 
the number of countries included in the calculation changes con-
siderably, due to enlargements of the EEC and EU. Among the 
biggest European countries, Germany increases its share, as do 
France (slightly) and the UK, while Italy sees its share signifi cantly 
falling during the period. The share of Asia, and China in particu-
lar, rises dramatically from the 1990s onwards. The rise in China 
relative to other developed countries is also illustrated in Figures 
2.2 and 2.3.
Table 2.1  World merchandise exports by regions and selected econ-
omies, 1948–2008
1948 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2008
World ($ bns) 59 84 157 579 1838 3676 7377 15 717
of which Shares %
USA 21.7 18.8 14.9 12.3 11.2 12.6 9.8 8.2
Latin America 11.3 9.7 6.4 4.3 4.4 3.0 3.0 3.8
Europei 35.1 39.4 47.8 50.9 43.5 45.4 45.9 41.0
 Germany 1.4 5.3 9.3 11.6 9.2 10.3 10.2 9.3
 France 3.4 4.8 5.2 6.3 5.2 6.0 5.3 3.9
 Italy 11.3 9.0 7.8 5.1 4.0 4.6 4.1 3.4
 UK 1.8 1.8 3.2 3.8 5.0 4.9 4.1 2.9
Africa 7.3 6.5 5.7 4.8 4.5 2.5 2.4 3.5
Middle East 2.0 2.7 3.2 4.1 6.8 3.5 4.1 6.5
Asia 14.0 13.4 12.5 14.9 19.1 26.1 26.2 27.7
 China 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 2.5 5.9 9.1
 Japan 0.4 1.5 3.5 6.4 8.0 9.9 6.4 5.0
 India 2.2 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1
Notes: i: fi gures refer to EEC(6) in 1963, EEC(9) in 1973, EEC(10) in 1983, EU(12) 
in 1993, EU(25) in 2003 and EU(27) in 2008.
Source: WTO.
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China is a leading exporter but imports relatively less. In fact, the 
US remains the biggest importing region. This could denote increas-
ing productive internationalisation of US fi rms who export some 
production phases abroad and re- import them to fi nish assembly in 
the home market.
The globalisation phenomenon can therefore be defi ned as a 
rapid rise in world patterns of trade in goods and services. The 
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Figure 2.2 Exports of goods, $ billions
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determinants of such a phenomenon are numerous and of diff erent 
types: political determinants include the end of the bipolar world; 
economic factors include the globalisation of fi nancial markets 
which have eased mergers and acquisitions worldwide and the 
setting- up of branches or factories in diff erent parts of the world; 
technological factors primarily include the information and com-
munications technology revolution which has drastically reduced 
communication and coordination costs across frontiers, as well as 
lowering transport costs.
This phenomenon is not new. It started at the beginning of the 
twentieth century with the reduction of transport costs, allowing 
large fi rms to become multinational fi rms. It has spread through-
out the twentieth century, and accelerated in the last quarter of 
the century due to economic, fi nancial, technological and also 
political factors, as the progressive liberalisation of world trade 
among  developed countries allowed multinational fi rms to expand 
abroad.
THE ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION AND 
‘UNBUNDLING’
Globalisation tends to be understood in the literature as meaning 
the acceleration of international trade in the last 20 to 30 years. The 
previous section has indeed illustrated the rapid growth of trade in 
fi nished goods and services. However, what is new in the last part of 
the twentieth century, and has important implications in terms of 
industrial policy, is the growth in the trade of intermediary products. 
This implies a considerable change in production organisation and a 
boom in productive internationalisation.
Productive internationalisation means the creation of ‘global 
value chains’ (Gereffi  , 1994) whereby phases of the production 
process are carried out by diff erent suppliers, and also by diff erent 
countries (as the various suppliers are located in diff erent countries 
of the world). Firms therefore ‘unbundle’ the production process, 
with a variety of suppliers producing parts or components for diff er-
ent phases of the production process. Whereas in the past such sup-
pliers were located near the factory, global value chains suppliers are 
located all over the world. Some phases are made in countries where 
labour costs are low, others in countries where there are advantages 
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such as high skills and competences, which make it more profi table 
to produce there.
The model of the large, vertically integrated fi rm analysed by 
Chandler in the fi rst part of the twentieth century is no longer domi-
nant, although it still exists in some sectors. From the 1970s onwards 
this model experienced many tensions and problems, including 
workers’ unrest, high costs and competition from new rivals such 
as Japanese producers. Progressively, organisations moved towards 
diff erent models. European fi rms fi rst tended to prefer automation 
(in the 1980s), to be less dependent on workers. However, excessive 
automation rapidly revealed its limits, especially in the ability of the 
fi rm to adapt to frequent changes in the competitive environment. In 
the 1990s, the prevailing tendency of fi rms appeared to be outsourc-
ing and de- verticalisation, coupled with the adoption of new work 
practices.
A number of empirical studies have assessed these organisational 
changes, using survey data which asks employees and managers how 
the fi rm’s organisation is changing – for example the extent of team 
work, the number of hierarchical layers, compensation mechanisms, 
and responsibilities of the individual employee and of his team. The 
results of these surveys, mainly carried out in the US (Black and 
Lynch, 1997), in the UK (Osterman, 1994) and France (Greenan and 
Mairesse, 1999) is that fi rms tend to organise as ‘network- forms’, 
whereby hierarchical levels are few, horizontal departments and divi-
sions are in intense communication, and teams do not only execute 
tasks but are involved in problem- solving. This requires workers at 
all levels to possess higher analytical skills, in addition to communi-
cation skills, as they have to intensively interact with colleagues in 
their teams and elsewhere in the fi rm. Higher skilled employees are 
favoured by these transformations since tasks for core workers with 
long- term contracts are increasingly non- routine, while unskilled 
workers are left behind: either laid off  because unskilled tasks (gener-
ally, services such as cleaning) are outsourced to outside suppliers or 
realised in- house but by hiring unskilled employees on short- term or 
other fl exible contracts.
Outsourcing tended to increase in the 1990s, some functions or 
tasks being externalised to outside suppliers in order to reduce the 
fi rm’s direct costs and increase specialisation. Initially, these suppli-
ers were predominantly located near the factory. However, through-
out the 1990s suppliers were increasingly chosen in foreign countries, 
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so that global value chains were rapidly created. Global value chains 
do not apply to all sectors and all fi rms, but the evidence is that they 
are spreading (Baldwin, 2006; Sturgeon, 2008).
The main factors behind their creation are falling transport costs, 
the IT revolution that makes coordination and communication 
easier and less costly even over long distances, and the emergence of 
new countries with potentially extensive markets. Firms established 
factories in these countries in order to access their booming markets 
and may have then discovered the feasibility and profi tability of 
exploiting low labour costs and other local advantages – leading to 
the siting of specifi c phases of the production process there.
Although information technologies have reduced communication 
costs within fi rms organised over such a large geographical space, 
transport costs and coordination costs are still high, especially in 
an organisation based on global value chains. As a result, the theo-
retical underpinnings of these chains is not easy to establish (and 
has not yet been fully established, as stressed by Sturgeon, 2008). 
More importantly, the state of research on global value chains is 
not advanced enough to predict whether these chains will continue 
spreading and become a dominant production organisation mode, 
or whether they will remain limited to particular fi rms in particular 
sectors (Baldwin, 2006). Scholars like Yeung (2006) seem to take 
their spread for granted.
What the evidence does seem to show is that the phenomenon 
is having deep consequences on international trade, production 
organisation and fi rm competition and, as we argue here, on 
industrial policy as well. Baldwin (2006) makes a very interesting 
analysis in this respect. He defi nes production internationalisa-
tion as an ‘unbundling’, whereby phases of the production process 
are separated, bundled diff erently and carried out by diff erent 
fi rms. Baldwin distinguishes two unbundlings. The fi rst unbundling 
occurred between the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth 
century, as it became no longer necessary to produce goods close to 
consumers, thereby allowing the spatial separation of factories and 
consumers. Trade was consequently primarily of fi nished goods, and 
international competition was primarily between fi rms and sectors in 
diff erent countries.
The second unbundling occurred from the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, as it was no longer necessary to perform phases 
of the production process near each other. Falling transport costs 
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and the IT revolution (the factors favouring globalisation) allowed 
the spatial separation of fi rms’ divisions and offi  ces. According to 
Baldwin (2006), this unbundling occurred fi rst in Asia because the 
distance between low cost countries and high cost ones was smaller. 
Thus Japanese fi rms started unbundling to low- cost Asian countries 
in the 1980s. In contrast, European fi rms intensifi ed production 
internationalisation, especially after the transition of Central and 
Eastern European countries to market economies, moving phases 
of their production processes to the new EU member countries. 
Even Italian industrial districts moved phases of their production 
processes to new EU members, especially Romania, thereby deeply 
changing the nature of those districts. Industrial districts had been 
based on the separation of production phases between small and 
medium fi rms (SMEs) located in the territory, the whole being coor-
dinated essentially thanks to shared local values and norms (social 
capital). Some SMEs in some districts have had to close down, 
replaced by lower cost foreign suppliers. Some district entrepreneurs 
even went to lower cost countries such as Romania in order to set up 
fi rms there that could continue to supply the district.
Off shoring has mainly aff ected the tasks previously carried out by 
so- called ‘conto- terzisti’, small fi rms focusing on simple operational 
tasks. It is these fi rms that are now disappearing from districts in 
Italy – only the leading fi rms or fi rms dealing with higher added 
value phases remain. The evolution of industrial districts seen in 
Italy is twofold: either an SME in the district grows to become the 
leader dealing with markets and governing the global value chain, 
or the district’s fi rms ally with one or more leaders originating from 
outside the district to gain access to markets. In the fi rst case, a 
district fi rm becomes the leader of the global value chain (Labory, 
2002); in the second case, the district fi rms become parts of global 
value chains governed by external fi rms.
Trade no longer consists exclusively of fi nished goods but increas-
ingly of parts and components – intermediary products. Baldwin 
argues, together with eminent scholars of international economics, 
that this requires a new paradigm for the discipline, where fi rms are 
no longer considered black boxes but where production organisation 
has to be analysed in detail to provide insights on the reasons for, 
and the eff ects of unbundling. This phenomenon also has important 
consequences in terms of industrial economics and policy. If com-
petition occurs at the level of tasks, policies aiming at promoting 
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specifi c fi rms or sectors may not be adequate. ‘Picking winners’ is 
even more diffi  cult and useless.
Some fi rms in declining sectors may be doing well because they 
exploit good unbundling opportunities. Thus the fact that Italian 
industrial districts have managed to survive despite the crisis and 
the intense competition from emerging countries may be explained 
by their capacity to exploit unbundling opportunities: maintain-
ing certain tasks in Italy while other tasks are internationalised. 
Generally, the production phases that remain in Italy tend to 
be those with greater intangible assets, such as creativity, design 
 competence, know- how and craft competencies (Bacci, 2004).
The type of tasks that are delocalised are not homogeneous or spe-
cifi c. Some of them are routine tasks, requiring low skills, but some 
also require high skills: for example, the entrepreneur going abroad 
to set up a specialised factory. Some design may be carried out 
abroad but not all. Technicians dealing with producing machines are 
needed for phases done both at home and abroad.
Some scholars have analysed the type of tasks that tend to be 
 off shored. They have found the diff erence is not according to the 
level of skills (highly skilled or unskilled labour), but according to 
whether tasks are routine or not. A great part of routine tasks can 
be codifi ed and therefore transferred to diff erent employees. Non- 
routine tasks not only involve analytical skills but also experience 
and tacit knowledge, which are both accumulated through time 
and may be transferable to new employees but at a high cost and 
only after some time. This does not mean that developed countries 
should only specialise in non- tradable tasks such as hairdressing and 
medical treatments. Producing goods for both the home market and 
foreign markets is also important for a country’s economic develop-
ment. However, the ability to learn and raise the knowledge content 
of goods, and the intensity of the use of intangible assets in the pro-
duction process, are likely to make tasks less tradable. It is therefore 
diffi  cult to establish with certainty which phases will be delocalised 
and which will not.
The unpredictability of the way in which production processes 
are unbundled and internationally organised is a key feature of the 
second unbundling process stressed by Baldwin (2006). This implies 
that the winners and losers of globalisation are extremely diffi  cult to 
predict.
In order to gain greater insights into global value chains, more 
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analyses of production processes and production organisation are 
needed in the economic literature, particularly industrial economics, 
in part because ‘economists really do not understand the “glue” that 
binds production stages and tasks together’ (Baldwin, 2006, p. 29).
We maintain that the way the production process is organised 
depends on the relative intensity of tangible and intangible assets in 
the diff erent tasks. This means not only workers’ productivity, but 
also human capital – the knowledge and competencies they bring 
in the production process which may not be reproducible abroad. 
Intangible assets also include collective knowledge creation capaci-
ties that depend not only on workers’ individual human capital 
but also on their social capital, their shared norms and values that 
make communication and collective knowledge creation easier. The 
embeddedness of a production process in a local territory may also 
determine the extent of production internationalisation, since even 
simple tasks such as handicraft to produce leather bags may achieve 
higher quality and value if realised in a territory with a long histori-
cal tradition in such production. This seems to explain the interest 
of the highest luxury brand names such as Dior, Gucci and LVMH 
in the local production capacity of Tuscany’s leather districts. Their 
know- how rooted in local culture and history appears not to be 
reproducible abroad, given the capacity of local workers to produce 
high- quality products (Bacci et al., 2010; Bacci, 2004). Bailey et al. 
(2010a) argue that this creates a ‘place leadership’ that can be main-
tained and extended through regional policy.
Global value chains make the traditional comparative advantage 
paradigm even less relevant in explaining patterns of country spe-
cialisation and for guiding policymaking. Indeed, the comparative 
advantage paradigm does not explain or even consider the frag-
mentation of the value chain in diff erent parts of the world. Rather, 
comparative advantages have a diff erent nature and are based on the 
capacity to create and govern global value chains.
In fact, the way global value chains are governed, as well as the 
place of domestic fi rms in them, should determine industrial policy. 
A country in which fi rms govern global value chains, shifting pro-
duction according to labour costs or labour skills, will have a diff er-
ent industrial policy from a country where fi rms represent the weak 
links in the chain, being exposed to sudden delocalisation of the lead 
fi rm to other, more cost- eff ective places.
China is a place where most multinationals locate part of their 
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production process nowadays, but the Chinese government is taking 
steps so that Chinese fi rms also become able to govern global value 
chains. India is also a place where multinationals locate, especially 
and increasingly to fi nd highly- skilled but cheap labour, but the 
Indian government is not so active in supporting Indian fi rms to 
become leaders of global value chains themselves (problems in India 
include slow bureaucracy and continually- changing government 
programmes to support manufacturing such as chip manufacturing).
Baldwin (2006) rightly highlighted that the EU policy of promot-
ing IT skills at all costs to face globalisation was wrong. Indian and 
Chinese workers are as able as European workers to learn those 
skills, and it is unlikely that these will be the less delocalised tasks. 
As we have argued elsewhere (Bianchi and Labory, 2004; Bianchi 
and Labory, 2006a, b), the knowledge- based economy constitutes 
an important phenomenon that has to be taken into account in poli-
cymaking. However, it does not mean a diff usion of IT across the 
whole society. Rather it denotes a rise in the depth of the knowledge 
content of products, which can be related to globalisation and the 
growing importance of intangible assets for countries’ economic 
growth and development.
In the globalised economy, where competition is worldwide and 
intense, increasing the knowledge content of products appears to be 
a winning strategy. This requires new work practices, with workers 
made more responsible and more fl exible to adapt to changes, 
suggest improvements, and resolve problems. Employees at all levels 
must be able to learn, to accumulate knowledge and to collectively 
create knowledge. Employees with these learning skills are probably 
less likely to see their tasks off shored. The literature on global value 
chains and fi rms’ internationalisation shows that human capital 
is a key element in fi rms’ decisions to locate in specifi c areas. In 
the knowledge- based economy, the search for skilled labour and 
 creative capacities are central to fi rms’ strategies.
Industrial policy must therefore look at the provision of intan-
gible assets for fi rms: human capital, knowledge and innovation 
capacity, but also cultural and historical heritage that may at least 
infl uence consumers’ perceptions of goods produced locally (again, 
this relates to the concept of place leadership put forward by Bailey 
et al., 2010a). However, not all tasks face the competition of similar 
task- providers in other countries. In particular, many services are 
not tradable because they require face- to- face interaction and the 
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simultaneous presence of the consumer and the producer in the same 
place: hairdressing or restaurant meals cannot be produced at dif-
ferent places, and the same is true for many services such as home 
cleaning, repair services, entertainment and leisure activities.
UNBUNDLING AND THE GROWING 
IMPORTANCE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS
Globalisation is intimately linked to the growing importance of 
intangible assets in economies and the knowledge- based economy. 
This is not taken to mean an economy where information and com-
munication technologies operate a ‘revolution’, but an economy 
where knowledge becomes a key strategic factor. The growing 
importance of intangible assets has been much discussed, especially 
in the European Commission and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2003a, b; OECD, 
2001a, b; Eurostat, 2001). Their growing importance is due to many 
factors that can be summarised in the concept of globalisation.
As we have already argued, globalisation translates into increased 
competition. Products have therefore become more complex, in the 
sense of having higher knowledge content. They are updated more 
often, and consequently contain greater innovation and incorporate 
services. This means that the knowledge- intensive phases of produc-
tion (or pre- and post- manufacturing phase), namely the research 
and development phase and the marketing, distribution and after 
sales service phases, have become more important.
Since the knowledge content of goods is nowadays higher and 
pre- manufacturing the key to value creation, activities carried out 
at these phases are very important. At the fi rm level, such changes 
have meant new forms of governance and organisation, which in 
fact are changes in the division of labour. In order to produce goods 
with high knowledge content, knowledge management within the 
fi rm becomes the key for increasing market power. In this context, 
the manufacturing phases of the production process become rela-
tively less important in terms of value creation. Their only aim is to 
produce at lowest possible cost without leaking strategic  information 
about the products.
The second unbundling may therefore be linked to the rising 
importance of intangible assets for fi rms, and of knowledge, since 
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it can be considered the common denominator of intangible assets 
(which are primarily human capital, capacity to communicate and 
create knowledge, and social and organisational capital). Given 
falling transport and communication costs, phases of the production 
process that are less strategic in terms of value creation and more 
based on codifi ed and easily communicated knowledge and compe-
tencies can be performed in any place. Hence manufacturing phases 
such as production of parts or components, or whole assemblies, 
have been delocalised to low cost countries.
Pre- manufacturing phases, namely research and development, 
and post- manufacturing phases, namely commercialisation and 
marketing, tend to remain in the main country of the fi rm. In this 
interpretation, the tasks that will remain in developed countries 
following the second unbundling will tend to be those that contain 
more intangible assets.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ‘TERRITORY’
When competition primarily arises between tasks rather than 
between fi rms or sectors, the ‘territory’ takes on increasing impor-
tance. In this context, territories should not be seen as simple 
administrative units but as places where values and distinctive 
 competencies and skills should be intensifi ed.
One industrial policy action that has been much discussed and 
also concretely implemented in the last ten to 20 years is the promo-
tion of fi rm clusters, especially clusters of SMEs. SMEs have become 
increasingly important as a result of globalisation for two major 
reasons. The fi rst reason is that they have been able to take part 
in internationalisation, sometimes governing global value chains 
themselves, as in some industrial districts, or becoming part of 
global value chains governed by external fi rms. The second reason 
is the growing importance of intangible assets, and knowledge in 
particular, that make size less important and allows SMEs to be 
competitive. SMEs are as able to create knowledge as large fi rms, at 
least regarding non- basic knowledge creations that do not require 
huge research facilities that SMEs could not aff ord.
Clusters have been promoted because networks seem to be 
increasingly important in the globalised economy. As previously 
mentioned, not only have SME clusters such as industrial districts 
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shown to be potentially successful production organisation modes, 
but also large fi rms have tended to decentralise internally and organ-
ise as networks both within the fi rm (the diff erent units that consti-
tute the fi rm are in network relationships rather than hierarchical 
ones) and outside the fi rm, setting up network relationships with 
suppliers which are often SMEs.
In fact, networks are eff ective forms of governance in the intan-
gible economy because they allow the creation and exploitation of 
complementarities between holders of intangible assets in produc-
tion processes. Unlike physical capital, intangible capital is dif-
fi cult to acquire. In particular, individuals holding human capital 
(intelligence, the ability to communicate and so on) and knowledge 
(acquired through education and personal experience) cannot be 
bought and owned by the fi rm. Complementarities have to be 
created so that incentives are provided to individuals to work within 
the fi rm, through remuneration and human capital improvements 
prospects.
Networks are not only created between fi rms but also between 
fi rms and institutions, such as government agencies, local authori-
ties, research centres and universities. In the globalised, knowledge- 
based economy, knowledge and intangible assets are constantly 
created and renewed and therefore universities take an active role 
in the production process. Not only do they transmit knowledge to 
students and hence human capital useful for industrial development, 
but they also take an active part in knowledge creation, through 
close relationships with fi rms. Hence networks are key in the glo-
balised economy, and a focus of industrial development policies has 
been to favour the creation of clusters.
In the context of the new trade in tasks, territories are important 
because task specialisation primarily arises at that level. Setting up 
clusters where fi rms from any sector and any competency can form 
may not be useful. Rather, favouring the specialisation of clusters, in 
the sense of task specialisation, may be a useful element of industrial 
policy. This task specialisation may happen through a self- selection 
process, driven by market transactions and historical relations, as in 
the case of many industrial districts in Italy.
Task specialisation may also be induced from above. The French 
policy of ‘competitiveness poles’ is an example. The central govern-
ment has made large funds available to fi nance the development of 
local clusters particularly in, but not limited to, high tech sectors. 
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Firms, research centres, universities and local governments have 
gathered to identify the products or tasks on which a cluster could 
be built and could competitively expand. The resulting poles are 
sometimes specialised in specifi c sectors but also on specifi c tasks 
or generic technologies at the research and development level of 
the production process: for example, Lyon Biopole is specialised 
in vaccines and diagnostics, while the ‘aerospace valley’ covers the 
aerospace sector but specialises in specifi c phases of the production 
process (research and development and manufacturing).
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBALISED, 
KNOWLEDGE- BASED ECONOMY
Trade in tasks therefore appears to strengthen the role of the local or 
regional level in industrial development. Trade in tasks implies that 
is it possible to spur industrial development by strengthening the 
relationship between innovation promotion, growing productivity 
and fi rms’ networks.
Task specialisation cannot be successfully imposed from above, 
from a central government that would apply fashionable strate-
gies or recipes already experienced in other contexts. Rather it 
depends on the more or less recent history of a territory: on its social 
structure, the economic organisation and the eff ective institutional 
governance of the territory. These factors combine and produce a 
unique situation that has to be governed with specifi c instruments 
which may have been used in other contexts but which have to be 
applied with originality and creativity as well as an awareness that 
instruments operate within a specifi c social structure, made up of 
diff erent people, many of whom are able to express a public ‘voice’.
The objective of policymakers is not to apply abstract models, 
but to defi ne a holistic approach to development which combines 
available resources with social objectives, sometimes learning from 
policies experienced in other contexts. When the social objective is to 
increase citizens’ quality of life, the process by which this objective is 
reached is as important as the fi nal result.
In this context, SME policies can have diff erent meanings: either 
acting as an instrument of technology diff usion that can imply rising 
productivity of the whole system, or as actions allowing the largest 
possible share of people to take part in economic activity.
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It is necessary to adopt a complex vision of development, where 
various actions combine in a long- term perspective to stimulate 
diff erent agents to follow a balanced and sustainable development 
path. Economic dynamics are rooted in social and local contexts, 
and become active when the context is open and able to adopt 
innovations without disaggregating. It is not enough to identify the 
strength of local communities as a common language and shared 
values and norms. The dynamic aspects of social structures must 
be able to transform without losing identity but rather by adapting 
identity and governance.
In this sense, this complexity must also involve the defi nition of 
industrial policies that can accelerate economic innovation processes 
without breaking the social context. The need for this unitary vision 
of industrial policy interventions also give rise to the consideration 
of the side eff ects of specifi c actions on other parts of the economy, 
as well as a refl ection on the links existing between diff erent parts of 
the economic structure.
For example, a policy promoting the development of high tech 
small fi rms simultaneously requires actions that favour a general 
increase in the productivity of the economic system, and the support 
of SME networks that allow collaboration and synergies between 
diff erent SMEs in shared innovation projects. Without these simul-
taneous actions, the risk is that SME policy has a limited impact on 
the local economy: a policy favouring spin- off s from universities will 
not impact regional development if the regional industrial context 
does not have suffi  cient endogenous development capacity.
Thus an Italian region like Emilia- Romagna, in which industrial 
development was previously based primarily on industrial districts 
in traditional sectors, has completely redefi ned its industrial develop-
ment policy by putting these two aspects together: favouring inno-
vation and spin- off s from universities, and favouring the adoption 
of new technologies by existing fi rms by creating a dense regional 
network between local authorities, fi rms, universities and other 
research centres. Without this global long- term vision, clustering 
policies incur the risk of being limited in scope, which does not help 
exploit the tendencies for structural change stimulated by opening 
processes.
Clustering can be a solution to the risk inherent in any innovative 
activity, given that the vulnerability of small fi rms is compensated by 
the variety of fi rms located in the territory. However, various factors 
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determine the growth of such small, innovative fi rms and all factors 
have to be taken into account in cluster policies. In addition, cluster 
policies should also pay attention to the diff usion of the knowledge 
created in clusters to the rest of the economy. Otherwise the policy 
risks generating a gap between protected high tech zones and zones 
dominated by fi rms with low competitiveness relative to foreign 
competitors. The policy also risks generating a gap between social 
groups in dynamic clusters and other social groups somehow left 
behind, as shown by the recent social unrest in the high tech cluster 
of Grenoble in France.
Clustering policies should also pay attention to competition. A 
risk indeed exists that local collusions or new dominant concen-
trations could be favoured in order to face international competi-
tion. Today, monopolies of information and knowledge can create 
 dramatic constraints in industrial development and democracy.
We believe therefore that task specialisation primarily arises from 
the bottom, namely from local or regional contexts, but which have 
to be combined in a wider frame at national or higher levels (as in 
the EU). The delicate interconnection between local experiences can 
only function if, simultaneously, conditions of eff ective competition 
are created. In other words the actions favouring the growth of new 
competitive subjects must take into account the international com-
petition context and curb the monopolistic temptations of economic 
actors.
GLOBALISATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: 
NATIONAL OR REGIONAL LEVELS?
Since the 1990s, many scholars have argued that the region is increas-
ingly the right level for industrial policy action because industrial devel-
opment is generated from the bottom. Globalisation has reinforced 
this view. In an increasingly integrated world, the role of the nation 
state is being reduced as more and more regulation and global public 
goods have to be defi ned at an international level. This is increasing the 
role of international institutions. The primary role in spurring indus-
trial development comes from the regions, given that agglomerations 
and exchange of knowledge, as well as interest coherence, primarily 
arise at that level. Ohmae (1995) argued that the region- state is the 
appropriate level of economic analysis in a globalised and borderless 
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world. The liberal policies implemented by most national states before 
the 2008 crisis reinforced this view, with the nation state appearing to 
surrender control by letting the market play by itself.
However, this view ignores the polity in which fi rms operate, still 
defi ned mainly at the national level.
Many industries have strong networks of SMEs but they are also 
dominated by major transnational fi rms that control global distribu-
tion markets (fi lm and fashion, for example). The strategies of large 
fi rms often shape the strategies of small innovative fi rms in their 
industry networks, the regions in which they are located, and in local 
labour markets (Bailey and Cowling, 2006).
Policies aimed at upgrading SMEs and creating poles of excellence 
are useful in the open, knowledge- based economy but they also need 
to take account of the power relations that are established between 
fi rms. Networks are often dominated by large fi rms or other specifi c 
players that may take disproportionate advantage of the network’s 
activity and then leave it further down the line.
Multinationals have considerable power to shape local labour 
markets. They defi ne strategies at all government levels to construct 
markets and production spaces that reduce risk and increase their 
profi ts. Firms, especially large ones but also smaller ones, lobby 
governments to infl uence policymaking and public good provision 
in their favour.
Firms are not only private agents; they are also political agents 
and this should be taken into consideration in discussions of indus-
trial and economic development. Adam Smith recognised this politi-
cal nature of entrepreneurs. The degree and nature of competition 
is not only determined by purely economic factors (such as industry 
structure and fi rm strategies) but also by political factors such as 
their ability to infl uence market regulation.
As we previously highlighted, policies that have tried to foster 
industrial development, especially at the regional level, have aimed 
at favouring networks and the emergence of clusters. Universities are 
also playing a role by promoting the creation of spin- off s that ascribe 
value to university research. However, these policies should also aim 
at favouring fi rm growth and the emergence of leaders. Otherwise 
regional experiences will not make an impact on the wider regional 
economy. Universities have a role in favouring fi rm creation in high 
tech sectors, but they also have a fundamental role in providing an 
appropriately trained labour force for fi rms.
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A key issue concerning the relative roles of the national and the 
regional level in industrial development is therefore determining the 
appropriate dimension of regional clusters or poles of excellence. In 
other words, determining the critical mass for development needed 
to make an impact in the long term on the region’s and the nation’s 
industrial and economic development. Local experiences in develop-
ment are useful, but they risk remaining local and of short duration 
if they are not included in a wider regional or national strategy of 
industrial development that favours the exploitation of synergies, 
be they spillovers or externalities, between territories. Territories 
which pool experience may also be stronger in the face of dominant 
business players that may otherwise infl uence local markets in inap-
propriate ways.
Small may be beautiful, but sometimes the only solution for small 
fi rms to survive is to ally with large fi rms on which they become 
increasingly dependent and which may appropriate their knowledge 
and capacities to leave them as simple task executors. Small fi rms 
based in territories that are backed by strong industrial development 
policies may have greater power in international networks, especially 
when access to fi nance is made more diffi  cult by the high internation-
alisation of the fi nancial sector.
The profi ts gained by fi rms as a result of off shoring production 
phases to low- cost countries, have not been invested in long- term 
growth perspectives, but have been given to shareholders in the form 
of dividends (Millberg and Winkler, 2009). In fact, the pressure of the 
fi nancial sector on the real sector to increase share profi ts may have 
even pushed fi rms’ productive internationalisation in some cases, 
since these operations allowed an easy and rapid increase in profi ts.
The result is that the gains from productivity increases have not 
been shared with employees. In fact, many employees lost jobs as a 
result of off shoring, while profi ts were distributed to managers in the 
form of stock options. If this is the case and off shoring is driven by 
short- term profi t maximisation rather than by a long- term strategy 
of concentrating tasks where relevant competencies and knowledge 
are dense, then the long- term eff ects of off shoring may not be positive 
for a country’s industrial and broader development. Profi ts should 
be invested in research and development, in product and process 
renewal, and in employee training for the long- term prospects of the 
fi rm.
Regional development studies have included the dynamics of 
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complex production networks in their analysis in recent years, 
moving from the earlier focus on endogenous regional assets, such 
as human capital and social capital. The relationship between glo-
balisation and regional change has thus been more directly exam-
ined. One interesting conceptualisation is that of ‘strategic coupling’ 
(Coe et al., 2004; Yeung, 2006), indicating the connection between 
lead fi rms governing global value chains and regional economies. 
The idea is that although endogenous factors are still important, 
they are not suffi  cient for regional development: external links are 
also fundamental, especially in the globalised economy. Hence the 
capacity of regional fi rms to set up their own global production net-
works or take part in one global network, by ‘strategically coupling’ 
with external lead fi rms, appears to be key to regional development. 
According to these authors, regional institutions have a role to 
play in favouring this strategic coupling in order to spur regional 
development, by stimulating processes of value creation (providing 
appropriate training of human capital and promoting start- up fi rms, 
for example), enhancement (technological and knowledge transfer) 
and capture, at diff erent levels of government (local or territorial, 
regional, or national), each level acting in complementary way to 
the other.
Coe et al. (2004) and Yeung (2006) only seem to consider the case 
where fi rms in the regional economy relate to an external lead fi rm; 
however, strategic coupling may also include a case where a regional 
fi rm sets up its own global production network by strategically 
coupling with suppliers in diff erent parts of the world. The way in 
which government at diff erent levels (especially regional of course, 
but also at national and local levels) can promote the development 
of regional fi rms’ own global production networks also appears to be 
interesting to explore further, especially given our word of caution 
regarding fi rms’ entry into global production networks governed by 
foreign fi rms which tend to have high bargaining power. Favouring 
the creation of their own global production networks by regional 
fi rms may be a preferred route to avoid the dependence of regional 
development on foreign fi rms which may decide to end the relation-
ship as soon as strategic coupling with other regions of the world 
appears to be more interesting.
Looking deeper into production processes and fi rm organisation 
should provide further insights on these issues. This is what the next 
chapter starts to do, by providing a framework for analysis.
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3.  Division of labour and industrial 
development
In this chapter, we start presenting a framework for the defi nition 
of industrial development policy. We have shown, in the previous 
chapter, the importance of the analysis of production organisa-
tion in the study of the determinants of industrial development 
and the wealth of nations (viewed as wider than economic wealth, 
and intending social and environmental sustainability). Production 
organisation has changed dramatically, with the unbundling of the 
various phases of the production process and the creation of global 
value chains. Parts of the production process can be carried out by 
suppliers spatially separated, even in diff erent countries.
Production organisation was analysed by Adam Smith as the divi-
sion of labour, giving rise to the modern fi rm. We extend the analysis 
of labour division to the evolution of production organisation in the 
twentieth century and up to today. We do not pretend to re- interpret 
Smith or to provide an exhaustive account of his ideas; rather, we use 
some of his ideas to provide the foundations of our framework for 
the defi nition of industrial policy. Note that Bianchi (1981) already 
used a framework based on the work of Adam Smith to explain 
the dramatic changes in production organisation that arose in the 
1970s and 1980s, especially in the automobile sector. We extend it to 
explain changes arising since then.
In our view, the essence of the fi rm is the division of labour, 
namely the coordination of specialised skills and competencies of 
diff erent individuals, in a dynamic and complementary manner, 
since skills and competencies are not static but constantly evolve 
through time, as individuals learn through experience. We contrast 
this analysis with theories of the fi rm existing in the literature, in 
order to highlight the distinguishing feature of our framework.
We conclude by deriving the implications of this analysis on 
industrial policy in broad terms, which will be explored in greater 
detail in the next chapter. The main conclusion is that industrial 
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policy is fi rst and foremost a process, made up of a variety of instru-
ments combined to orient industrial development.
AN ANALYSIS OF LABOUR DIVISION
We prefer to start our analysis with production. That is, from the 
moment at which organisational processes aimed at transforming 
some (tangible and intangible) inputs into (tangible and intangible) 
goods that can be sold on markets are created. These processes are 
realised by using knowledge, capabilities and intelligence to generate 
value which lies at the core of the production process. This capacity 
to generate added value – to combine knowledge, skills and com-
petencies and transform them into goods – is where the essence of 
the fi rm lies and is, according to Smith (1776), what determines the 
wealth of nations.
In other words, the determinants of economic development are 
not only the raw materials or the land which a territory has at its 
disposal but also the individual and collective capacity to transform 
inputs into outputs; the capability to learn and apply new knowledge 
to production processes; the competence to accumulate, transfer and 
organise knowledge and incorporate it into goods.
Smith grounded his analysis of economic processes into social 
and political processes. Thus, in a primitive society one produces for 
oneself, for one’s own survival. In the feudal society one produces 
not only for oneself but also for the owner of the land (a Lord), who 
guarantees protection in exchange. In such a context the control 
of the land, commercial routes and raw materials, are essential to 
political control.
The industrial revolution drastically changed this scheme based 
on the poverty and ignorance of land workers and craftsmen to 
produce goods for the rich owners. The industrial revolution stimu-
lated knowledge and the use of competencies in production as fewer 
farmers and more workers had access to a minimum education and 
higher income. Industrial development is thus intrinsically linked to 
cultural and social improvements: ‘The greatest improvement(s) in 
the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of skill, dexter-
ity and judgement with which it is any where directed, or applied, 
seem to have been the eff ects of division of labour’ (Smith, 1776. 
p. 13).
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Improvements in labour productivity depend on the division 
of labour, that is the capacity to divide an activity, a work or a 
process into phases on which specifi c knowledge or better ‘skill, 
dexterity and judgement’ is applied. The capacity to manage intan-
gible factors is thus the key element in assigning value to tangible 
goods. In other words, knowledge applied to production is the 
engine of the  production process and the value of the creation 
process.
The Basis of Productive Effi  ciency
Smith explains how the application of the skill, dexterity and judge-
ment of workers to labour division implies an increase in labour 
productivity in the following way:
‘This great increase of the quantity of work, which in consequence of the 
division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing 
is owing to three diff erent circumstances; fi rst, to the increase of dexterity 
in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which 
is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and 
lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate 
and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many’ (Smith, 
1776, p. 17).
In other words, labour productivity depends on the capacity of 
individual and collective learning applied to a productive process. 
The productive process is not fi xed in time but rather constantly 
changes through time as learning takes place and improvements can 
be made. Being applied to a specifi c task, such as a manual activity 
or a study fi eld, dexterity rises both because discernment rises with 
experience and study, and because one can realise the same task in 
a shorter time, reducing lead time and transforming some parts into 
a routine. A learning process thus emerges thanks to specialisation, 
which implies a rise in productivity. Specialisation also allows for 
the reduction of lead time since the same individual does not have to 
spend time shifting from one task to another.
In this manner the division of labour is a fundamental deter-
minant of the wealth of nations. This has been translated, in 
mainstream theory, into productivity (total factor productivity) 
determining economic growth (namely, GDP growth). However, 
as previously outlined, Smith’s vision was wider than economic 
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growth. In any case, this reasoning can be applied to the analysis of 
production organisation not only at the time Smith wrote, but right 
up to today. Some broad tendencies of productive organisation 
have emerged in certain periods of time, corresponding to domi-
nant production processes: the Taylorist and Fordist production 
processes which dominated for about a century up to the 1970s; the 
fl exible production system designed by engineer Ohno of Toyota 
from the 1970s to the 1990s; and most recently the modular produc-
tion system and global value chains where labour division arises not 
only between fi rms in the same territory but also between fi rms in 
 diff erent spatial locations.
The fi rst crucial problem for a rational labour division is the 
 identifi cation of productive phases, where coherent learning pro-
cesses can be developed. These phases should be neither too wide, 
where the knowledge base would be too broad for specialisa-
tion to take place, nor too narrow, where specialisation would 
be too ‘easy’. However, specialisation also implies the need for 
coordination mechanisms, because when all workers specialise in 
specifi c tasks these tasks have to be coordinated. Specialisation 
must therefore be accompanied by a collective complementarity, 
meaning not only complementary tasks but also complementary 
learning processes, allowing the production process to be managed 
in a coherent manner and thereby avoiding the waste of time and 
of knowledge.
Specialisation and complementarity therefore represent the basis 
for productive effi  ciency, because they allow a coherent develop-
ment of knowledge and the progressive reduction of the time needed 
to realise the whole production process, as well as the capacity to 
 generate both new processes and new products.
The division of labour therefore generates a new phase or a new 
function which is implicit in craft production, namely production 
organisation and management. A new position emerges in the fi rm 
which is the production manager, who is in charge of dividing the 
production process into tasks and coordinating the whole produc-
tion process. This function has increased in importance as capital-
ism has developed, often at the expense of individuals’ learning 
capacities.
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Production Organisation
We go back to Smith’s famous metaphor, that of the pin factory, in 
order to explain how the widening and deepening of labour division 
implies changes in production organisation and the emergence of 
new productive functions.
If pin production was carried out by a single worker, as in craft 
production, the worker would take the raw material, raw metal, and 
would transform it through successive tasks into the fi nal product, a 
box of pins. Thus the craftsman would heat the metal, make it take 
the shape of the pin, add the pinhead, fi nish the pin, wash it, put it 
into a box, and close the box when it is full. Some of these phases are 
inseparable, others are separable and can be done at diff erent times. 
For instance the shaping of the pin is inseparable from the heating of 
the metal, otherwise one has to wait for the metal to get hot again in 
order to fi nish the shaping. Putting the pins in the boxes can be done 
later, independently of the shaping phase. The craftsman working 
on his own must stop the production of pins in order to spend time 
putting them in the boxes.
When the craftsman wishes to produce more boxes of pins, he can 
either spend more time working and produce one box after the other, 
or ask another craftsman to work in parallel, carrying out the same 
phases as he does to obtain a box of pins. Alternatively, he can divide 
the production phases between him and the other craftsman, with 
one of them making all the pins and working the hot metal while the 
other worker specialises in box production. This production process 
is summarised in Figure 3.1. First, when the same worker carries out 
all the production phases, he must do them in sequence, fi rst heating 
and working the metal, then stopping to produce the heads, followed 
by another interruption to make the boxes.
The pin production process can be divided into 12 phases: wire- 
drawing, wire- straightening, cutting, pointing, pinhead making, 
pinhead fi nishing, pinhead and pin assembly, fi nishing, washing, 
making boxes, box fi lling and box closing, leading to the fi nal 
product. The craftsman sequentially realises all the phases.
Raw
materials
Finished
product1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Figure 3.1 Pin production process of a single craftsman
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The fi rst means to increase production is to add a second crafts-
man who produces other pin boxes using the same process. This new 
production cycle would be as in Figure 3.2, where the two craftsmen 
are indicated as A and B.
This can be called production growth by addition, where cycles 
add to each other. All craftsmen work separately, in parallel. 
Another means to increase production is to organise and divide the 
tasks involved between the two workers, A and B. For instance, 
worker A specialises in the production of pins while worker B spe-
cialises in making and fi lling the boxes. This is production growth 
by multiplication, because the increase in dimension changes the 
production cycles (Figure 3.3).
Workers A and B can work in sequence or work simultaneously: 
worker A prepares the pins and worker B prepares the boxes, which 
will be fi lled and closed once a suffi  cient number of pins has been 
produced. The cycle can be divided between more workers who may 
be able to work simultaneously. Phases 1 to 4, however, have to be 
realised in sequence, because they have to be performed when the 
metal is hot. The sub- cycle of making pinheads (phases 5 and 6) can 
be done in parallel, as can the sub- cycle of producing boxes (phases 
10 and 11). Phases 7 and 12 are important because they concern 
assembly (pin and hat, and then pins and boxes). Some phases may 
also be improved using machines.
If production must be further increased, it is necessary to under-
stand how much time is required for each phase in order to ensure 
continuity of the production cycle, thereby avoiding a worker in a 
successive phase waiting for the preceding phases to be completed. 
A:  RM1 12    FP
B:  RM1 12    FP
Figure 3.2 Production cycle of diff erentiated pins
A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B 10 11 12 Finishedproduct
Figure 3.3 Production growth by multiplication
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The main risk is demand, which may reduce. This implies a slow 
down or halt to the whole cycle because all workers are now inte-
grated in a single production process.
Labour division therefore implies the creation of a new position in 
the organisation: someone must look for the best ways to organise 
production, and must therefore dedicate his/her time to production 
organisation. This requires identifying the production phases and 
organising them into sequence or in parallel, according to whether 
they are separable or not.
Scale Economies
The result of this organisation is that with the same quantity of work 
one can increase fi nal production. In other words, productivity can 
increase. All this reasoning of course assumes that demand increases 
so that the additional production fi nds a market. The division of 
labour therefore allows for the creation of scale economies.
The fi rst scale economy is related to the capacity to learn. By 
repeating the same tasks, by working the same raw material, or 
by using the same machines a learning process is created using 
the advantages of experience: repetition creates a learning process 
whereby the same operations can be carried out in a shorter time. 
These economies of scale can be called dynamic economies of scale 
because they are related to the capacity to accumulate knowledge 
through time.
Labour division also allows the production of more in the same 
time period, exploiting technical knowledge at its best, producing 
more at a given point in time with the same inputs: these are static 
scale economies. The risk of labour division and specialisation is that 
demand changes making production capacity redundant. This risk 
is particularly acute when the production capacity in place does not 
easily have alternative uses.
Labour division always implies, to a certain degree, sunk costs 
because the production process requires investment in specifi c 
machines, in specifi c personnel training, and so on. The implication 
is that when a production process has to be changed these costs 
cannot be recuperated, as new machines must be produced and new 
training must occur.
A historical case of a production cycle based on static scale econo-
mies is the Fordist production system. In this system the production 
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process was divided into very elementary tasks to be performed in 
sequence (Figure 3.4), each worker specialising in a specifi c task.
As in the pin case, the product itself was extremely simplifi ed and 
standardised, in order to allow the extreme labour division. This is 
the famous example of the black Ford T model.
With this production organisation is associated a particular fi rm 
structure: the large, vertically integrated fi rm. It is characterised by 
a high hierarchical level, the top of the fi rm making all decisions, 
communication fl ows being uni- directional from top to bottom (the 
U- form of Chandler (1962)). The associated nature of work is low 
skill, with elementary tasks performed by workers with few learning 
possibilities.
In order to see how the labour division can evolve, and how it 
has actually evolved, let us imagine a change in demand. If society 
changes so much that consumers would prefer pins with varied 
colours, or varied metals composing it, the production organisation 
shown in Figure 3.4 can be altered to meet the needs of consum-
ers. A new production line using a diff erent metal can be added. 
Diff erent production lines producing diff erently coloured pins can 
also be added. The product is diff erentiated but the production cycle 
remains the same. The economies of scale of the production cycles 
are still exploited, but a new type of economy is added, namely econ-
omies of scope. This was the production organisation introduced 
by General Motors in the 1920s, which allowed for diff erentiation 
between the cars made while still reaping economies of scale.
A diff erent fi rm structure is associated with this new production 
organisation: the M- form. It is still a large, vertically integrated fi rm, 
organised into divisions dealing with diff erent products or diff erent 
geographical markets, each repeating the whole production process 
in diff erent geographical markets. However, with product diff erenti-
ation other production phases appear related to research and devel-
opment, management of the single divisions, and coordination of 
the whole organisation, as well as marketing and commercialisation.
Phases 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Finished
product
Workers A B C D E F G H I J K L
Figure 3.4 Fordist production systems
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As diff erentiation increases, the pre- and post- manufacturing 
phases, essentially research and development and marketing- 
commercialisation, become more and more important, as the work 
to be done becomes relatively more strategic than the work done. 
Smith indeed defi ned these two concepts in the example of black cloth 
production. ‘A public mourning raises the price of black cloth (with 
which the market is almost always understocked upon such occasions) 
and augments the profi ts of the merchants who possess any consider-
able quantity of it. It has no eff ect upon the wages of the weavers. 
The market is understocked with commodities, not with labour; with 
work done, not with work to be done’ (Smith, 1776, p. 76).
In case of unexpected changes in demand, it is necessary to be 
able to alter production. For this purpose, it is not suffi  cient to think 
in terms of manufactured goods, namely of work done, but also to 
manage resources and competencies that cannot yet be forecasted, 
namely in terms of work to be done.
Globalisation increases competition and creates the need to fre-
quently innovate products and personalise goods. Actual manufac-
turing, work done, becomes relatively less strategic than the work 
to be done: namely the know- how and competencies to create and 
produce goods and services, the content of which depends on the 
ability to incorporate technical, organisational and market knowl-
edge into production. The most valuable capital of the fi rm increas-
ingly becomes the capacity to combine skill, dexterity and judgement 
in an organisation capable of operating in terms of work to be done. 
In other words, the most valuable capital of the fi rm is intangible, 
and based on knowledge.
The fl exible and modular production processes developed from 
the 1980s group production phases into modules, each dealt with 
by a specifi c team with the intention to increase the capacity of the 
fi rm to frequently create and renew products, thanks to an ability to 
manage the work to be done.
The second unbundling can also be interpreted in this perspective. 
It means pushing the logic of the greater importance of work to be 
done to an extreme. Indeed, pre- and post- manufacturing phases 
of the production process are so important that they (generally) 
remain under the direct control of the company, in the home or main 
market. They can also be carried out in diff erent divisions, located 
in diff erent countries, but in a limited and controlled network. 
The manufacturing phases, that is assembly, are strategically less 
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important so they can be off shored to other countries where labour 
costs are lower. In this sense, off shored tasks are more likely to be 
those less intensive in intangible assets. This is, however, a hypoth-
esis that requires  empirical verifi cation.
The new production process can therefore be represented as in 
Figure 3.5.
Scale Economies and Innovation
As previously mentioned, there are diff erent types of scale economies.
1. The fi rst type is related to the capacity to learn: to accumulate 
experience through time, to transfer knowledge on productive 
functions, so as to reduce the time to produce a good (lead time). 
This is a dynamic scale economy.
2. The second type concerns the ability to produce, in a given time 
period, large volumes of homogeneous goods, by rationalising 
the productive cycle, often simplifying the product, so as to 
reduce production unit cost. This is a static scale economy.
3. The third type concerns the ability to derive scope economies by 
combining the production of diff erent varieties of the product in 
the same production cycle.
4. Another type of scope economy can also be outlined, namely 
the ability to accumulate experience and knowledge so as to 
continuously change the fi nal product using the same produc-
tion cycle, in order to adapt it to changing consumer needs. This 
is a dynamic scope economy, which is very important because 
it allows a fi rm to make product innovations while avoiding 
the problem of irreversible sunk costs associated with specifi c 
 production process.
R&D Manufacturing Marketing and
commercialisation
Phases i ii iii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Finished
product
Localisation Home or in
controlled
network 
(partially or totally) offshored Home or in controlled 
network
Figure 3.5 Globalised production systems
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We can therefore summarise the facts just derived about the organi-
sation of production in Table 3.1.
Diff erent advantages exist for scale and scope that lead to varied 
production organisations. These diverse production organisations 
are not always substitutable, and the question now arises as to what 
factors drive the adoption of one form or another.
MARKET POWER, MOBILITY AND STRATEGY
Production decisions must take not only demand characteristics, 
but also rivals’ decisions or expected decisions, into account. Smith 
expresses this problematic in the following way (Smith, 1776, p. 31): 
‘as it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the divi-
sion of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited 
by the  extent of that power, or in other words by the extent of 
the market’.
The division of labour is therefore crucially determined by the 
characteristics of the market, namely demand and competition. The 
‘power of exchanging’ in Smith refers to market power, in other 
words the fi rm’s position relative to rivals. If the market extends, as 
when diff erent countries initiate an economic integration process, 
the power of exchanging changes because demand suddenly widens 
and new rivals have to be considered in the wider market, with the 
same or diff erent products, and lower or higher prices. We can 
therefore call the set of all agents that interact in a market, including 
consumers and producers, as well as all the agents interacting in the 
production of a given good, the extent of the market and their power 
relations, market power.
Barriers to entry can aff ect the number of agents interacting in 
markets. Industrial economics has extensively analysed structural 
and strategic barriers to entry, as well as fi rms’ strategies to extend 
market power.
Table 3.1 Economies of scale and scope
Types of economies Scale Scope
Static 1 4
Dynamic 2 3
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The role of the entrepreneur is therefore not only to guarantee 
continuity in the productive cycle between complementary phases 
but also to organise and manage the cycle given his knowledge 
of the market: that is, all agents’ interactions that determine his 
market power. His functions therefore become more numerous and 
generate a new possibility for labour division within the manage-
ment function. The productive cycle contains knowledge not only 
about the transformation of raw materials, but also about the fi nal 
product and the market, namely consumers and rival producers. 
Management implies production organisation and planning as well 
as the defi nition of market strategies, in the sense of strategies aimed 
at maintaining and developing market power.
Thus as the production cycle becomes more divided and more 
complex, producing more diff erentiated goods, many additional 
functions are created: production planning and organisation, 
research and development to foster product innovation, logistics 
and acquisition of components, marketing, fi nance and so on. The 
phases carried out do not only regard production (manufacturing), 
but also pre- manufacturing (research and development, production 
planning) and post- manufacturing (marketing and commercialisa-
tion). All these phases represent the value added chain, by which 
the entrepreneur creates value added from raw materials and com-
ponents by applying learning and knowledge to the production of 
goods and services.
The organisation that makes up the management of all these 
functions needed to carry out all the phases becomes a fi rm. A fi rm 
manages and carries out all the phases of the value added chain. 
In craft production, all these functions are performed by a single 
person. As the fi rm grows, labour is increasingly divided among 
the various phases. As the fi rm grows larger the necessity to sepa-
rate management and ownership increases. Problems of corporate 
 governance thus arise.
Functions that add to the pre- and post- manufacturing phases, 
such as research and development, marketing and commercialisa-
tion can be called strategic phases. These strategic phases have 
various articulations and confi gurations depending on the extent 
of the market. For instance, a fi rm producing a homogeneous good 
in a monopoly regime does not need marketing or advertising. A 
Fordist fi rm does not need to continuously market new products 
since the factories are specifi c to particular models and cannot be 
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easily changed, but consumers only require standardised products 
at the lowest possible costs. In contrast, a fi rm producing highly dif-
ferentiated products in a very competitive context will need a strong 
marketing department that will identify changes in consumers’ tastes 
and advertise the companies’ products, as well as a research and 
development department that continuously develops new products 
to meet the new potential demand.
The extent of the division of the value added chain into phases, 
and the manner in which these phases are managed within the fi rm, 
therefore determines a wide variety of possible fi rm organisation 
models. This depends on whether the fi rm carries out all the pro-
duction phases, or concentrates on certain phases with suppliers 
carrying out other phases. One can also imagine an extreme case 
where a fi rm concentrates on strategic phases only, while all produc-
tive phases are carried out by other fi rms and suppliers.
One can also imagine a case where phases or groups of phases 
are managed by diff erent fi rms that coordinate their activities not 
through hierarchical control but through market relations, and 
where the product of one fi rm is the component used by another 
fi rm. This case is characterised by the coexistence of many SMEs, 
which remain effi  cient only if conditions of specialisation and 
complementarity are maintained between them. This is the case of 
 industrial districts or, more general, SME systems or networks.
Are there preferred organisational models? In other words, given 
demand and industry characteristics, is there an optimal organisa-
tional model for the fi rm? The predominance of the large, vertically 
integrated fi rm managing mass production models for almost all of 
the twentieth century led many scholars to answer positively to this 
question. But this model started to enter a crisis in the 1970s for 
many reasons including workers’ confl icts, changing demand and 
changing raw material prices. The rising performance of Japanese 
producers in the 1970s and 1980s, together with their particular 
organisation model – based on just- in- time, constant improvement 
and modular production – led many scholars to think that a new 
organisational model was diff using worldwide and proving to be 
optimal (see Labory, 1997, for a review).
However, the coexistence, not only across industries but also 
within industries, of diff erent organisational models has led many 
analysts to the conclusion that the reality is one of variety and there 
is no dominant organisation model.
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PRODUCTION ORGANISATION, INSTITUTIONS 
AND FIRM STRATEGIES
We mentioned above that fi rms choose the division of labour in 
order to fi t products with the extent of the market. However, the 
specifi c form of labour division varies across fi rms and territories. 
Indeed, the fi rm’s environment simultaneously shapes its strategies 
and labour division choices. Besides the extent of the market, the 
environment is made of other relevant markets and fi rms (suppli-
ers), customers, the legal and regulatory context, and political and 
social norms. In other words, the environment is also shaped by 
institutions.
As stressed by Roberts (2004), strategies are implemented through 
organisational design, and strategic capabilities are embedded in 
organisations. However, organisations cannot be changed as quickly 
as strategies. When the environment or the extent of the market 
changes, the fi rm’s strategy can be changed relatively quickly 
through a decision by the managers, but the implementation of the 
new strategy generally requires organisational, that is labour divi-
sion, changes. New product characteristics may change the produc-
tion process; teams may have to change, hiring new personnel who 
will take time adapting to the fi rm and integrating into it; knowl-
edge and competencies required to perform work may change, and 
employees will take time learning the new knowledge and acquiring 
the new competencies. So two fi rms, adopting similar strategies in 
similar environments and market extent, may have diff ering per-
formance if they diff er in their ability to change their respective 
organisations to implement the strategy.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE FIRM
Economic theory has amply and deeply studied the fi rm, its nature 
and organisation. We provide here a brief review of the main theo-
ries of the fi rm, hopefully highlighting the main points of the diff er-
ent approaches. We do not aim to be exhaustive but rather to stress 
the main elements that appear as contrasting or as complementary to 
our approach. Our aim is to suggest that the existing theories of the 
fi rm are complementary and could be unifi ed in a view of the essence 
of the fi rm as labour division.
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   73 25/03/2011   15:50
74 Industrial policy after the crisis
Coriat and Weinstein (2010) argue that there are two main 
approaches to the theory of the fi rm: the contractual approach and 
the evolutionary approach. These approaches developed after 1970, 
when the Walrasian model of the fi rm, which saw it as a black box 
that combines inputs to produce outputs, was criticised. In such a 
model, the fi rm’s internal organisation does not matter since markets 
instantaneously provide all the information necessary for decision- 
making, and the behaviour of individuals (entrepreneurs and con-
sumers) is guided only by the market. Coase, in his seminal work 
entitled The Nature of the Firm (1937), argues that market transac-
tion costs increase when information is imperfect and asymmetric. 
The fi rm is constituted in order to reduce these transaction costs. 
The role of the fi rm is then to exchange information in contracts 
through a strategy, a learning process, and the management and 
organisation of contracts.
Williamson, one of the founders of the new- institutionalist school, 
bases his analysis on the hypotheses of opportunism and bounded 
rationality, which leads to the vision of the fi rm as a set of contrac-
tual competencies. The fi rm exists because it can reduce the costs of 
transactions performed on the market. The fi rm and the market are 
therefore viewed as two diff erent solutions to carrying out exchange. 
The heterogeneity of organisational forms (internal and external 
to the fi rms, quasi- markets, and so on) is explained by the diff erent 
levels of transaction costs to be minimised.
Neoclassical View
The neoclassical view has been enriched by the introduction of infor-
mation economics into models, especially the two major problems 
of asymmetric and imperfect information, namely moral hazard 
and adverse selection. The fi rm has information that the worker 
cannot completely verify before starting to work in it (its working 
conditions), and the worker has information that the fi rm cannot 
fully verify before he starts work (his knowledge and competencies). 
Incentive contracts allow the resolution of these information asym-
metries in that they get the parties to reveal the information they 
hold. The same is true of the relationship between the fi rm and its 
suppliers or its clients. Thus, all economic activities can be reduced 
to exchange and to contracts. The fi rm is just a set of contracts. This 
theory assumes that each individual maximises his own interest, and 
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does not care for the interest of others unless he is compensated for 
it. Only well- defi ned contracts can resolve confl icts.
The pioneering work on information symmetry in the theory of the 
fi rm came from Alchian and Demsetz (1972), who developed team 
production theory, and from Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama 
(1980) on agency theory. Alchian and Demsetz considered in particu-
lar the free- riding problems arising in joint production, and showed 
that team work is optimal in the case of joint inputs and a non- 
separable production function (when the marginal productivity of a 
factor depends on the quantity of that factor and of other factors). 
According to these authors, the fi rm is a set of contracts that manages 
team work. In other words, the fi rm exists because of the comple-
mentarity between production factors. Coordination problems in the 
fi rm only amount to problems of team coordination. Agency theory 
instead considers the fi rm as a set of incentives: the fi rm defi nes con-
tracts that align the interests of its members, given information asym-
metries and self- interested agents. Coordination is therefore reduced 
to a problem of motivation. Agency theory also examines the organi-
sational form of the fi rm: its hierarchy and internal labour market.
The neoclassical theory however does not consider the existence of 
authority within fi rms. A behaviour cannot be imposed on workers 
and employees, only contracts can induce them to behave in a way 
that is appropriate to the fi rm, because they provide them with ade-
quate rewards. Hence the internal labour market is really a private 
market, governed by economic rules and not administrative rules.
The neoclassical analysis of the fi rm is not limited to incentives. 
Other aspects studied include the fi nancial structure of the fi rm 
and corporate governance problems. Another important question 
which is examined is that of information fl ows within the fi rm, 
and the optimal hierarchical structure that balances information 
acquisition costs and the benefi ts of rapid decision. For example, 
Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1985) interpret information cost as a 
delay in decision- making and derive an optimal hierarchy. Other 
studies highlight the trade- off  between delay in decision- making and 
quantity of i nformation processed.
Transaction Cost Theory
Like the neoclassical theory of the fi rm, the theory of transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985) takes exchange as a unit of analysis. 
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The main hypothesis is bounded rationality: that is, individuals are 
not able to possess and use all relevant information for their eco-
nomic decision. The consequence is that agents do not maximise but 
instead make and correct errors in order to improve their situation. 
This trial and error process depends on their past experience. The 
second major hypothesis is opportunism: that is, the search for one’s 
own interest even at the expense of other agents.
Given uncertainty and information asymmetries, market trans-
actions are costly and it can be convenient to adopt another form 
of exchange, namely a governance structure diff erent from that 
of markets. The fi rm is then the place where transaction costs are, 
under  certain conditions, minimised. The heterogeneity of organi-
sational forms is explained by the fact that the optimal govern-
ance structure of transactions depends on the characteristics of 
transactions and on the institutional environment. Hence fi rms 
in diff erent industries (with a variety of products and production 
systems), in diverse countries or regions (with diff erent institutional 
 environments) will adopt diff erent organisational forms.
In other words, the fi rm is neither a production function nor a 
private market; it is a hierarchical way of governing transactions. The 
fi rm is still a set of contracts, but of a diff erent nature than in neoclas-
sical theory, in that contracts allow for the establishment of long- 
term relationships but also authority in relationships. Transaction 
cost theory, like neoclassical theory, is fundamentally static: given 
technology and market conditions, there exists an optimal organisa-
tional form that maximises effi  ciency (transaction cost minimisation 
in transaction cost theory; profi t maximisation under incentive and 
productive constraints in neoclassical theory). The deterministic 
models used in transaction cost theory somehow contradict the 
hypothesis of bounded rationality. Williamson (1998) justifi es this 
paradox by the fact that the analytical framework of maximisation is 
easy to use and reaches the same conclusions under the hypothesis of 
bounded rationality as under the hypothesis of rationality. The fact 
that both hypotheses lead to the same conclusion may not be so well- 
founded. One can see this very simply when considering the fact that 
bounded rational individuals make errors, while rational individuals 
do not. The possibility of errors implies the possibility for ineffi  cient 
organisational forms to remain in markets. However, according to 
Williamson in the long term both hypotheses lead to the same results.
In both these approaches exchange is the unit of analysis and 
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markets are the key institution to study in economics. Industrial 
policy is justifi ed only by market failures.
Individuals are rational in the long- term, so policymakers do 
not have to care about the restructuring of productive sectors that 
could be brought about by shocks: in the long term, only the most 
effi  cient survive and industries will specialise in their comparative 
 advantages, given the stock of resources available in the country.
Evolutionary Theory
The evolutionary theory of the fi rm focuses attention on learn-
ing and considers that the nature of the fi rm lies in learning and 
knowledge accumulation. Contrary to the previous approach, it is 
dynamic. Organisational competencies are the essential assets of the 
fi rm and are progressively built over time.
As Coriat and Weinstein (2010) show, the evolutionary theory 
of the fi rm is made of diff erent approaches, the coherence of which 
has to yet to be more precisely found. This view was initiated by the 
work of behaviourists such as Cyert and March, and also Penrose 
who showed that the fi rm does not only manage information, but 
is also a set of resources that must be made productive in order to 
increase the performance of the fi rm. The evolutionary theory made 
important contributions to this view, considering the fi rm as a set of 
knowledge and competencies, with its unit of analysis being knowl-
edge. Wernerfeld (1984, p. 172) explains that ‘a fi rm’s resources at a 
given time could be defi ned as those (tangible and intangible) assets 
which are tied semi- permanently to the fi rms’.
Coriat and Weinstein argue that what is important for Penrose is 
not so much the presence of resources but rather the service that the 
resource can render. The capacity of the resource to provide a service 
depends on the organisation and management of the fi rm: ‘Strictly 
speaking, it is never resources themselves that are the “inputs” in the 
production process, but only the services that resources can render’ 
(Penrose, 1959, p. 25). Firm performance depends on its capacity to 
accumulate resources and make them productive. This capacity in 
turn depends on the core competencies of the fi rm.
Overall therefore, the fi rm is either seen as a set of competencies 
(Foss, 1997), a depository of knowledge through routines (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982), a learning organisation or a problem- solver 
(Marengo, 1992), or a set of capabilities (Rumelt, 1984; Foss, 1997).
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Like new- institutionalists, scholars of this theory consider ration-
ality to be bounded, essentially because the heterogeneity of behav-
iours observed in the real world could not be explained otherwise. 
With the unit of analysis being knowledge and not exchange, produc-
tion and innovation problems are fully accounted for in the theory. 
This has two major consequences. First, the competitiveness of fi rms 
is determined by their capacity to learn and create knowledge, and 
industrial policy can favour fi rms’ competitiveness. Second, confl icts 
of interests are ignored, so that (internal or external) labour markets 
are not considered (Coriat and Weinstein, 2010). The way in which 
individuals are coordinated and motivated within fi rms to collec-
tively create knowledge and competencies is not considered in detail.
Regarding the fi rst aspect, the nature of the fi rm is essentially to 
learn and accumulate knowledge, which translates into individual 
and organisational competencies that determine the competitive 
advantages of the fi rm. These organisational competencies or capa-
bilities translate into routines that represent the distinguishing 
features of fi rms, and are at the origin of their diff erences in perform-
ance. According to Cohen et al. (1996, p. 683), ‘a routine is an execut-
able capability for repeated performance in some contexts that has 
been learned by an organisation in response of selection pressures’. 
Routines are coordinated, repetitive sets of organisational activities.
Cohendet et al. (2010) claim that the concept of routine has to be 
made more precise in this theoretical approach: its origin, defi nition, 
and measurement are not clearly defi ned. One avenue for increasing 
its determination may be through deeper analyses of the division of 
labour processes. Learning primarily arises at the individual level, 
and fi rms combine the knowledge of diff erent individuals by allow-
ing them to interact and thereby share knowledge and collectively 
create new knowledge, the essential purpose being to integrate this 
knowledge into production processes.
This approach thus seems to implicitly recognise that the division 
of labour is the essence of the fi rm. Thus Grant (1996) argues that 
‘without the benefi ts from specialisation there is no need for organi-
sations comprising diff erent individuals’ (p. 113). Organisations 
have to coordinate these specialisations and provide incentives to 
cooperate, through incentive mechanisms such as compensation 
and/or through authority by which the fi rms’ managers impose 
specifi c behaviours. Individuals can bring knowledge and com-
petencies to the fi rm if they have previously been able to increase 
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their human capital through education, training and social policies. 
Infrastructure such as transport and telecommunications is also 
important to ease interactions between individuals and match them 
with particular needs in fi rms. Therefore, the state has a role to play 
in the provision of public goods and actions, allowing the knowledge 
base to increase (through research and development and education) 
and easing interactions (through networking).
Industrial policy is therefore dynamic and aimed at favouring the 
development of competencies so that existing fi rms can develop new 
comparative advantages and new fi rms can be created. This view 
stresses the knowledge content of production processes and is very 
close to our view, where the fi rm’s essence is labour division to allow 
the specialisation of individuals, together with their coordination 
to ensure complementarities between specialised knowledge and 
competencies.
Firms learn and innovate in a context that constantly evolves, 
due to changes in fi rms’ strategies (reorganisation, product innova-
tions, and so on) and also to changes in the competitive context (for 
instance, the emergence of new competitors like China and India 
in the late 1990s). Therefore, the market and competition do not 
represent adjustment mechanisms but rather dynamic forces that 
bring about change and thereby generate confl ict and instability, 
not harmony and equilibrium (Burlamaqui, 2000). One of the main 
objectives of industrial policy is thus to accommodate change and 
reduce uncertainty. As stressed by Burlamaqui (2000), these unsta-
ble dynamics require the presence of a robust and active state that 
implements both broad and selective policies to stabilise the system.
Institutions therefore matter. Chang (2000) defi nes the main ele-
ments of an institutionalist theory of industrial development. This 
theory views the market as one of many institutions that organise 
economic activities. Other such institutions include fi rms and the 
state, which create the rules of economic interactions and ensure 
their implementation.
The neoclassical theory accounts for the state as an institution, 
but views it as an organisation made up of self- interested individuals 
whose interests have to be aligned through appropriate incentives. 
The state is thus reduced to a ‘quasi- market’ and its relationships 
with other institutions are reduced to contractual relations. Chang 
rejects the hypothesis according to which the market is central in the 
analysis of economic activities in general, and industrial development 
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in particular. Markets do not appear naturally but through a politi-
cal process that defi nes the rights and duties related to the market. 
According to Chang (2000), politics is not a quasi- market process 
whereby material benefi ts are exchanged for political support.
When the unit of analysis is exchange and all economic phenom-
ena can be analysed in terms of market (or non- market) transac-
tions, industrial policy is reduced to ensuring that the market works 
properly. This leads to an analysis in terms of ‘failures’, which we 
will examine in more detail in the next chapter.
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN A POLITICAL 
ECONOMY FRAMEWORK
The two approaches to the theory of the fi rm we have presented in 
the last section appear to be complementary approaches in order to 
explain the second unbundling. First, the contractual approach is 
useful to address the problems of coordinating confl icting interests 
and the problem of motivation of a fi rms’ employees. However, in 
this approach the analysis of the production process, its separation 
into phases, and the rationale and eff ects of carrying out the phases 
within single fi rms or across fi rms, is not considered. More precisely, 
the division of phases among the fi rm and its suppliers has been 
considered in these approaches but only as market transactions that 
in some cases (for instance, in the presence of asset specifi city) are 
better performed within the fi rm itself. Second, the evolutionary 
approach is more dynamic and has the advantage of accounting for 
the specialisation of individuals into specifi c knowledge areas and 
competencies that are put together within the fi rm, the essence of 
which is the creation of knowledge.
In our view, these two latter aspects are important and should be 
simultaneously taken into account. The essence of the fi rm is labour 
division in order to produce goods more effi  ciently and to reply to 
market changes more eff ectively. Labour division in fact requires 
two elements:
1. Specialisation and complementarity: specialisation in specifi c 
knowledge and competencies, that allows the employee to learn 
and to perform tasks better (in a dynamic process).
2. Coordination of individuals with diff erent knowledge and 
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competencies: the fi rm is made up of individuals with diff erent 
knowledge and competencies who have to be motivated and 
coordinated for the whole to become more than the sum of 
the parts. Compensation mechanisms motivate individuals to 
apply eff ort and to cooperate; organisational structures allow 
specifi c forms of interaction, by specifying teams and other 
communication channels (such as cross- functional communica-
tion and reporting to diff erent fi rm members) where individuals 
interact.
The analysis of the previous sections has, in our view, four main 
implications:
1. The centre of analysis should be the organisation of the value 
chain – which is to say the division of labour – not the market. 
The market is important in determining the possibilities for 
labour division but the key determinants in industry develop-
ment are labour division and the organisation of the value 
chain, which determines the frontier of the fi rm and the rela-
tionships of the fi rm and its environment, its strategies and 
performance.
2. Industrial policy is aimed at promoting and easing the trans-
formation of production organisation to meet new needs and 
requirements arising from change that may be political (the end 
of war or dictatorship), social (May 1968, the evolution of the 
role of women in society, or the arrival of immigrants), scientifi c 
(technological progress) or environmental (climate change being 
a prime example).
3. Industrial policy is a key policy for three major reasons: fi rst, it 
concerns value creation, since we consider industry as all pro-
ductive sectors; second, it directly impacts on a country’s eco-
nomic growth; third, it directly aff ects the standards of living of 
citizens. It aff ects their income, their cultural evolution (includ-
ing education and training, and the possibility to access cultural 
developments) and their social status.
4. Industrial policy has eff ects only in the very long- term. Just as 
fi rm strategies are quick to change but not the organisations 
that implement them, industrial policy aims at providing new 
impetus and levers for the mechanics of the industrial develop-
ment process to take a specifi c path. Industrial policy only makes 
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sense in the long- term, which is a problem when policymakers 
are concerned about voters and tend to have only the next elec-
tion as their time frame. In this sense, a long- term vision such 
as that defi ned by the EU in the Lisbon Strategy can be useful 
because it thinks about the long- term future without too many 
short- term electoral constraints (see Chapter 6).
A policy aimed at developing new sectors means not only trying to 
base economic development on new technologies and high potential 
industries, but also bringing about a social and cultural evolution in 
society. The education system must be oriented towards more train-
ing of engineers and scientists; the population must have high skills; 
and as a result there will be new demands on living environments, 
access to culture, and so on.
Neoclassical theory suggests that providing an optimal allocation 
of resources implies reaching the ‘best’ situation for society, where 
each individual consumer cannot be made better off  in terms of pref-
erences and budget constraints. However, it may be that an optimal 
is reached but with some people not allowed access to education and 
cultural development. It may be that they fi nd jobs but are unable to 
live in decent conditions: for instance, an individual making a living 
on short- term contracts cannot make long- term plans and has dif-
fi culty in accessing credit for buying goods such as houses. It may 
be that he contributes to the employment rate, but can that be an 
economic objective? Classical economists such as Smith stressed that 
industrial development aimed at reaching the ‘wealth of nations’, 
which meant not only higher GDP and income, but also justice and 
happiness, or, in the words of Sylos Labini referring to Smith, ‘civil 
development’.
The importance of cultural development is underlined in Smith 
in his analysis of the division of labour. Smith expects that extreme 
division of labour may lead to alienation, which can, however, be 
prevented by education (Smith, 1776).
By sustainable industrial development we therefore mean indus-
trial development as a support to civil development: meaning 
cultural and social development on the one hand, and attention 
to the environment on the other hand. Environmental concerns 
were nonexistent at the time classic theorists wrote, but the 
concept of civil development in a modern setting must include 
this aspect.
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Sylos Labini (2006) emphasised this point, claiming that ‘the 
nexus between economic and civil development is always strong, 
even when economic development damages civil development’ (p. 
105). Research is, in this respect, important not only for economic 
development but also for civil development, because research simul-
taneously results from and feeds cultural growth, raising practical 
issues that translate into intellectual issues.
Economic development is a complex phenomenon, dependent on 
political and social aspects and not just economic ones. The organi-
sation of production has dramatically changed since the 1970s but 
economics has continued to be based on the same paradigm, that 
of the large fi rm realising economies of scale. New approaches have 
been developed since the 1970s that take account of some aspects 
of the new forms of production organisation, such as the analysis 
of districts and their external economies, together with the great 
importance of their social embeddedness. New forms of produc-
tion organisation within large fi rms – such as the network form, the 
modular organisation of production, and the changing nature of 
work whereby workers have to be more fl exible and responsible – 
have also been identifi ed. However, the paradigm on which policy 
analysis is based has remained the same, centred on exchange and 
on the capacity of the market to reach equilibrium on its own. In 
this context, industrial policy as a long- term vision is not necessary, 
as in the long term markets adjust and lead to optimal results if 
 competition is as free as possible.
We do not mean that the objectives of undistorted competition 
and openness to exchange with the rest of the world are not perti-
nent, but that a change in production organisation has important 
social and political implications. This is true in terms of the nature of 
work, such as skill requirements and wages, income and standards 
of living, and power relations within society. An economy based 
on long- term employment and workers’ representation in trade 
unions is socially and politically diff erent from an economy where 
 short- term fl exible contracts predominate.
In a nutshell, the discussion provided in this chapter suggests that 
industrial development is a complex and dynamic phenomenon, 
with diff erent approaches in industrial economic theory analysing 
diff erent aspects. The market failure approach allows for the consid-
eration of only limited aspects. A long- term vision is necessary, iden-
tifying possible development paths and providing levers to make 
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some paths more likely and to mobilise society towards specifi c 
objectives, as we will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter.
CONCLUSIONS: UNBUNDLING AND THE 
RISING IMPORTANCE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS
Smith describes the advantages of the modern organisation by relat-
ing the capacity to learn and therefore to accumulate knowledge 
within a specifi c activity. One example is the knowledge accumulated 
from repetition, which permits task optimisation and enhanced 
knowledge of materials and tools in the defi ning and designing of 
new instruments and machines. The capacity also exists to develop 
knowledge through experience and dedicated studies aimed at 
improving the organisation of production: dividing up work and 
articulating its cycle in phases and sequential tasks, and thereby 
reducing lead times. The required knowledge is therefore somewhat 
technical, related to a single task and the function of productive 
transformation. There is also a specifi c learning eff ect related to the 
capacity to design and manage a complete productive organisation. 
How can this organisation be defi ned?
In Chapter 3 of his book, Smith answers by suggesting that there 
is no unique and perfect model for organising production, although 
it must always be related to the exchange system to which it belongs 
or, even better, to the level and type of competition. Market knowl-
edge complements technical and organisational knowledge. We 
must understand its confi guration, the role of competitors and the 
nature of the traded goods. The union of technical, organisational 
and market knowledge determines the productivity  improvements 
that are the basis of economic development.
In such a model, the capacity to create value is clearly related 
to the capacity to focus human competencies on the production 
of goods within an organisational model that accumulates and 
transfers technical, organisational and market knowledge into the 
productive cycle. The explanations provided by Smith are related to 
productive capacity. Through diff erent examples he reminds us that 
as the scope of the market increases, it is possible to defi ne a deeper 
division of labour: to further develop the capacity to incorporate 
knowledge and therefore to increase the value of goods off ered on 
the market.
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Specialisation and complementarity within a dynamic context 
are the key to effi  ciency, and therefore to competitiveness. The 
capacity to design new methods of organisation, to introduce new 
machines, to identify new needs and to open new markets, consti-
tutes the essential component through which this effi  ciency becomes 
a competitive advantage. Smith called these innovations ‘secrets’, 
and claimed that although the advantages derived from such secrets 
permitted continuously high profi ts, they would attract new com-
petitors. While trade secrets are diffi  cult to maintain, ‘secrets in 
manufacturing are capable of being longer kept than secrets in trade. 
A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour 
with materials which cost only half of the price of those commonly 
made use of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of 
his discovery as long as he lives, and even leave it as a legacy to his 
posterity’ (Smith, 1776, p. 77).
Knowledge, learning and innovation are therefore sources of 
competitive advantage that combine together to represent the engine 
of social development. An economy becomes more dynamic as its 
knowledge base spreads and as its organisation of production is 
increasingly based on learning. The essence of the knowledge- based, 
post- crisis economy can be summarised with this metaphor. We have 
moved from an economy based on the work done, to an economy 
based on the work to be done.
We therefore think that there is an urgent need for studies of pro-
duction organisation, which could empirically check which phases of 
the production process are off shored and which are not, and which 
tasks are associated. We do not pretend to provide a new expla-
nation that is superior to previous ones. We just hope to stress a 
particular element of the analysis of fi rm structure and market com-
petition that appears to have been rather neglected in the past and 
which should be a focus of attention to hopefully better understand 
the complexity of industrial development and derive appropriate 
industrial policies.
In this perspective, the long- term cannot be assumed to be char-
acterised by automatic adjustment. Structural changes arise in long- 
term adjustment processes, where fi rms operate by trial and error, 
adjusting the work done to the work to be done. When the extent 
of the market changes, the division of labour has to be adapted. 
Economic development does not arise without a structural adjust-
ment of its internal relationships, both economic and social. The 
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implications of this analysis for the defi nition of industrial policies 
are derived in the next chapter.
This chapter has shown that production and labour organisation 
are key determinants of development. The globalisation process is 
inducing a re-organisation of production processes on a global scale, 
whereby the “word done” is unbundled globally but the “work to be 
done” is concentrated, as knowledge becomes the heart of produc-
tion. While the crisis has shown that leaving the system unregulated 
does not function, the new industrial policy accompanying this 
process is not a return to subsidies or direct intervention of state in 
markets but a policy based on two major axes, which we will elabo-
rate in the next chapters. The fi rst axis is that of innovation and terri-
tory, because the system cannot grow if innovation is only internal to 
fi rms but rather the territory has to valorise skills and competencies. 
The second axis is that of entitlements and provisions, namely relat-
ing rights to development processes, promoting the right to partici-
pate in collective learning processes.
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4.  A framework for defi ning 
industrial policy
INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the main approaches to industrial economics 
and policy which lead to diff erent recommendations on industrial 
policy. It shows that the theoretical framework that emerges leads to 
a justifi cation of industrial policy only on the basis of the existence 
of ‘failures’. Market failures justify public intervention in markets 
in the neoclassical paradigm; government failures justify the pref-
erence for no government intervention; systemic failures are what 
governments should address in formulating (essentially research and 
development and innovation) policies within evolutionary theories.
These approaches are useful to point to specifi c problems in the 
economic system, but in our view they lead to an industrial policy 
consisting of a series of independent actions without a broad vision. 
Markets and institutions build up a system where economic insti-
tutions co- evolve with social and political institutions. The point 
is thus to provide the right gears and levers to guide the industrial 
development process towards more desirable paths, making it more 
likely that certain directions are taken. Our framework is therefore 
one of political economy in the sense of Robbins (1981).
Our approach is holistic, with the idea that the properties of the 
industrial system cannot be explained by its component parts alone. 
As Aristotle put it, the whole is more than the sum of the parts.
In this perspective, the analysis of production organisation is 
essential. Production organisation is determined by the fi rm’s char-
acteristics, its internal and external environments, social and politi-
cal institutions, the extent of the market, and product requirements. 
In turn, production organisation has implications on the social, 
economic and political characteristics of the economic system in 
which the fi rm is embedded. In other words, the division of labour 
determines the productive power of labour (productivity) that has 
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to be defi ned according to the extent of the market, but it also deter-
mines working conditions and the living standards of workers, hence 
their access to education and to cultural development. Inventions 
and technical progress in turn depend on the culture and knowledge 
that originate from experience. It is in this respect that industrial 
policy has to be determined in a holistic way: industrial develop-
ment is determined by, and in turn infl uences, the characteristics 
and evolution of society and its cultural development. So indus-
trial development policies must take account not only of available 
resources and technologies, but also of the social characteristics of 
the territory and the training of human resources that simultane-
ously determine social  and economic evolution. We represent this 
defi nition of  industrial policy, in a ‘sundial’ framework of industrial 
development.
Smith stressed the importance of culture and knowledge for devel-
opment, using the example of the American colonies. In such colo-
nies, English immigrants brought their culture and knowledge which 
enabled the development of a rural and then urban middle class; in 
contrast the development of Spanish and Portuguese colonies was 
limited by the feudal culture and its highly segregated society.
THE STATE AND THE MARKET
The role of the state in the economy, and in industrial develop-
ment in particular, appears to be justifi ed by a number of ‘failures’: 
market, government and systemic.
Market Failures
Markets, in order to generate an optimal allocation of resources, 
must function in conditions of perfect competition. These conditions 
are rarely found in reality. For example, information is imperfect 
and incomplete, asymmetrically distributed between individuals. 
The technology of production may be such that it is more effi  cient for 
a monopoly to serve the market (a natural monopoly). Conditions in 
which the market does not generate the social optimum are defi ned 
(in neoclassical theory) as market failures, generally justifying state 
intervention.
There are four main types of market failures:
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1. Externalities, whereby a third party to a transaction is aff ected 
(negatively or positively) by it; in case of negative eff ects (such as 
pollution) the state intervenes through command- and- control or 
incentive- based regulation.
2. Internalities, whereby failures arise within the transaction, as in 
the case of asymmetric information (for example, in labour or 
some product markets, such as medicines); generally, product or 
labour regulation solves these problems.
3. Public goods (defence, street lights, and so on), which are non- 
rival (the consumption by one individual does not reduce the 
quantity available to other individuals) and non- excludable (it is 
impossible to prevent one individual from consuming the good; 
for example, the light in the streets); generally the state provides 
such goods because no fi rm can fi nd it profi table to produce 
them.
4. Market power, which may result naturally, as in the case of a 
natural monopoly, or from abuse of a dominant position or 
predatory actions. In the fi rst case, the state intervenes through 
regulation; in the second, through antitrust policy.
In terms of industrial policy, market failures justify competition 
policy and regulation of network industries, of products and labour 
markets, as well as environmental policy. This is extremely useful, 
but it has two major drawbacks. First, it tends to convey a static view 
of industry: market failures arise once and disappear when corrected. 
Second, it tends to lead to a fragmentation of industrial development 
policies: competition policy, innovation policy, regulation, and trade 
policy are all treated separately, but they have an overall impact on 
industrial development. This does not mean that the market failure 
approach is not useful; however, a long- term holistic vision makes it 
possible to consider the whole and not just the parts, as well as the 
dynamics of the industrial development process.
In our view, industrial policy is about shaping industrial restruc-
turing and development, favouring certain generic technologies that 
are assessed as strategic because they provide key inputs (such as 
energy) or because they have high potential growth, with potential 
applications in many sectors. The government has to intervene to 
sustain investment in some areas because market forces alone do not 
provide clear enough indications of the profi tability of resources that 
do not actually exist, such as a new technology.
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Static models which assume exogenously given factor endow-
ments in one country relative to another are unlikely to be appropri-
ate. When a country wishes to spur the development of new sectors 
in the economy, such as Germany implementing an explicit policy 
to develop competence in biotechnologies from the 1990s onwards 
(Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004), it has to act on factor endowments and 
cannot take them as given. Thus research and development has to be 
favoured in order to increase the knowledge base (the endowment 
in knowledge), while the education system has to be mobilised to 
provide appropriate skills (researchers specialised in the new tech-
nology, engineers and technicians, and so on). The market failure 
argument can be used to justify public intervention to increase skills 
(via education programmes) and research and development (private 
investments are generally not optimal from a social point of view). 
But no indication of the particular tasks that have to be favoured 
is given from this unless an analysis of production processes is 
 performed. Even then, the latter analysis may be inconclusive.
An analysis of production organisation and the economic system 
should be performed with a long- term perspective, highlighting 
historical evolution and trends that make certain developments 
more likely. The market failure approach tends to lead to a frag-
mentation of industrial policies into specifi c actions, each aimed at 
specifi c market failures, without a broad perspective. Markets may 
effi  ciently favour the maximisation of short- term profi ts, so that 
no market failure appears. However, long- term perspectives are 
essential.
For instance, from the point of view of the effi  ciency of corpo-
rate governance, the separation of ownership and control has been 
shown to better ensure that fi rms maximise profi ts. A reliance on 
capital markets allows for the punishment of managers who do not 
maximise profi ts and act in the interest of the fi rm’s value, although 
the crisis has shown that these results are not always confi rmed. 
Therefore, from the point of view of market failure, distributed 
shareholding is better than concentrated shareholding. However, 
the reliance on capital markets has also been shown to lead fi rm 
managers to focus on short- term profi ts, at the expense of long- term 
investments. Thus some fi rms are led to redistribute their profi ts to 
shareholders instead of investing in costly (in the short- term) activi-
ties that may, however, yield high competitiveness in the long- term.
In addition, a fi rm may fi nd it appealing to delocalise its activities 
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away from a certain territory because this maximises its profi ts, but 
this may not favour the industrial and economic development of the 
territory which the fi rm leaves, because the fi rm’s departure leaves 
many people unemployed and local suppliers in crisis. The territory’s 
government may fi nd that persuading the fi rm not to leave is a useful 
industrial policy, although from a market failure point of view this 
is not justifi ed.
Our analysis is that the current crisis is due to the inability of the 
economic system, markets and institutions to adapt to the dramatic 
structural changes brought about by globalisation. There was not 
one market failure, but many market failures and, more fundamen-
tally, a structural adjustment problem of the system that has to be 
addressed.
Government Failures
When bureaucrats and policymakers are considered to be self- 
interested individuals, government failures may arise. These failures 
occur when they pursue their own interests at the expense of the 
interests of the community, or when they are ‘captured’ by interest 
groups or lobbies of various types. In the presence of information 
asymmetries – which imply that the behaviour of policymakers 
cannot be perfectly monitored – adopted policies can be wrong from 
a welfare point of view.
Pushing this argument to the extreme, this implies that the best 
solution is to leave the market to work freely or keep intervention 
to a minimum. However, looking at the experience of most coun-
tries that have reached a high industrial development level, both 
industrialised and newly ‘emerged’ economies, it is very diffi  cult to 
fi nd a case where governments have not implemented some sort of 
industrial policy, in the sense of shaping and promoting industrial 
development. Even the US did this by promoting research and devel-
opment in defence- related sectors and favouring ‘buy American’, 
using public procurement as a tool to develop sectors such as 
 aviation (Bianchi and Labory, 2010).
Both market and government failures have supported the ‘neo-
liberal’ view. Given the likely appearance of government failures, 
public intervention must be kept to a minimum: the minimum being 
pure market failures. In fact, claiming that the solution to economic 
problems is to leave the market to itself involves a value judgement: 
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namely that whatever solutions the market freely leads to is better 
than any attempt by the state to somehow adjust the evolution of 
the economic system. Losers will lose just because they are ineffi  cient 
and deserve to lose, even if that means falling into poverty. Similarly, 
abandoning an industrial policy because fi rms are better able to 
decide on their restructuring – and in any case the state cannot pick 
winners – implies the same value judgement.
The unpredictability of the tasks that will be off shored and those 
which will remain in the country as the process of unbundling goes 
on may also be used as an argument against state intervention, using 
the same value judgement. However, economic systems are complex 
and their evolution highly diffi  cult to predict. As stressed by Robbins 
(1981, p. 3), ‘quantitative prediction in economics is apt to be haz-
ardous’. Economics is not a natural science where a theory’s validity 
depends on its ability to predict economic outcome. If this were the 
case, the last fi nancial crisis would have been avoided.
We further argue that any policy recommendations necessarily 
involve value judgement. Robbins (1981) pointed to the desirability 
of returning to a political economy perspective in the sense that eco-
nomics cannot be a science and necessarily implies value judgements. 
‘There might be utility in the broad sense in the working of the insti-
tutions of well- run slave state, and yet the assumptions behind my 
Political Economy would reject them’ (1981, p. 8).
As we will argue in what follows, the consideration of entitle-
ments and provisions allows for the defi nition of industrial policy in 
a political economy framework, because they take account of rights 
and human freedom.
Systemic Failures
The evolutionary theory has outlined the importance of a third 
type of failure, namely systemic failure. When technical progress 
is determined in ‘systems of innovation’ – whereby all actors of the 
innovative process are interrelated and the density and eff ectiveness 
of the relationships is key to determining the extent of innovation 
and its commercial success – it is clear that failures of systems or 
networks have to be corrected in order to increase innovation. Von 
Tunzelmann (2010) has analysed technology policy in post- war 
Britain, arguing that network failures have created more problems 
than market failures although policy was more offi  cially justifi ed by 
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the latter failures. According to the author, technology policy must 
be designed taking into account the system innovation processes 
of which they are a part. Thus instruments aimed at increasing the 
innovative eff ort will be eff ective only if the overall system is coher-
ent. Von Tunzelmann provides the example of the Lisbon Strategy, 
which sows systemic failures within it given that budget constraints 
on the macro side suggest countries should follow restrictive eco-
nomic policies, while technological imperatives would dictate expan-
sive economic policies.
This analysis of systemic failures can be extended to the whole 
economic system, and not confi ned to technological development. It 
is therefore very interesting since it recognises the economic system 
as complex and dynamic, and suggests governing systemic failures in 
order to guide the system towards appropriate development paths.
New comparative advantages (be they defi ned at sector or task 
level) and new industries develop in territories where the presence of 
a system allows synergies between various actors to be realised. For 
instance, spin- off  fi rms are created from the interaction between a 
scientist, who makes a discovery with potential product application, 
and an entrepreneur, who brings management and business compe-
tencies. There might be systemic failures in industrial systems that 
prevent the restructuring of old industries and the birth of new ones.
According to Von Tunzelmann, and as shown by his example of 
the Lisbon Strategy, systemic failures also include problems raised 
by the lack of coherence between diff erent policies. Industrial policy 
will be ineff ective if macroeconomic or trade policies are incoher-
ent. Von Tunzelmann provides another example of systemic failure 
raised by incoherence. He argues that the corporate governance 
regime prevailing in the UK has also created problems for innova-
tion and acted as an obstacle to the eff ectiveness of innovation poli-
cies. The market- led system of the UK has led to short- termism in 
management and the impossibility of adopting long- term strategic 
decisions such as investment in technological development. Short- 
termism is due to the pressure of powerful capital interests and 
pressures to increase dividends for shareholders. The market for cor-
porate control worked all too well, favouring aggressive takeovers 
that impeded fi rms from adopting strategic long- term visions.
Von Tunzelman argues that there is a need for a better alignment 
of actor interests and objectives in the innovation system, at all 
levels: micro, meso and macro. Networking policies are important in 
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order to ensure better alignment. This is true for technological devel-
opment, but also for industrial development in general. For instance, 
old industries are more able to adapt to changing competitive con-
ditions if the system is eff ective in bringing about interactions with 
agents that can suggest solutions to the problems of old industries, 
or suggest the application of new technologies that can upgrade 
existing products or even change those products.
This approach, although limited to the sphere of technologi-
cal progress, is useful and very similar to our approach aiming to 
identify the gears and levers of industrial development to bring the 
economic system into desirable paths.
PROVISIONS AND ENTITLEMENTS AS KEY 
ELEMENTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Two important elements of industrial development are resources 
and rules. Resources include knowledge and human capital, as well 
as raw materials and infrastructures. Rules are both social (in some 
societies some categories of people are excluded from economic 
activities, such as some castes in India, or women in Islamic socie-
ties) and institutional (laws and regulations that determine, for 
instance, access to education or the procedures to create fi rms). 
Countries have diff erent sets of rules and resources that determine 
diff erent production organisation capacities and hence diff erent 
paths in industrial development. Rules and resources are not fi xed 
through time. On the contrary, they constantly evolve as a result of 
demographic, cultural and political trends.
In turn, rules and resources determine the capacity of the economic 
system to organise production, in the sense that they determine fea-
sible technologies, feasible contracts with employees, available raw 
materials, and available skills. Rules and resources therefore appear 
as levers which industrial policymakers can activate in order to 
favour industrial development.
The concepts of resources and rules can be made more precise by 
referring to Dahrendorf’s analysis in The Modern Social Confl ict. 
An Essay on the Politics of Liberty (1988), which he revised in 2008.1 
Dahrendorf defi nes the concepts of provisions and entitlements in a 
way that is similar to but more precise than our concepts of resources 
and rules. Entitlements refer to socially defi ned means of access; 
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essentially to goods, but not only goods. Sen (1982) defi ned entitle-
ments, referring only to goods. Dahrendorf extends the concept to 
include non- economic commodities such as the right to vote and the 
right to be educated: there are civil rights (basic elements of the rule 
of law and equality before the law), social rights (the universal right 
to real income) and political rights (suff rage, freedom of associa-
tion and freedom of speech). Entitlements open up choices in our 
commodity purchase, in our use of the education system, and in 
our voice in the political system. The set of choices (in the sense of 
objects from which to choose, not of the act of choosing) opened up 
by entitlements is what Dahrendorf calls ‘provisions’.
Both entitlements and provisions are key determinants of the 
development of nations: of their growth from not only an economic, 
but also a social, political and cultural point of view (what we shall 
call, in Smithian terms, the wealth of nations). Thus Dahrendorf 
gives the examples of the industrial revolution and the French 
revolution of the eighteenth century. While the former was essen-
tially a revolution of provisions, leading to an enormous growth in 
provisions, the latter was essentially a revolution of entitlements, 
concerned with enlarging human rights and the rights of citizens. 
Both provisions and entitlements are necessary for economic devel-
opment, or more generally the wealth of nations. Thus capitalism, 
and the enormous increase in provisions it has brought, would 
not have developed without the prior development of entitlements 
 throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
A more recent example is that of developing countries. The poli-
cies recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the 
World Bank to developing countries have concerned provisions and 
not entitlements, often increasing the wealth of the already rich in 
these countries and leaving the poor in the same situation as before 
since their entitlements, such as access to education, jobs and goods, 
did not change. As Dahrendorf puts it (2008, p. 15): ‘Unless tradi-
tional entitlement structures are broken and elements of civil society 
created, macroeconomic growth means little for the many, however 
satisfactory the International Monetary Fund may fi nd the statistics’.
In fact, Dahrendorf argues that economics has become a science 
of provisions, while politics and sociology have specialised in enti-
tlements. The problem is that the two are interrelated and must be 
taken simultaneously into account. Economic progress presupposes 
both, and for Dahrendorf taking both elements into account means 
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building a civil society. The interrelation of provisions and entitle-
ments, of economics and politics, is shown in the fact that civil rights 
provide access to markets and therefore help their extension, while 
rising income is a necessary precondition for an entitlement to a 
decent standard of living.
Countries have diff erent trajectories of industrial development 
according to their sets of provisions and entitlements. Some coun-
tries have levels of provisions and entitlements that are quite bal-
anced and lead to a balanced path of industrial development (path 
A in Figure 4.1). This is the path chosen by the EU in the economic 
integration process (see Chapter 6). Some have high levels of provi-
sions but low levels of entitlements (path B), which is the case of 
China. Others, such as South Africa, have low levels of provisions 
but high levels of entitlements (path C).2
Provisions and entitlements determine the capacity to organise 
production, hence simultaneously the effi  ciency and equity of a 
system. For instance, the division of labour characterising the British 
industrial revolution was made possible by the transformation of the 
feudal society into a bourgeois society, and in turn had implications 
Provisions 
Entitlements 
– + 
(B)
+ +
(A)   (C) 
– – + –
Figure 4.1 The relationship between provisions and entitlements
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on the development of a working class, leading to less poverty and 
more education within the population. Experiments with the divi-
sion of labour in British fi rms at that time implied a signifi cant 
increase in productivity (effi  ciency) but also in equity (poverty was 
reduced, although the living conditions of workers at that time was 
still quite hard). In turn, that industrial development fed increases 
in equity and effi  ciency (more access to education and the resulting 
higher capacity of workers who could contribute to higher produc-
tivity and effi  ciency).
In this framework, industrial policy has a clear role. By acting 
on provisions and entitlements the government infl uences indus-
trial development and consequently both ‘justice and happiness’, 
in the sense of equity (the capacity of all individuals to take part in 
economic activities) and standards of living (the type of work one 
has access to determines income, skills, capacity to learn, access to 
leisure and culture).
We can also relate this framework to the discussion of industrial 
policy in the current post- crisis context we have carried out so far. 
What globalisation has essentially meant is a rise in the diversity of 
players in world exchange, and hence in the complexity of industrial 
development. New players have emerged, with diff erent cultural 
and social characteristics, basing their development on particular 
 provisions and entitlements.
Whereas before the 1990s world trade was dominated by trade 
between developed countries, with similar provisions and entitle-
ments (culture, labour, regulation and so on), nowadays world trade 
is characterised by intense competition where the old players (the 
developed countries of the Western world, such as the US, Europe 
and Japan) have progressively lost market share to new players, such 
as China and India. These countries are characterised by specifi c 
provisions and entitlements.
For instance, China has abundant cheap and relatively skilled 
labour, together with limited entitlements (rights) that include 
extreme working conditions, little care for the environment and no 
freedom of speech (path B in Figure 4.1). These provisions and enti-
tlements have led to exponential growth, but at the cost of human 
rights and environmental protection. Chinese products fl ow to the 
rest of the world because they are cheap. This raises a deep indus-
trial policy problem for Western countries: should they adjust their 
provisions and entitlements to Chinese standards to reach a similar 
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   97 25/03/2011   15:50
98 Industrial policy after the crisis
industrial development path, or should China be made to raise its 
level of entitlements so that equity in China gets closer to the equity 
levels of the Western world?
Dahrendorf (2008) seems to suggest that China should be made 
to raise its levels of entitlements because only by doing so can it 
become a civil society. An interesting point that Dahrendorf stresses 
here is that a single country can no longer develop its civil society on 
its own, but depends on other countries in the world making similar 
progress due to the high level of interactions between them.
In the post- war world, Western countries dominated by the 
US dictated the levels of entitlements necessary for development. 
International organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), 
aimed at consolidating the importance of democracy and human 
rights and diff using them to developing countries. The ‘multilat-
eral’ world of today, where Western countries and values no longer 
dominate, has to defi ne new entitlements. New challenges have also 
emerged, such as environmental protection, which is essentially an 
entitlement problem (the right of access to a clean environment). 
However, the new players in world trade do not seem to be willing 
to accept such constraints. This was shown by the failure of interna-
tional discussions about climate change policies in Kyoto in 1998; 
developing countries are not ready to pay the cost of environmental 
damage until they reach certain levels of development.
Globalisation has brought about a change in the way access 
to fundamental rights is provided. Rights used to be guaranteed 
through long- term contracts, providing secure jobs for life. Through 
contributions, social assistance and access to health services and 
pensions in old age were also guaranteed. The changing produc-
tion organisation examined in Chapter 2 has forced governments 
to change labour legislation and new forms of contracts have 
been made possible. Many workers have now short- term or other 
forms of fl exible contracts, which no longer guarantee access to 
social assistance, health services or pensions. The state has also lost 
control over labour relations as a result of delocalisation and the 
transformation of large, integrated fi rms where trade unions used to 
bargain over labour contracts. This does not necessarily mean that 
workers’ rights have been reduced but that they need to be reformu-
lated. Fundamental labour rights that aff ect individual workers are 
identity, income and security. These rights are also fundamental to 
shaping life and personality.
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The organisation of production today is characterised by a divi-
sion of labour often organised on a global scale, exploiting com-
plementarities between diff erent parts of the world. Phases of the 
production process are spread across diff erent countries, according 
to the level of resources and capabilities available. In such a context, 
complementarities arise between countries, and the world system 
of production becomes very complex. Industrial development no 
longer depends on one country only but on various ones. The defi -
nition of entitlements, representing one lever of industrial develop-
ment, can no longer be decided individually by a country but only by 
all (or a group of) countries, in a coordinated manner.
It is in this sense that the European experience is illuminating. As 
argued in Chapter 6, European economic integration means that 
industrial development becomes a matter not only of single coun-
tries but also (and foremost) of the whole, of the EU. The primary 
industrial policy of the EU is therefore the economic integration 
process itself, because it requires the defi nition of a common vision 
of economic and industrial development, with common objectives 
which, in the EU, are laid down in its treaties (harmonious economic 
development that respects the environment; high levels of employ-
ment and social protection; constantly improving conditions and 
quality of life; and economic and social cohesion within and between 
countries). The economic integration process has thus led to the 
coordinated development of both provisions and entitlements in the 
EU and has resulted in European countries embarking on a similar 
path of development (path A in Figure 4.1).
Path C in Figure 4.1 characterises a country such as South Africa, 
where entitlements, namely civil rights, have only recently been 
extended to the whole population, and the economic opportunities 
for the black population remain low due to a lack of provisions (see 
Chapter 5).
In the market failure approach, industrial policy does not really 
make sense because it does not have instruments of its own. There 
are no ministries or agencies in charge of industrial policy for this 
reason (Välilä, 2006). Industrial policy is implemented through 
fi scal policy (subsidies, grants and tax exemptions), trade policy 
(access to foreign markets and access of foreign fi rms to the domes-
tic market), competition policy, social policy (such as education, 
life- long  training and workers’ protection) and even macroeconomic 
policy (infl uencing infl ation, exchange rates and interest rates).
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   99 25/03/2011   15:50
100 Industrial policy after the crisis
It is true that industrial development is determined by many 
factors, not only those related to industry characteristics but also 
macroeconomic, labour and other policies. For this reason, indus-
trial policy has to be considered as a vision, a strategy of industrial 
development in a political economy framework. Industrial develop-
ment, and more generally economic growth, arise when the whole 
economy is appropriately geared to it. However, we disagree with 
the conclusions of Välilä that industrial policy cannot be considered 
and thought about. Industrial policy is about complex interactions 
within the economy and no simple solution exists to spur indus-
trial development. However, a broad vision coming out of broad 
refl ection is necessary for all its components to be coherent and 
complementary.
As we will show in the last chapter, this is precisely what the 
European Commission seemed to suggest at the beginning of the 
twenty- fi rst century, by proposing a strategy for economic growth to 
which all member states would adhere and by underlining the impor-
tance of an integrated vision of industrial development. In this view 
industrial policy is considered in a broad sense not only to correct 
market failures but also to favour structural change, review crisis 
industries and develop new industries including, but not limited to, 
those that are science- based.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AS A VISION OF 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
The consideration of industrial policy as a vision of industrial 
development implies the explicit analysis of the complementarities 
between instruments and between implementation levels. Defi ning 
such an industrial policy allows all policy fi elds and all levels to share 
the same objective of industrial development (and development in a 
broad, classic sense).
Once this view is adopted, two issues arise. First, the design of 
industrial policy requires the identifi cation of industry’s current and 
future expected trends, of crisis industries and of the technologies of 
the future and the possible applications of such technologies. This 
analysis should allow for the identifi cation of possible scenarios of 
future industrial development which policymakers have to choose 
between. The choice of the industrial development path to favour is 
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both very risky (for example, choosing a technology that is rapidly 
surpassed by a new one) and very costly (resources are required to 
identify scenarios and above all to invest in the new technologies). 
However, the potential gain for the country as a whole, in terms of 
industrial and civil development, wealth of nations, is very high.
Industrial policy choice is also very political. Stakeholders have 
to be involved in order for the vision to be shared and approved. 
In dictatorial regimes, such as Italy in the 1930s, industrial policy 
choices are imposed. In democracies, consultation with all interested 
parties is necessary in order to increase the probability of success, 
both because consulting interested parties allows policymakers to 
better access relevant information and so make better- informed and 
more appropriate choices, and also because consensus indicates that 
implementation will be more closely followed. The need for consen-
sus on economic policy confi rms there are implied value judgements 
on which all stakeholders have to agree.
Industrial policy choices must also be made holistically, consid-
ering the interdependencies between instruments and policy levels, 
between strategy and organisations, organisations and their envi-
ronment, and so on. The economic system is complex and industrial 
development is determined by complex interdependencies and pro-
cesses. Industrial policy as a long- term vision of industrial develop-
ment implies the abandonment of methodological individualism by 
considering the specifi c industrial development problem within the 
overall system of which it is a part. Just as individual actions within 
societies are largely explained by the characteristics of the whole 
society, especially its social norms and culture, fi rms’ strategies and 
organisation are determined by the characteristics of the economic 
system of which they are a part: the institutions, the extent of the 
market and the characteristics of other related markets.
Industrial policy as a long- term vision of industrial development, 
leading to and backed by a civil society, can therefore be represented 
as shown in Figure 4.2.
A Framework for Industrial Policy as a Long- term Vision
Entitlements and provisions are essential elements of industrial 
policy. Using our refl ection on industrial policy in the twenty- fi rst 
century (Bianchi and Labory, 2006a, b; 2009), we identify two 
other dimensions or levels of development, namely innovation and 
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territory. Entitlements determine the rights of individuals to take 
part in development as well as in productive and competitive pro-
cesses. Provisions determine their knowledge, competencies and 
resources, and hence their capability to take part in these processes, 
together with other resources necessary to perform economic activi-
ties. Innovation is the capacity to create knowledge and to apply this 
new knowledge to production processes; it is a dynamic element that 
sustains development. The territory dimension highlights the impor-
tance of the embeddedness of productive processes in territories, 
where they can gain from local resources such as social capital and 
infrastructure (Figure 4.2).
All these levers are important and are not substitutes for each 
other. Sustainable industrial policy should aim at using all four 
levers, coherently defi ning and implementing measures at the diff er-
ent levels of regional, national and supranational government. These 
levels of government are represented by the bold line in Figure 4.2, 
creating a sundial.
All four elements determine both the cumulativeness and the sus-
tainability of industrial development: cumulativeness in the sense of 
providing a dynamic process; sustainability essentially in the sense 
Innovation: I
Provisions: PEntitlements: E
Territory: T
Figure 4.2 Four levers of industrial development
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of the compatibility of the economic, social and political spheres. 
These dimensions are not substitutes but complementary, and have 
to be simultaneously developed in order for industrial development 
to be sustainable from both social and environmental points of view.
In fact, the four levers can enable a virtuous circle of development: 
innovation spurs regional development and social improvements, 
which in turn enlarge entitlements, allowing more people to take part 
in the development process, which enables further innovation. The 
model is therefore essentially dynamic, not representing the develop-
ment process itself but both the elements to take into account in the 
policy decision- making process as well as their links. These elements 
and their links indeed determine possible learning mechanisms.
The model of entitlements, provisions, innovation and territory 
sets up all possible public policies, as shown in Figure 4.3.
The overall area defi ned by the four elements can be divided along 
the diff erent axes drawn, thereby determining areas that show dif-
ferent focuses of policies. The IOP area is that of traditional indus-
trial policies, consisting of measures to develop resources, such as 
infrastructure and fi nancing for fi rms, and measures to promote 
innovation. The IOT area is that of social policies, since people are 
T
I
E P
Social 
policies 
Structural 
policies 
Human
capital policies
Innovation
policies
Figure 4.3 The sundial of industrial policy: the EPIT framework
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primarily part of territorial communities and their social well- being 
is intimately linked to it. New social policies also include the provi-
sion of learning capacity to workers and therefore extend to the 
whole IET area. Entitlements are another key element of not only 
social policies, but also human capital policies in the sense of train-
ing and education. Providing the population with the relevant skills 
is indeed essential to industrial and economic development. The ETP 
area is that of urban and environmental policies.
If the dial leans towards the provisions pole, away from entitle-
ments, the risk is reaching what can be called a ‘Chinese syndrome’, 
where there is growth of provisions without entitlements. This 
growth is unsustainable from a social point of view because economic 
growth is not supported by redistributive and participative justice. In 
contrast, if the dial is shifted towards entitlements, without simul-
taneously developing provisions, we have high social demands that 
cannot possibly be fulfi lled, given the lack of resources. If the dial 
is pushed too far towards innovation, the risk is of non- embedded 
change, while pushing excessively towards territory risks leading to 
conservation without the ability to manage change.
CONCLUSION
The sundial therefore expresses the need for coherence between the 
diff erent levers. It is not necessary that all countries be perfectly in 
equilibrium, but if the sundial leans towards one pole or another 
it can indicate policy adjustments are needed and suggest possible 
actions for policymakers so that their long- term vision and imple-
mentation become more coherent and eff ective. These are industrial 
policies after the crisis: the capacity to view in the long- term the com-
plexity of society and to defi ne policies that could guarantee their 
economic, social and human development.
The axes on the dial can also change over time as new priorities 
emerge. For instance, the terms implicit in the EU Lisbon Strategy 
(Chapter 6) may be better termed as knowledge instead of innova-
tion (because of its emphasis on the knowledge- based economy 
where not only innovation, or knowledge creation, is essential but 
also the transfer and accumulation of existing knowledge); and envi-
ronment (particularly environmental concerns) instead of territory. 
Instead of entitlements, related to the right of access to collective 
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goods, there is the concept of capabilities, defi ned by Amartya Sen 
as not only access rights but also the capacity and the competency 
necessary to execute these rights. Provisions become human capital, 
which is key to activate all three of the other elements.
Development depends both on the extension of the base of the 
four elements (knowledge, environment, capabilities and human 
capital) and on the coherence between the instruments that the 
state, at regional, national and supranational level), implements in 
order to develop and coordinate the four key elements. The sundial 
therefore represents a holistic approach to industrial policy, trying 
to understand the mechanics of the whole in which industry is a 
component part in order to favour sustainable development, namely 
industrial development that is compatible with social development, 
equity and environmental preservation for future generations.
The next two chapters illustrate this framework with concrete 
examples.
NOTES
1. The Modern Social Confl ict. The Politics of Liberty, completely revised second 
edition (Dahrendorf, 2008).
2. These cases are illustrated in Chapter 5.
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   105 25/03/2011   15:50
106
5.  Industrial policies as long- term 
strategies: some examples
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we wish to illustrate our industrial policy framework 
using a few examples. These examples show the necessary coherence 
between the main pillars of the sundial we drew in the last chapter, 
but are not used to identify a single optimal path. In fact, it is impor-
tant to stress that there is no single path to long- term, sustainable 
industrial development but a number of diff erent possible routes 
from which a preferred one can be chosen. We suggest that this 
choice can be helped by the sundial which shows the requirement for 
coherence if development is to be sustainable and contribute to civil 
as well as economic development.
The sundial has four axes – entitlements, provisions, innova-
tion and territory – that are not substitutes but complementary in 
contributing to industrial development. Authorities at all levels can 
choose to favour one or more axes, but sustainability in the com-
petitive context of the twenty- fi rst century requires that all axes be 
considered in one way or the other. The vertical fi fth axis represents 
the coherence of industrial development policy. This is twofold: 
fi rst, coherence between the diff erent actions in the diff erent fi elds, 
namely macro and micro, and social and economic, must be ensured; 
second, coherence between the levels of implementation, namely 
regional, national and supra- national must also be ensured.
This is a holistic approach to industrial policy, whereby the poli-
cymaker takes a broad view, trying to represent the whole system 
in which the particular policy issue is part, in order to identify and 
activate the appropriate levers for industrial development.
We illustrate this view using a number of country case studies. 
Each case study provides a summary of what we think are the main 
features of that country and the main elements of the industrial devel-
opment path and industrial policy adopted (based on a literature 
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review and/or own experience in these countries). Inevitably we have 
had to perform a very broad synthesis.
We start with China and Brazil. The growth of emerging countries 
has been the most important aspect of the new century as already 
emphasised in this book. Since the 1990s, these countries have 
fuelled the growth of the world economy. In China, we focus on a 
particular region, Guangdong and the area of Shenzhen within it. 
The third country we mention is South Africa, because it is an inter-
esting example where there was a lack of entitlements for a long time, 
followed by a sudden extension of rights that continues to create 
 tensions because of the lack of equal distribution of provisions.
The other two countries examined are two small European coun-
tries, Ireland and Finland. We choose them because of their parallel 
high growth rates in the 1990s which were supported by very diff er-
ent approaches to industrial policy. As a result, these two countries 
have been very diff erently aff ected by the crisis. Given their small 
size, regional coherence may be less of a problem, although both 
countries have been concerned by this aspect too. To start with, 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the growth rates of these fi ve  countries 
over the period 1990 to 2012.
China is the highest growth country, sustaining high growth rates 
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Figure 5.1  Real GDP growth in Brazil, China and South Africa, 
1990 to 2012
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throughout the period, even during the fi nancial crisis. Brazil and 
South Africa have more uneven paths, while Finland and Ireland 
really take off  in the middle of the 1990s. The latter two countries 
are also the hardest hit by the fi nancial crisis, while the former three 
 countries rapidly return to pre- crisis growth levels.
CHINA
In order to illustrate our framework we focus on a particular 
Chinese region, and specifi cally the city of Shenzhen. Shenzhen is the 
city which has grown most rapidly in China in the last 30 years. In 
1978, Shenzhen was a fi shing village, closed behind the frontier that 
separated the Chinese People’s Republic and the booming British 
colony of Hong Kong.
The Shenzhen district then had 20 000 inhabitants and formed 
the southern part of Guangdong province, on the delta of the Pearl 
River. The provincial capital Guangzhou, Canton, had been the 
western entry port into the Chinese empire in the eighteenth century, 
characterised by corruption and political dependence. Adam Smith, 
even mentions the deprivation of the area in the Wealth of Nations. 
However, during the Mao era Guangdong became the most rapidly 
industrialising area of the People’s Republic, based on heavy industry.
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Figure 5.2 Real GDP growth in Finland and Ireland, 1990 to 2012
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At the end of the 1970s China started the policy of setting up 
economic zones, and the fi rst of these zones was created in Shenzhen 
in 1980. Economic zones are special areas where specifi c rules are 
implemented in order to support high growth rates. The main objec-
tives are to attract foreign capital and to favour the creation of 
manufacturing activities, not only thanks to low cost labour but also 
to special normative and fi scal conditions in the zones that make 
their products internationally competitive. The economic zones can 
thus manufacture products that are exported to the rest of the world, 
on the basis of a sort of social dumping that can only be temporary.
Shenzhen was chosen by Deng Xiao Ping as the fi rst economic 
zone with the idea that it could provide the productive base for 
Hong Kong island, thanks to its geographical location. Since then 
the Shenzhen economic zone has grown very rapidly, reaching 13.5 
million inhabitants and attracting investment amounting to about 
US$ 30 billion. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has operated since 
1990 and illustrates the strong development of the fi nancial sector in 
the city and region.
From an urban point of view the city expanded in two directions: 
one towards Canton, with the development of satellite cities inte-
grated by a railway and metro network, and the other towards Hong 
Kong. The integration process has been so strong that a unique 
metropolitan context has been in place since 2007 which would con-
stitute the third largest metropolitan area in the world, after New 
York and Tokyo.
From an economic point of view the development of Shenzhen has 
been supported by a strong concentration of high- tech investment, 
in particular by multinationals in the electronics sector, together 
with commercial activities in the port which are integrated with 
those of Canton and Hong Kong.
Extremely high growth has generated numerous problems, despite 
and because of so- called hukou, the regulations that require internal 
work and residence permits and limit the residence period within the 
economic zone. It is estimated that about 70 per cent of the Chinese 
workers employed in the zone do not hold hukou, so they have to go 
back to the countryside when they have fi nished their work contract. 
Parallel cities for temporary workers are also developing.
Thus a complex urban development experienced two crucial 
periods. In the fi rst period a special economic zone was defi ned 
and saw the fi rst housing developments centred on the growth of 
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industrial areas with rather precarious residential areas alongside. 
In the second period it became necessary to structure the city, using 
urban interventions to articulate service and residential areas as the 
economic zone became more and more high- tech. In particular, new 
universities were created, including Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 
Polytechnic, Shenzhen Graduate School of Beijing, University, 
Shenzhen Institute of Information Technology and the Southern 
University of Science and Technology.
The rapid growth of the urban area inevitably created social 
problems, in particular crime. Another important type of problem 
created has centred on the environment. Such rapid and extensive 
growth has created many pollution problems, of the air water and 
soil.
The Shenzhen government decided to tackle the social and envi-
ronmental problems by designing a long- term strategy of industrial 
development. International experts and business representatives, 
including representatives of foreign multinationals, were invited to 
identify the long- term development issues of the area and suggest 
solutions.1 The process led to the identifi cation of three critical 
issues:
1. the need to increase the quality of production and the required 
adjustments in education and research; hence the relationship 
between industrial, technological and educational dynamics;
2. the defi nition of environmental priorities and the redefi nition 
of urban areas in order to address pollution and modernisation 
problems;
3. the need to address social problems and to extend entitlements, 
in particular freedom of expression, pushed by the media in 
Hong Kong which is still relatively free.
The case of Shenzhen shows how the issues of industrial policy, 
urban policy and technological policy are interrelated. It also shows 
the infi nite set of actions that can be implemented at the diff erent 
levels of policy, from town to province, region and nations, the 
coherence of which can only be guaranteed by defi ning a strategy for 
long- term industrial development.
A third lesson to draw from this case is that a long- term vision of 
industrial development can only be sustainable if entitlements are 
developed together with provisions. The whole of China is trying to 
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sustain development on the basis of a growth in provisions, without 
due regard for entitlements such as the civil and political rights of 
citizens. Political élites of the communist party take all decisions at 
all decision- making levels. This form of development, exclusively 
based on provisions without entitlements, has a high cost: the need 
to maintain high growth rates to avoid social unrest.
China’s growth obligations have pushed the government to main-
tain its ‘dangerous liaison’ with the US, buying the US defi cit both 
to avoid an appreciation of the Yuan and to allow Americans to con-
tinue buying Chinese products. China after the crisis will be a more 
technological, dynamic and educated country, but also a country 
with higher internal inequalities and resulting instabilities. Despite 
this the country will have to show more responsibility and participa-
tion in global economic and political coordination now it is one of 
the world’s biggest powers. This extreme contradiction will have to 
be resolved at some point.
In terms of our sundial, Chinese development can be represented 
by the starting point of the arrows in Figure 5.3. The direction of 
T
I
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Figure 5.3 Sundial showing changes needed in Chinese development
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the arrows to the left and bottom changes in development needed to 
become more sustainable.
BRAZIL
Brazil is today part of the so- called BRICs countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China), which inverted the dynamics of the world 
economy at the beginning of the twenty- fi rst century. By 2009 Brazil 
had become the world’s eighth largest economy in terms of GDP, 
and ninth in terms of purchasing power parity (World Bank).
After a long history of colonisation, followed by political instabil-
ity and dictatorship after independence, Brazil has had a democratic 
government since 1985. President Cardoso governed the country 
between 1994 and 2002 and ensured a return to economic stabil-
ity. President Lula da Silva has been governing the country since 
2002, implementing an interestingly balanced strategy of industrial 
development.
The Lula government courageously increased public spending and 
the poorest families’ income by raising the minimum wage and pen-
sions. This created a signifi cant rise in internal demand both from 
households and from the state. Investments also increased so that 
overall the economy experienced a boom.
Without going into details in this short overview, Brazil provides 
an example of balanced industrial development in the sense that 
both eff ective rights (entitlements) and provisions have risen simul-
taneously. In addition, entitlements and provisions have contributed 
to development in a complementary way, so that development is 
robust and sustainable in the long- term. This synergetic develop-
ment of entitlements and provisions not only boosts social cohesion 
but also regional cohesion, which has been a concern of the Lula 
government from the start.
Regional cohesion rests on developing the north- eastern states 
to eliminate the historical social injustice of the country and also to 
generate a new level of economic development that could benefi t the 
whole country. This strategy however requires a long- term vision 
where investment in large infrastructures, such as the Porto Suape, 
is viewed not only as a development lever to generate growth around 
the port but also as the basis for developing trade with the rest of the 
world, turning these regions into worldwide exchange hubs.
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The Brazil of Lula seems to represent an attempt to simultane-
ously develop rights and resources, ensuring cohesion between 
 economic development and democracy (Figure 5.4).
SOUTH AFRICA
The new South Africa started in 1994, with the end of apartheid 
and a change in the constitution. The history of the country started 
with the arrival of Dutch colonists in 1652. Their objective was not 
to create provinces of their home country abroad, but to create new 
independent states. Fighting against local populations, the Dutch 
colonists (Boers) expanded along the coastal area around Cape 
Town and the Natal Province.
When Great Britain attempted to put these areas under British 
dominance, lured by the discovery of diamonds and then gold, the 
Boers were pushed further inland, crossing the Vaal river where they 
founded the Transvaal and Orange Free State.
T
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Figure 5.4 Sundial of Brazilian development
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After a new war with the British, these states were conquered 
and the Union of South Africa was created, gaining independ-
ence in 1910 and taking the name of the Republic of South Africa. 
Segregation became institutionalised and the government estab-
lished three classes of race: white, coloured and black.
The republic was a state of the white, reaching standards of living 
comparable to the West. Coloured people were discriminated against 
but involved within democratic life, while blacks were left as a class 
without rights. After World War Two, foreign governments started 
to boycott South African products in protest against apartheid. 
Within the country, the black population started to organise and 
movements against apartheid expanded, of which Nelson Mandela, 
incarcerated for 27 years, remained a reference and leader.
At the beginning of the 1990s, in the extraordinary period of 
history where the Berlin Wall and bipolarity ended, apartheid also 
came to an end. The government took the fi rst step towards this end 
in 1990 by lifting the ban on the African National Congress and 
other political organisations. Nelson Mandela was freed and soon 
became head of state. Civil and political rights were recognised for 
the whole population, but the economy remained in the hands of 
whites.
Today South Africa remains imbalanced as entitlements have been 
provided to the whole population but provisions are still unequally 
distributed, raising discontent among poorer sections of society. 
Provisions
Entitlements
Figure 5.5 Provisions and entitlements in South Africa
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Here the problems are essentially social and show that  entitlements 
cannot be extended if provisions are not.
IRELAND
Ireland developed rapidly from the 1990s up to 2005. However, it 
experienced a collapse with the fi nancial crisis, resulting from struc-
tural weaknesses that were not addressed by industrial policies. In 
2008, growth fell substantially, and the public defi cit rose to one of 
the highest levels in eurozone; prospects for living standards have 
gone down, while unemployment is growing.
Yet during the period 1990 to 2005 Ireland experienced average 
annual growth rates of more than 7 per cent, bringing commenta-
tors to speak of the ‘Celtic Tiger’. The rapid fall in real GDP growth 
in 2008 (see Figure 5.2) led to talk about the collapse of the Irish 
economy, although this assessment may be somewhat exaggerated 
and it may be more appropriate to refer to a deep recession.
However, a number of scholars have highlighted weaknesses in the 
Irish economy that might have increased the sharpness of the reces-
sion and the vulnerability of the Irish industrial development path. 
For instance, Kirby (2010) makes a pessimistic analysis of the Irish 
economy. He outlines three major structural weaknesses that bring 
into question both the recovery of the economy after the recession 
and longer- term growth. First, Irish industrial development has been 
spurred by the growth of high- tech sectors, especially electronics and 
pharmaceuticals, but the bulk of the sector is foreign- owned with 
very few indigenous fi rms. Thus in 2006, output from fi rms assisted 
by Ireland’s industrial development agencies included €50.6 billion 
from foreign- owned fi rms and €9.7 billion from indigenous fi rms, 
while employment was almost equally divided between the two types 
of fi rms (153 510 in foreign- owned ones and 151 610 in indigenous 
fi rms) (Kirby, 2010, pp. 6–7). The Irish high- tech sector is therefore 
highly dependent on foreign- owned fi rms, mainly US ones.
Irish industrial policy has essentially focused on attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) using a number of measures including main-
taining low tax rates (Bailey et al., 2010). The development of indige-
nous fi rms has only recently represented a concern. Only in 1994 did 
a programme for small businesses start in Ireland, with the ‘Small 
Business Operational Programme’. The indigenous fi rm sector is not 
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only small, it is also not innovative with low investment in research 
and development, and low product and process innovation. The 
focus on FDI attraction not only led to maintaining low tax rates but 
also to adopting other types of measures to ensure the competitive-
ness of the Irish economy. One such measure has been social partner-
ship agreements on moderate wage increases in return for lower tax 
rates.2 Such agreements have been adopted since 1987 (Bailey et al., 
2010a), with six such social pacts adopted between 1988 and 2005. 
Ireland also chose to favour FDI in particular sectors, namely elec-
tronics and pharmaceuticals, chosen because of their high growth 
prospects and low transport costs. Another measure to attract this 
investment has been the training of skilled labour able to work in 
these particular sectors.
The second weakness according to Kirby is social failure, or what 
we could call a lack of coherence between economic growth and 
social cohesion. The Irish boom disproportionately benefi ted techni-
cal professionals and self- employed small business entrepreneurs. 
They gained high incomes while a substantial part of the population 
remained on low- incomes or even in poverty. Relative poverty in 
fact increased during the years of the Irish boom: the percentage 
of the population with income at 50 per cent or less of the average 
rose from 18.6 per cent in 1994 to 23.8 per cent in 2001, and the Gini 
coeffi  cient of inequality was 32 in 2005, a bit higher than the EU- 15 
average of 30 and much higher than the value in Finland (26).3
In addition, there is evidence that public services are of low quality 
in Ireland, especially health (low quality of care and inequality in 
access to health services) and education, generating strong inequali-
ties in life- chances. Ireland also has more homeless people than 
many other European countries (Kirby, 2010) and homelessness 
doubled between 1993 and 2005.
The third weakness outlined by Kirby is the wrong adjustment to 
globalisation. Ireland is one of the most globalised countries in the 
world, but this adjustment came through the liberalisation of the 
banking sector and housing markets which led to even more expo-
sure during the fi nancial crisis.
Overall, the industrial policy chosen by the Irish state focused on 
attracting FDI by liberalising the economy and providing favourable 
tax rates at the expense of social cohesion. Thus Cullen (2004) shows 
the high price in health, quality of life and the social  environment 
paid by Irish people for the economic boom.
M2570 - BIANCHI PRINT.indd   116 25/03/2011   15:50
 Examples of long- term strategies 117
Irish industrial policy has therefore not been sustainable from a 
social point of view. In terms of our sundial, the preferred levers 
have been innovation, knowledge, and provisions but not entitle-
ments. Provisions have been favoured at the expense of entitlements, 
with capabilities increased only for a small (highly- skilled) part of 
the population.
Perhaps because of a lack of attention to entitlements in the 
whole population, FDI has not produced much spillover to the rest 
of the economy. Some studies have shown that the contribution of 
multinationals to the Irish economy has been small compared to 
their Irish revenues (see the review by Bailey et al., 2010a). Bailey 
et al. (2010a) conclude that there is evidence of Lewis- type dualism, 
in that indigenous fi rms have not benefi ted much from FDI. The 
evidence concerning the linkages between FDI and indigenous fi rms 
shows very small linkages in traditional and overall manufacturing 
sectors and signifi cant but small linkages in the high- tech sector. 
Clusters have also developed in the country but their linkages with 
 multinationals are low.
Bailey et al. (2010a) conclude that it is also important to develop 
domestic capabilities for industrial development, in order to avoid 
vulnerability. The Irish FDI- led growth has proved to be extremely 
vulnerable to both a downturn in the US economy and to a move of 
multinationals’ activities to lower cost countries.
In 2008 the Irish government issued a recovery strategy entitled 
‘Building Ireland’s Smart Economy’ (Government of Ireland, 2008), 
which presented the government’s industrial policy objectives for the 
next fi ve years. The main objectives are to prepare the ground for 
recovery and long- term future growth, through two major sets of 
policies. The fi rst set is just a continuation of previous Irish industrial 
policies, namely to spur the high- tech sector by attracting FDI, essen-
tially by maintaining the competitiveness of the economy (through 
low taxes and low wages). The second set of policies aims at address-
ing environmental problems, making Ireland a ‘green economy’.
The Irish experience shows in particular that focusing on one 
sector or one type of sector is not sustainable in the long- term. In 
fact, industrial policy in Ireland has been almost entirely focused on 
the high- tech sector, generating two problems:
1. the Irish high- tech sector has developed primarily thanks to 
foreign- owned fi rms butwith limited growth of indigenous fi rms;
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2. it has produced a dual society where one part of the population, 
highly skilled workers in the high- tech sectors, are well- off  while 
the rest of the population face unemployment because tradi-
tional and other lower- skill sectors have not developed much.
A knowledge- based economy should not only mean innovation 
capability in high- tech sectors but also access to knowledge and to 
learning mechanisms for all citizens in all sectors of the economy. 
Our sundial expresses just that: new sectors are needed but they 
should not constitute the only focus of industrial policy. In addition, 
developing a domestic capability for industrial development is very 
important to avoid vulnerability. However, developing domestic 
capability is generally a slow process that requires decades.
The Irish case also shows that industrial policy must be aligned 
with macroeconomic policies: a policy of tax relief for foreign fi rms 
locating in the country, together with moderate wage increases nego-
tiated with social partners in order to further attract foreign fi rms, 
in exchange for income tax rebates, is inevitably accompanied by 
reduced public expenditure. If public expenditure does not go down 
in the area of infrastructure (essential to attract FDI) and innovation 
and training programmes for the sectors of the foreign fi rms (high- 
tech in Ireland), it has to go down in other areas. In Ireland, it has 
gone down in the area of social security.
FINLAND
As a result of a very deep recession in the early 1990s, it is argued 
that Finland has shifted from a resource- based to a knowledge- 
based economy in ten to 15 years, thanks to a strong and effi  cient 
research and technological development policy.
Looking at Finland’s industrial story in more detail is illuminating. 
Not only did Finland rapidly move to a knowledge- based economy, 
but it also rapidly industrialised, shifting from an economy where 
the primary sector is predominant to an economy where the second-
ary sector prevails. In the 1950s, more than half the population and 
40 per cent of output were still in the primary sector. Already by the 
1970s the country become a mature industrial economy.
How did this happen? The evidence is that Finland’s industriali-
sation was strongly backed by the state, through industrial policy. 
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From the 1950s on it started a policy of strong capital accumulation, 
where the state promoted, in agreement with business and other 
stakeholders, investments in two specifi c industrial sectors, forest 
and metal- based industries. The social consensus on this industrial 
policy appears to have been particularly strong, since many scholars 
stress its importance (for instance, Jäntti and Vartiainen, 2009; Ylä- 
Antilla and Palmberg, 2007).
The Finnish industrial development path was boosted and sus-
tained by a number of elements. First, large investments could be 
made thanks to the high level of savings available in the economy. 
Public savings were high in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s by inter-
national standards, at about 8 per cent of GDP. These savings were 
used to fi nance investment and support state- owned fi rms in the 
basic- metal, chemical- fertilisers and energy sectors.
Second, interest rates were controlled by credit rationing. As a 
result of these fi rst two elements, investment as a percentage of GDP 
was about 25 per cent in the 1960s and 35 per cent in the 1980s. A 
third element was the importance given to international linkages 
from the start. Finland being a small economy (just over 5 million 
people), it turned early towards exports in order to increase the extent 
of its market. Exports grew from about 20 per cent of GDP in 1960 
to 30 per cent of GDP at the beginning of the twenty- fi rst century.
A fourth element was the complementarity between sectors of 
the economy. In the industrialisation phase, the Finnish forest and 
metal industries grew in a complementary manner; in the later phase 
of transformation into a knowledge- based economy, the develop-
ment of the diff erent industries was also complementary since the 
main growing sector, information and communications technology 
(ICT), was also the driving- force for the modernisation of the more 
traditional industries.
A fi fth element was the previously mentioned corporatism – a 
pragmatic and strong level of cooperation between the state, busi-
nesses and other stakeholders. ‘The Finnish business elites colluded 
to distort the markets in a way that sustained high investment rates’ 
(Jäntti and Vartiainen, 2009, p. 9). These two authors argue that 
the credibility of politicians is key in order to make industrial policy 
(growth policy for them) function: they have to have clear objectives, 
share them with businesses and workers, and set out a strategy to 
reach them.
Complementary to the fi fth element, has been the low levels of 
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corruption and a widely shared consensus across the population 
due to the nearby presence of the USSR, now Russia. The threat of 
the USSR appears to have made the Finnish more apt to consensus 
(Jäntti and Vartiainen, 2009): the country had to grow in order to 
justify its independence and workers had to be cared for in order 
to avoid increasing support for communist ideas and the possible 
infl uence of its neighbour country. Therefore, trade unions were 
encouraged to take part in the discussions on industrial policy and 
unionisation was encouraged.
Economic growth and industrial development therefore took 
place alongside social cohesion. Moderate wage increases were 
agreed in the negotiations between the state, businesses and labour 
in order to maintain the international competitiveness of Finnish 
fi rms. However, in return, the state committed to develop welfare 
services. For example, the expansion of the welfare system in the 
1960s and 1970s led to the number of social workers tripling between 
1970 and 1985. Health and other welfare services have been provided 
on the basis of universal access – access to all at the same price.
Industrial transformations and restructuring always generate 
winners and losers; when the government agrees with labour to 
favour certain transformations because they are the only guarantee 
of the country’s long- term industrial development, but ensures that 
the losers will get support, it is more likely not only to get political 
consensus on the transformations but also to enable more people 
to take part in learning dynamics and become winners of industrial 
development.
Market forces alone do not consider losers’ compensation, because 
of their focus on short- term profi ts. Only a political action can take 
this issue into account, because it brings benefi ts in the short term 
to the wider aim of economic development over and above income 
growth; and in the long- term, also to economic growth, by enabling 
more workers to take part in the new industrial development path 
through retraining programmes.
Finland is now a knowledge- based economy, after a second indus-
trial transformation from 1990 onwards. To give just one example, 
the value of ICT export products was 5 per cent of Finland’s total 
export value in 1990 and about 20 per cent in 1998 (Paija, 2000). In 
addition, according to international classifi cations, Finland is the 
country most specialised in ICT and has a high quality of education 
at all levels but especially at higher ones.
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After the industrialisation phase of the 1950s to 1970s, Finland 
continued developing by looking to new industries. After the reces-
sion of the early- 1990s, Finns agreed on a new social pact to restruc-
ture into a knowledge- based economy, building a national system 
of innovation, priority to research and development investment, 
clusters, and an ICT- driven industrial development path.
A quick look into the transformation of Finland into a knowledge- 
based economy shows that the industrial development strategy did 
not start in the 1990s but much earlier. A determining factor appears 
to be the adoption by the Finnish government, in the 1970s, of spe-
cifi c telecommunication standards that were subsequently adopted 
in other Nordic countries, and then Europe and the rest of the world. 
The international adoption of Finnish standards or of standards 
already adopted by Finnish fi rms provided them with a fi rst mover 
advantage that was a key factor in their success.
Another specifi c aspect is that this move to a knowledge- based 
economy, through the rapid growth of the ICT sector, has been 
driven by one large fi rm that, given the small size of the Finnish 
economy, drove the whole industrial development of the country. 
This fi rm is of course Nokia, a very old Finnish fi rm created in 
1865, which had run diff erent businesses up to its specialisation in 
ICT in the 1990s (Ali- Yrkkö, 2001). Nokia developed its business 
in telecoms equipment and subsequently a cluster of smaller ICT 
fi rms developed in the country. In 1998, Nokia had about 300 fi rst- 
tier suppliers. The Finnish ICT cluster now consists of thousands of 
fi rms, many of which used to work for Nokia but developed their 
independence and started supplying other fi rms, especially foreign 
ICT fi rms such as IBM, ICL (now Fujitsu- Siemens) and Ericsson.
However, Nokia is still the dominant actor in this business in 
Finland. It is the largest company in Finland, accounting for about 
a third of the market capitalisation of the national stock exchange. It 
represented about 3.3 per cent of the value of Finnish GDP, contrib-
uted 1.9 per cent to GDP growth and more than 30 per cent of the 
whole research and development (private and public) expenditure 
of the country in 2000 (Ali- Yrkkö, 2001). In contrast, it represented 
only 1.1 per cent of total Finnish employment, showing that new 
sectors such as ICT are useful to bring dynamism to economies but 
are not necessarily large employers. They predominantly employ 
highly- skilled employees who only represent a small part of the pop-
ulation. Hence the social sustainability of such an industrial policy 
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strategy must also consider other sectors which can generate more 
employment at lower skill levels.
Nokia is a large domestic fi rm so the reliance of Finnish industrial 
development on one single large fi rm is not as worrying as in the case 
of Ireland, where large foreign- owned fi rms have come looking for 
high- tech skills but are ready to move if the relative costs of the same 
skills are lower in other countries. However, Finnish authorities are 
concerned about the lack of entrepreneurship in Finland, and are 
taking measures to promote it.
A number of lessons can be drawn from the Finnish case. First, a 
long- term perspective is necessary in order to design an appropriate 
industrial development path, and measures towards it must be con-
sistent over time. Second, some specifi c sectors can be pin- pointed 
but the rest of the industrial structure must be considered too, and 
induced to restructure and adjust by favouring complementarities 
between sectors. In Finland, mature industries such as forestry and 
metals restructured by adopting new information and communica-
tions technologies to improve production processes.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has briefl y illustrated the application of a holistic 
approach to industrial policy. It has also shown the heterogene-
ity in countries, and regions’ initial conditions and possible paths 
to industrial development. Each country has specifi c economic, 
social and political history and conditions and has to defi ne specifi c 
 development strategies.
The holistic approach not only means defi ning appropriate meas-
ures to guide eff ective development along an appropriate path, but 
also to hold the diff erent parts in a coherent whole, in a dynamic 
way, maintaining coherence as the whole evolves and grows.
Among the countries considered, it appears that those which have 
paid attention to social cohesion as well as training, education and 
investment to favour the restructuring of traditional industries and 
the development of new industries (for example, Finland), have 
performed best. Finland, although a small country with limited 
resources, has managed to develop a sustainable industrial devel-
opment path built on consensus and coherent actions on the social 
side (training, education and welfare) and on the economic side 
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(investment in research and development, and regional develop-
ment). Brazil also appears to have chosen a balanced development 
path and a set of coherent measures, although our analysis of this 
country is too brief to provide detailed evidence.
Ireland appears to have chosen a vulnerable industrial develop-
ment path, paying little attention to social cohesion and choosing a 
high dependence on foreign multinationals rather than developing a 
strong domestic industrial base.
China is an example of development fuelled by an enormous 
growth of provisions without entitlements. In fact, only very high 
growth rates can make such a development path sustainable.
South Africa is a country where entitlements have been extended 
but provisions remain unequally distributed, thereby preventing a 
part of the population really taking part in development.
Industrial development strategies therefore vary according to 
history, as well as social, economic and political characteristics. 
They have to be coherent in order to be sustainable, not only 
between diff erent policy areas (social, welfare, innovation and trade, 
for example), but also between policy levels (local, regional and 
national).
The next chapter shows how the EU has been able to defi ne a 
coherent industrial policy, not only between policy areas, since trea-
ties have constantly stressed the importance of coherence between 
policy fi elds (at least since the Maastricht Treaty), but also between 
policy levels which, in the EU, are not only regional and national, 
but also supranational.
NOTES
1. One of these experts was Patrizio Bianchi who was economic adviser to the 
Governor of the Guangdong province in 2000.
2. The promised tax rebate in return for lower wages is put into question by O’Toole 
(1997), who shows that employees on 50 per cent of the average industrial wage 
rate saw the average tax rate rise from 14.4 per cent in 1980 to 17.4 per cent in 
1995, while employees on fi ve times the average industrial wage saw their average 
tax rate decline from 50.6 per cent in 1980 to 46.8 per cent in 1995.
3. Source: Eurostat http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_ 
sic2&lang=en.
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6. The European experience
In 2000, the EU launched a complex strategy for industrial develop-
ment aiming to revitalize the European economy by completing the 
three phase process establishing monetary union and enlargement to 
Central and Eastern European countries. The context external to the 
EU was also important since the Doha trade agreement was signed 
in the same year and China entered the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The Lisbon Strategy proposed concerted action involving 
multiple policies and represented a long- term vision of industrial 
development for the EU.
This chapter explores how this new approach relates to previous 
European approaches to industrial policy. First, a historical review 
of industrial policy is provided, based on our previous work (Bianchi 
and Labory, 2009). The Lisbon Strategy is then analysed as a long- 
term vision of industrial development. The problem with this strat-
egy has been the lack of political commitment to its implementation, 
as we will see in this chapter.
ECONOMIC OPENING AND STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT POLICIES
Economic union means an aggregation of nation states agreeing a 
series of common rules in order to guide an economic integration 
process. Economic union is therefore primarily a political action that 
facilitates an institutional transformation and, with it, structural 
dynamics within and between countries.
In order to defi ne the nature and direction of the structural 
changes brought about by the opening of the economy it is there-
fore necessary to simultaneously defi ne the collective dynamics and 
institutional changes: that is the collective norms that regulate the 
internal and external relationships of the social groups that interact 
through the economic opening process.
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Historically, up to the beginning of the economic integration 
process, European capitalism developed within each nation; each 
European country implementing its own strong industrial policies 
to support national champions. The extent of national sovereignty 
was more limited than the extent of the market, with the conse-
quence that economic growth inevitably turned into a confl ict of 
nations.
The productive system was defi ned on a national basis so that the 
state could act on the division of labour and on the extent of the 
market. Interventions on the division of labour aimed at concentrat-
ing production; interventions on the extent of the market aimed at 
opening foreign markets through trade policy.
The traditional references of that industrial policy have been 
France’s strong interventionism, as well as the Japanese experience 
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI): that 
is, strong central bureaucracies that could defi ne and orient eff ec-
tive economic development towards specifi c industrial development 
paths using command- and- control instruments together with a 
strong moral orientation of independent economic agents.
This vision of interventionist industrial policy did not leave space 
for competition policy. Instead the state was pushing to concentrate 
national industry in order to reach scale effi  ciencies and be well- 
equipped to compete in world markets, defending national interests. 
This type of policy was also characterised by its centralisation and 
consequent neglect of local development issues, apart from issues 
related to factor prices.
This policy perspective cannot function in an economic integra-
tion process, such as a tariff  and economic union. At the beginning 
the integration process may function, leaving national institutions 
and interest groups unchanged. However, as integration proceeds 
national alliances are inevitably questioned by the structural changes 
brought about and new alliances get created that pull together inter-
ests from across national boundaries.
Integration inevitably has an eff ect on national institutions, and 
common rules must be defi ned in order to avoid national interests 
requesting protection. The politically crucial and delicate step of 
the economic integration process therefore consists of defi ning the 
transition towards an economic union and setting out the policy 
approach to favour the structural changes that have to take place in 
order for the process to be eff ective.
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE TREATY OF 
ROME
The absence of explicit provisions regarding industrial policy in the 
Treaty of Rome was not the result of neglect but of a clear limit 
imposed by national governments on the powers of the Community.
The conception of industrial policy was that of a central author-
ity which, through the specifi cation of administrative acts, classifi ed 
fi rm behaviour as forbidden or admissible – or to be promoted – in 
order to reach an industrial structure that was assessed as most in 
line with the general objectives. This conception of industrial policy 
has been called ‘constructivist’ and is of French origin, having been 
developed during the reign of Louis XIV by his Minister of Finance, 
Jean- Baptiste Colbert. It presupposed that the state had the techni-
cal capacities and the political legitimacy to delineate and manage 
objectives of national development and collective welfare using regu-
latory instruments. It was still the prevalent approach to industrial 
policy in France in the 1950s operated by the Commissariat Général 
au Plan, the head of which was Jean Monnet.
The basic principle of such an approach is that the extent of the 
market is wider than the area of sovereignty of the national state 
and so the government must ‘guide’ its industry to make the country 
economically independent and politically strong.
The authority governing industry therefore has a political role 
which can only be assigned to the central government. The assign-
ment of such functions to a supranational government could only 
arise in exceptional cases, where codetermination principles could be 
accepted in the name of collective welfare. In other words, given pos-
sible economic confl icts that would eventually become political, the 
European states accepted the idea of creating a common organisa-
tion that would govern production and trade in order to internalise 
these possible confl icts.
As a result the Treaty of Rome only contains rules about fair 
competition in the common market, while industrial policy is left 
to the authority of national governments. The treaty does however 
contain the objective of stable industrial development, to avoid 
internal divergence that could put common action at risk. The treaty 
also includes precise norms that prevent nation states from imple-
menting any public interventions that would create obstacles to the 
 functioning of the common market.
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The main action in favour of industrial development was in fact 
the completion of the tariff  and economic union that the Treaty of 
Rome instituted. This process of integrating the economies of the 
six founding countries was set up to allow the necessary structural 
adjustments to take place in a progressive manner. Member states 
could take measures to promote structural adjustment and also 
measures to strengthen national fi rms so that they could compete in 
the new common market. The main measures included in the Treaty 
of Rome regarding competition in the common market therefore 
concern fair competition and preventing the abuse of dominant posi-
tions (as well as cartels and any implicit or explicit agreements), and 
the prohibition of state aid that favours national fi rms at the expense 
of fi rms in other member states.
Exceptions were allowed that enabled the implementation of 
industrial policy in practice. For example, Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty of Rome allowed derogations to the prohibition of cartels 
or any agreement between fi rms in the case of agreements aiming to 
improve production or product distribution, or to promote techni-
cal or economic progress, provided they did not end up restricting 
competition in the common market.
This formulation was a compromise between the French and the 
German visions of the time. The French vision favoured fusions 
and acquisitions to create national champions and did not include 
competition as a key objective. The German vision paid attention to 
the fair functioning of markets, although actions aimed at improving 
social aspects were also considered necessary.
So while the abuse of dominant positions was prohibited, excep-
tions were allowed where considered necessary for technical progress 
and for ensuring the competitiveness of European fi rms against 
outside fi rms, primarily large American fi rms.
EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE 1970s
In the 1970s industrial policy fell within the competence of member 
states, although within the framework defi ned at the European 
level. The crises of the 1970s hit the various member states diff er-
ently. The Community took a supervisory role when it came to 
national policies but also explicitly promoted constructivist policies. 
The most obvious illustration of this was in the steel sector, where 
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Commissioner Davignon proposed a plan for the restructuring of 
the sector based on agreed market shares and determined minimum 
prices (May 1977). This plan was accompanied by subsidies to fi rms 
in order for them to reduce their production capacity.
This action plan conducted within the European Coal and Steel 
Community generated similar actions in other sectors: an agree-
ment between the 11 main European producers of synthetic fi bres 
was signed in 1978. This split the European market on the basis of 
the market shares prevailing in 1976, and introduced subsidies and 
protectionist trade policy measures limiting imports from outside 
the Community. Thus the Commission itself interpreted its role in 
industrial development in the 1970s as a guarantee of the competi-
tiveness of European fi rms in the face of foreign rivals, even if this 
could slow down their structural adjustment.
The promotion of agreements between fi rms and subsidy provi-
sion have in fact delayed the necessary structural adjustment of 
European fi rms, thereby slowing down the economic integration 
process. The situation reached an extreme in the early 1980s when 
the term ‘Eurosclerosis’ was coined to defi ne the European economy.
Consequently the 1980s saw the relaunch of the economic integra-
tion process based on the idea that completing the internal market 
was in itself the main industrial policy to adopt. This meant aban-
doning the protection of national fi rms and implementing European 
competition policy more strictly, alongside a less protective trade 
policy.
To promote the competitiveness of European fi rms, industrial 
policy shifted to regional and local levels, with the new aim of 
improving the capacity of fi rms to take part in competitive markets 
by providing the right conditions rather than providing subsidies 
that compensated for their ineffi  ciencies but also delayed their 
 structural adjustment.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE SINGLE 
EUROPEAN ACT AND IN THE TREATY ON THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
The constructivist approach to industrial policy was therefore pro-
gressively abandoned in the 1980s in favour of an evolutionary 
approach more in line with the German tradition, adopted implicitly 
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in the Single European Act (1986) and explicitly and fully in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992).
This approach was announced by diff erent initiatives and defi ned 
in the Bangemann Report.1 This was a key document as it defi ned 
the new approach to industrial policy. Community action should 
aim to create a context favourable to the competitiveness of fi rms 
rather than directly acting on fi rms (with subsidies for instance) 
to preserve their effi  ciency. Creating the appropriate framework 
or context has meant both ensuring the good functioning of the 
common market and acting as a catalyst and pioneer of industrial 
development. This has been accomplished through the promotion of 
research and technological development, training and human capital 
improvement, the promotion of the development of SMEs, and the 
development of service and industrial cooperation networks.
The Maastricht Treaty adopted this approach. It contains, for the 
fi rst time in European treaties, an explicit article on the opportunity 
to implement policies for the development of industrial competitive-
ness: article 130 defi nes the extent of European industrial policy. In 
addition to article 130, numerous provisions complete the defi nition 
of the new industrial policy approach: article 130F on innovation 
and research policy; article 129 on infrastructure networks; as well as 
provisions on environment and competition policies and measures to 
promote the completion of the internal market.
Industrial policy in an open and competitive context was thus 
defi ned, consisting of various actions aimed at both increasing the 
extent of the market and accelerating fi rms’ organisational and tech-
nological adjustment. This vision of industrial policy was based on 
a set of instruments which aimed to create the conditions for social 
development and collective growth.
The Maastricht Treaty thus proposed a method for industrial 
policy that combined the common approach with the intergovern-
mental approach. Article 130 claims that ‘the Member States shall 
consult each other in liaison with the Commission and, where neces-
sary, shall coordinate their actions. The Commission may take any 
useful initiative to promote such coordination . . .. The Parliament 
shall be kept fully informed’.
This approach to industrial policy had wide implications as its 
design could be implemented beyond the EU’s borders as a design 
of industrial policy in an open economy. The approach was suc-
cessful because it was compatible with the liberal approach of 
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most governments at that time, primarily the US and international 
organisations recommending the ‘Washington Consensus’ recipe 
to promote growth in developing countries. The term industrial 
policy was even abandoned because it was taken to mean the direct 
intervention of the state in markets. Rather, the term competitive-
ness policy was preferred, emphasising the horizontal approach to 
provide the conditions for businesses to prosper with limited state 
intervention.
EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE 
TWENTY- FIRST CENTURY
Despite this approach, there was a constant competitiveness gap 
between the EU and its main rivals Japan and the US in the 1990s – 
especially in the development of high- tech sectors. Europe appeared 
to have the capacity to innovate but not to transform innovation 
into commercial success. European fi rms also appeared less able to 
adopt new technologies, especially information and communication 
technologies, which has prevented them from increasing productiv-
ity (see Bianchi and Labory, 2009, Chapter 9 and 10). In addition, 
by the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, European fi rms were also 
challenged by fi rms from emerging economies, such as China, India, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
As a consequence, the debate on industrial policy emerged again 
in the EU at the beginning of the new century, especially in 2002 
when member states became concerned about the deindustrialisation 
of the EU. In 2003 and 2004 the European Commission published 
two reports analysing the process of deindustrialisation in the EU 
and concluded that it was not a real threat for two major reasons. 
First, deindustrialisation is in fact ‘tertiarisation’ of the economy, 
whereby services take growing importance. This phenomenon is not 
worrying for industry as most new services are related to manufac-
turing activities and off er the opportunity to reorganise production, 
and create global value chains. Second, the delocalisation of manu-
facturing activities to countries outside the EU, another aspect of 
deindustrialisation, should not create problems as long as the EU 
remains a worldwide centre of excellence for human capital and 
innovative capacity.
The reports stressed two main problems for European industry. 
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On the one hand, the productivity gap with the US continued to 
widen. On the other hand, the performance of European high- tech 
sectors vis- à- vis rivals in the US, Japan and emerging countries was 
not satisfactory. The Lisbon Strategy was supposed to address these 
problems.
THE LISBON STRATEGY
In 2000, EU member states met in Lisbon with the President of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi, and defi ned a long- term 
strategy which aimed at ‘making the Union the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge- based economy of the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth thanks to job creation and rising social 
cohesion, by the year 2010’. In order to reach this objective, the EU 
needed to develop innovation and an information society, streamline 
the European social model, and guarantee good macroeconomic 
conditions with an appropriate policy mix. The strategy proposed 
six measures:
1. the e- Europe action plan, to develop an information society 
through measures to use the internet in government and public 
services and favour competition in the telecommunication sector 
to ensure lower connection prices;
2. the creation of the European Area of Research and Innovation, 
focusing on a better coordination of innovative activities within 
the EU, strengthening relationships between business and 
academia, the promotion of researchers’ mobility, and the 
 creation of a European patent;
3. support to SMEs and to fi rm creation by reducing start- up costs 
and by promoting innovation;
4. the completion of the internal market, especially in fi nancial and 
other services;
5. the promotion of effi  cient and integrated fi nancial markets with 
particular attention to SMEs’ access to fi nancial capital;
6. the coordination of macroeconomic policies.
The European Commission was assigned the role of coordinat-
ing national policies and monitoring the progress made towards 
the achievement of the objectives. The European Commission 
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subsequently defi ned a new approach to European policymaking, 
called the ‘open coordination method’. Member states were invited 
to exchange information on the measures they had implemented so 
that best practice could be identifi ed and adopted elsewhere, thereby 
creating partnerships between member states under the monitoring 
of the European Commission.
The Lisbon Strategy is therefore an industrial policy in the wide 
sense of the term – a long- term vision that should at least start to 
bring all member states to the same industrial and economic devel-
opment path. The strategy has been criticised as incoherent, due 
in particular to the contradiction between the necessity for public 
support to research and development and innovation – requiring 
an increase in funds, like the other micro policies suggested by 
the  strategy – and the requirements of macroeconomic stability, 
especially within the eurozone, which requires budget constraint. 
However, we think the main problem here is that of EMU, not of the 
Lisbon Strategy per se. EMU membership imposes strict budget cri-
teria and thereby limits the possibility that countries can implement 
fi scal policies favouring economic growth. This problem was not 
resolved but rather brought to the extreme during the Greek crisis at 
the beginning of 2010, mentioned in Chapter 1.
The idea of a long- term strategy defi ned at the European level 
that member states subsequently adapt and implement in their own 
countries seems to be appropriate. States can decide on the best 
instruments to adopt after consulting with others and company 
best practice. Member states can also coherently defi ne regional 
 development strategies.
The problem is that in recent years member states have tended to 
play independently and without considering the collective benefi ts 
within the EU. The crises of 2001–2002 and of 2008 have shown how 
selfi sh member states are, in the sense of lacking a political will to 
pursue the European integration process. The diffi  culties of ratifying 
the Lisbon Treaty provides additional evidence of this lack of politi-
cal will. Citizens might be reluctant to pursue the integration process 
and therefore do not vote in favour of it; but the main fault lies with 
politicians who do not carry out appropriate information campaigns 
that would convince European citizens of the benefi ts of pursuing 
the integration process further.
All too often, the EU level is presented nationally as the external 
constraint that imposes unpopular measures. One example is the 
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restrictive fi scal policy proposed in June 2010 by the Italian govern-
ment which was presented as being imposed by the European integra-
tion process and the speculative attacks of fi nancial markets, about 
which the government had no room for manoeuvre. The result is that 
the EU is increasingly negatively perceived by European citizens.
The failure of the Lisbon Strategy is therefore primarily political 
and due to the current political crisis of the EU. In fact the European 
Commission claims in 2006, in its strategy for European innovation 
policy, that ‘today Europe does not need new commitments; it needs 
political leadership and decisive actions’ (European Commission, 
2006, p. 3).
Consequently the EU, with the Lisbon Strategy, has defi ned 
a specifi c European approach to industrial policy, coordinating 
both a wide set of instruments and a wide set of implementation 
levels. The long- term vision of industrial development to which all 
member states adhere is defi ned on the European level, not by the 
Commission on its own but essentially on the basis of a dialogue 
between member states in the European Council. The long- term 
vision is then implemented by all policy decision- making levels from 
the European to the local levels.
The main level for competence is the national one, where each 
country adapts the strategy to its own needs and conditions, and 
takes  the necessary measures. At the EU level, the Commission 
monitors progress towards the general objectives and coordinates 
national eff orts, promoting an exchange of information and expe-
riences between European countries. The Commission also coor-
dinates  eff orts made at the local level, supporting the sharing 
of experiences between regions for instance through the Interreg 
programme. The ‘open coordination method’ adopted by the 
Commission is very important in ensuring coherence at the European 
level as well as leaving room in the future for, possibly, a more impor-
tant role for the EU in defi ning and implementing industrial policy.
This new approach is therefore the natural evolution of the 
Bangemann approach, taking a more active role in the orientation 
of industrial specialisation in the EU and in bringing about struc-
tural change to follow specifi c paths. While in the 1990s industrial 
policy was aimed at providing the conditions for industry to embark 
on the best path, in the 2000s public authorities at all levels also try 
to identify the best path in order to orient industrial development 
towards it.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AS A LONG- TERM 
VISION OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we synthesise the evolution of European industrial 
policy and pull out some key elements, using our framework for 
analysing industrial policy in a long- term perspective.
Overall, three phases of industrial policy can be identifi ed, which 
we present in a stylised manner in Table 6.1. The table identifi es 
the main elements of the industrial policies implemented in each 
phase. In the fi rst phase, industrial policies were selective and inter-
ventionist. Actions could be distinguished according to the type of 
industry. Traditional, crisis industries were sustained by subsidies 
Table 6.1 Phases of the evolution of European industrial policy
Phase 1 
(1970s and 1980s)
Phase 2 
(Bangemann)
Phase 3 
(Lisbon)
Actions –  Subsidies to 
old industry
–  National 
champions
–  Protection of 
infant industry
–  Actions on the 
context, the 
competitive 
environment 
(antitrust and 
regulation; 
action at ter-
ritorial level)
–  Development 
of new indus-
try: innovation 
as develop-
ment of new 
technology
–  Providing fair 
rules
–  Development of 
new industry: 
knowledge
–  Innovation as 
knowledge accu-
mulation and 
creation
–  Complex interac-
tions at territorial 
but also wider 
levels: networks
Levers Entitlements
Provisions
Entitlements
Provisions
Innovation
Territory
Entitlements
Provisions
Innovation
Territory
Approach Traditional 
approaches to 
industrial policy
Horizontal 
approaches to 
industrial policy
Dynamic approach 
to industrial policy: 
stress on cumu-
lativeness and 
sustainability
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or state ownership. Other industries were sustained by promoting 
international competitiveness, helping them to create and adopt 
new technologies or guarantee markets (through public procure-
ment). New industries were promoted through infant industry 
protection, namely protection from foreign trade in the fi rst stages 
of their existence. Industrial policy acted on the rules of the com-
petitive game with trade policy, regulation and competition policy, 
although the latter was not strongly implemented in Europe in that 
phase. The other lever of industrial development on which industrial 
policy action was concentrated was resources, namely provisions. 
Extending provisions meant guaranteeing the availability of the nec-
essary resources for development: human capital, fi nancial capital 
and raw materials. Entitlements were also important, since each 
country implemented social cohesion and welfare policies and the 
European social model consolidated in that period.
In the second phase, defi ned at the European level by the 
approach set out by Commissioner Bangemann in his famous report 
(1990), industrial policy was no longer based on direct intervention 
but on providing the conditions for industrial development. This 
meant that entitlements were even more stressed than in the previ-
ous phase, since the approach left the market to function on its own 
and fair competition and fi rm creation had to be guaranteed by the 
availability of provisions and entitlements, allowing all individuals 
to take part in the competitive game.
This approach diff ers from that of the fi rst phase not only because 
of the elements of provisions and entitlements, but also, and more 
fundamentally, due to the addition of two additional levers: innova-
tion and territory. Given the increasing gap in performance between 
American, Japanese and European fi rms, innovation is considered an 
essential (dynamic) lever for the competitiveness of European fi rms 
– hence the strengthening of the framework programme and technol-
ogy policy in the EU, explicitly formalised in the Maastricht Treaty.
Last, but not least, the new approach recognised that industrial 
development primarily arises at the local level, in specifi c territories 
where synergies and proximity make knowledge accumulation, 
exchange and creation possible, thereby allowing fi rm creation and 
growth. Bottom- up approaches therefore substituted the top- down 
approaches of the earlier phase. The representation of the key levers 
of industrial development are shown in Figure 6.1. All levers have to 
be considered for industrial development to be sustainable.
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Notice that this framework is not fi xed but dynamic: innovation 
allows fi rm creation that embeds in territories and enables social cohe-
sion to develop; in turn this allows entitlements to consolidate, and 
innovation is strengthened and promoted since more people take part 
in the learning mechanisms contributing to the development process.
In the third phase, beginning with the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, 
a new approach to industrial policy is progressively defi ned and imple-
mented. This tries to take into account the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the bipolar world, the emergence of new powers, especially in 
Asia, and technological developments that spur the knowledge- based 
economy. The levers are the same but have to be extended further; for 
instance, territory includes a wider emphasis on the environment.
CONCLUSIONS
In 2010 a new strategy has been defi ned by the EU for the period 
2010 to 2020 to replace the Lisbon Strategy.2 The strategy is defi ned 
T
I
E P
Figure 6.1 Key levers of EU industrial policy
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as a growth strategy, and is concerned with overall economic 
growth. The development path chosen is one defi ned as smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive, and is based on knowledge and innovation, 
the need to preserve the environment’ and including everyone in the 
development process to ensure social cohesion.
One of the elements necessary to achieve these objectives is indus-
trial policy. The European Commission defi nes industrial policy as 
enterprise policy, namely measures aimed at fi rms. This is a rather 
restrictive defi nition of industrial policy compared to the broader 
one we adopt in this book. In this book we have talked about indus-
trial policy as industrial development policy, in a vision that sees 
industrial policy as an instrument to wider economic, social and cul-
tural development. For this purpose, a holistic approach is necessary 
that considers not only the specifi c part, namely the industry and the 
fi rms within it, but also the whole of which the industry is a part, 
because the industry does not develop if the whole is not compatible. 
Other parts of the whole include social cohesion, which determines 
income distribution in the population and the propensity to consume 
industry’s products; education and training which determines the 
skills available to industry; and university research which also off ers 
technological development opportunities to fi rms.
A key element of the 2020 strategy is human capital, because it 
is fundamental to create and maintain learning processes. Human 
capital, together with territorial assets such as social capital, are 
indeed key to knowledge- creation processes such as innovation. 
Industrial development must involve not only a single high- tech 
sector, but also other traditional or more mature sectors that also 
employ many workers. These workers have to be appropriately 
trained and involved in labour division in order for learning pro-
cesses to arise also in these industries. Social cohesion is thus 
essential to a sustainable industrial development path, because it 
is complementary and expands learning processes to the whole 
economy. Social cohesion also allows cultural and civil develop-
ment, which are the basis for the additional learning processes.
Provisions, entitlements, innovation and territory must be devel-
oped in a balanced and complementary manner in order for indus-
trial development to take place and be maintained. The actions 
needed to create and maintain these learning processes are many, 
from education and training to research and development, and from 
particular support for green technologies to competition and open 
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trade provisions. Appropriate actions must be implemented at all 
levels of policymaking, including regional, national and suprana-
tional levels. The coherence between the diff erent levels of decision- 
making are also emphasised in the 2020 strategy.
This new European industrial policy thus essentially becomes a 
vision of the future, towards which various policies implemented by 
policymakers at all levels could be coherently orientated.
The new industrial policy necessarily recalls an articulated vision 
of the economy or, as Hirschman (1999) would argue, is a way of 
making the economy more complex. This strategy indeed implies 
a complex and multi- layered vision of the state, from the EU to 
towns. The role of the European level is to defi ne a long- term 
strategy, implement common programmes that create European 
networks, and regulate the competitive environment. The national 
level defi nes and implements industrial policies to support the par-
ticipation of individuals and fi rms in the competitive game, while the 
local and regional levels operate the territorial planning needed for 
development.
The success of this new approach will depend on the capacity of 
EU members to unify behind a common objective and eliminate 
national tensions that, especially in the context of a world crisis, 
tend to mistakenly focus on the national frontiers as the natural area 
where problems can be best resolved. As stressed by the European 
Commission in its communication proposing the 2020 strategy, 
‘Europe can succeed if it acts collectively, as a Union’ (European 
Commission, 2010, p. 3). The EU strategy for 2020, if appropriately 
and convincingly implemented, could also constitute an eff ective 
industrial policy.
NOTES
1. COM(1990) 557 Final, 16 November 1990, ‘Industrial policy in an open and com-
petitive environment’.
2. Proposal by the European Commission (2010) adopted by the European Council 
in June 2010.
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Conclusions
Deep structural transformations have occurred in economies and 
societies in the last 20 years, essentially as a result of globalisation. 
A debate on the usefulness of industrial policies started at the begin-
ning of the new century, marking a sort of ‘return’ of industrial poli-
cies. The crisis has revealed how necessary this debate was, and is, 
for four major reasons.
First, the crisis has revealed that markets do not self- regulate and 
that the state has a role in helping this regulation.
Second, the crisis has revealed that long- term perspectives cannot 
be ignored. The crisis is, to a large extent, determined by the pre-
dominance of short- term views, despite what current behaviour 
may bring in the future. We have shown in this book that long- term 
perspectives, both in economic analyses and in policymaking, are 
essential in order for economic development to be sustainable, in 
the sense of having the capacity to self- generate resources for future 
growth and in the sense of guaranteeing social and environmental 
sustainability.
Third, the crisis has revealed that a political economy framework 
is useful in order to understand the complexity of the economic 
system and of industrial development, and to defi ne appropriate 
economic policies. Isolating economic phenomena from political 
and social characteristics and dynamics only leads to policy failures. 
For instance, a policy for economic development that does not take 
account of the fact that a certain part of the population may be 
excluded from markets due to their social status will not be eff ective 
in spurring development, or at least will only lead to unbalanced and 
unsustainable development.
In the changed context of today’s world the lessons of classical 
economists are more useful than ever. Of particular use is Adam 
Smith, who highlighted that the wealth of nations is primarily deter-
mined by industrial production, and the capacity to organise spe-
cialisations and complementarities in knowledge and competencies. 
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Classical economists taught that industrial production is effi  cient 
if it corresponds to a market where competition is the expression 
of the right of all individuals to autonomously and independently 
participate in collective action. The long term goal of autonomous 
and independent participation of all individuals in markets and 
industrial production, rather than the short term goals of immediate 
profi ts, are what drive the wealth of nations.
In this context, new industrial policies imply a new design of the 
international regulatory system. This includes not only a redefi nition 
of the role of international institutions, but also the search for new 
development goals that take the problems that the global economy 
has to face into account, including the environment, health and food 
security. For this reason, thinking about industrial policy does not 
amount to thinking about a battery of incentives and protectionist 
measures to save the national economy, but rather to discuss the 
concept of the market and the state in a global context.
We therefore propose a framework for the defi nition of industrial 
policies, taking production organisation or, in Smith’s words, labour 
division, as the unit of analysis. The key idea of this framework 
is that industrial policy should act on the learning capacity of the 
economic system by activating appropriate gears towards certain 
development paths. The division of labour determines productivity 
by enabling the application of skill, dexterity and judgment on pro-
ductive processes. In dynamic terms labour division allows learning, 
improvements and knowledge creation. We have shown that the 
deep structural transformations of the last 20 to 30 years, related to 
globalisation, have led to re-organisations of production such that 
the new productive processes are centred on knowledge, and hence 
on people. Indeed, the more heterogeneous is the ‘work done’, the 
more consistent should be the ‘work to be done’, namely the knowl-
edge fl ows within the production process.”
The division of labour determines the capacity of the industrial 
system to adapt to changes in the extent of the market, and so to 
bring about structural adjustments, which implies industrial devel-
opment. Specifi c labour division adjustments are possible if both 
entitlements and provisions are adequate; that is, if people have the 
capabilities to take part in the competitive game and if rules of the 
game are adequately defi ned and guaranteed by the state.
A fourth major problem revealed by the crisis is therefore that 
these provisions and entitlements are no longer completely defi ned 
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at the national level alone. A large part of these are now inter-
dependent, and a countries’ provisions and entitlements depend on 
decisions made by other countries. The economy is open because 
political and economic actors are increasingly interdependent, with 
decisions taken in one part of the world having a potential impact in 
other parts of the world.
Globalisation has a profound impact on the relationship between 
states and markets. Thirty years ago, when national capitalism was 
largely controlled by national governments, the spheres of capital-
ism and democracy coincided. Today, capitalism has become global 
while democracy remains at national or local level. Capitalism is 
ruled by a multi- level governance system, where some decisions 
are made in international institutions (such as the WTO and IMF, 
and also the International Accounting Standards Board regarding 
intangible asset reporting, and international patent offi  ces), others 
by national and regional institutions, or by independent authori-
ties. As stressed by Schmidt (2004), politics is largely at the national 
level, while policy (the activity of an authority with public power and 
institutional legitimacy) and polity (the way in which social parties 
which represent a policy organise and the way in which the authority 
organises) arise at international, national and local levels.
From the point of view of economic modelling, rationality and 
welfare- maximising policies presuppose the existence of a strong 
central authority and an economic and political system under 
control. Welfare- maximising policies can be defi ned at various levels 
of government, especially lower levels, but what about their eff ects 
on other levels? What is their interdependence with policies defi ned 
at other levels?
The economy is knowledge- based, perhaps as it has always been 
although it is more intensely so now. It is clear that technology and 
products are far more complicated nowadays than in the days of 
Adam Smith or Schumpeter. Consumers use cars, telephones and the 
internet, the functioning of which requires a degree in engineering to 
understand. Consumers buy medicines and food but are unable to 
say whether particular components or ingredients can be potentially 
harmful. Products therefore embody much greater knowledge than 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The consequences are twofold. First, production systems have 
changed. Their major distinguishing feature now, in our opinion, is 
their increasing reliance on intangible assets. We have argued that 
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the higher knowledge content of goods implies a change in the value 
creation process of fi rms whereby pre- and post- manufacturing 
phases of production receive greater importance. These are the 
phases which are more intensive in intangible assets, namely human 
capital (in the sense of skills), knowledge and innovation, and social 
capital.
The ability to create and benefi t from networks has become a key 
strategic asset, as value creation is governed and realised in global 
value chains. We argue in this book that the knowledge intensity 
of products, which makes intangible- intensive phases of the pro-
duction process relatively more important, may be a factor in the 
off shoring of manufacturing production phases. This constitutes an 
important structural change in industrial systems, called ‘the second 
 unbundling’ by Baldwin (2006).
When knowledge is the key asset in the economy, human capital 
is also fundamental. Knowledge and competencies are embodied in 
people who create knowledge collectively by communicating and 
exchanging knowledge and experiences. However, only people with 
a certain level of skills can take part in knowledge creation processes 
and become part of a fi rm’s core workforce with long- term contracts.
People with relatively low levels of skills are pressured to take part 
in the knowledge creation process of the fi rm, at all levels. Employees 
dealing with purely technical tasks in the fi rm, for instance imple-
menting administrative procedures or implementing software in 
machines, are also asked to identify problems and suggest improve-
ments. Many studies have shown that stress has increased for many 
workers with medium levels of skills (not unskilled) as the new 
working practices have been implemented. Meanwhile, unskilled 
workers are left behind and paid very low wages with short- term 
contracts that cost the fi rm less.
Second, and following from the fi rst point, it ‘makes it more 
important than it has ever been before for everyone in society to be 
well- educated in their early years, and to have access to good, impar-
tial sources of information throughout their lives’ (Fleischaker, 
2004, p. 268). The education system therefore becomes a key lever 
of industrial development and economic growth, especially at higher 
education levels and in particular universities, but also at lower 
levels.
Not everybody though can reach high skill levels. Specifi c labour 
legislation should therefore be defi ned for the unskilled, to give these 
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people guarantees (at least against poverty) and a certain entitle-
ment to take part in industrial development. Skilled workers must 
be educated not only technically, to obtain the knowledge neces-
sary to perform specifi c tasks, but also behaviourally, to obtain the 
knowledge and competencies necessary to be able to communicate 
knowledge and take part in collective knowledge creation processes. 
Perhaps it is the latter aspect which makes tasks less ‘off shorable’.
The role of universities has changed in the last decades, as univer-
sities increasingly take an active role in industrial development by 
encouraging fi rm creation and, more generally, the valorisation of 
the new knowledge created by its researchers. However, universities 
also maintain the fundamental role of educating people and forming 
the human capital necessary for industry. They enable fi rms to spe-
cialise in appropriate tasks, allowing them to either govern or be part 
of global value chains, without losing too much bargaining power to 
defend their position.
In addition, when knowledge rather than machines is key to fi rms’ 
competitiveness and to industrial development, the wider goals of 
economic growth – those that were stressed by classical economists 
– take primary importance again. Knowledge creation and accumu-
lation requires not only that people be skilled, with a certain knowl-
edge base and specifi c competencies, but also that people have a 
certain level of culture and openness to exchange with other people. 
In other words, knowledge creation and accumulation requires a 
civilised society, in the sense given to the term by Dahrendorf (2008, 
p. 19): ‘It is that in order to advance human welfare one needs both, 
entitlements and provisions. People need access to markets and poli-
tics and culture, but these universes also have to off er numerous and 
manifold choices. No society can be regarded as truly civilised that 
does not off er both’.
A civil society gives meaning to the ways in which people live 
together, providing equal opportunities to all and punishing illegal 
behaviour (justice). It also provides citizens with more than just 
material well- being, but also social well- being, solidarity and non- 
exclusion, and access to cultural development (happiness), which in 
turn feeds industrial and economic development.
Rethinking industrial policies today means redefi ning the basic 
concepts of collective actions and putting them in a dynamic 
perspective.
The crisis is not only fi nancial, it is also the result of a vision of 
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the world which tended to ignore the centrality of the link between 
production, knowledge and people in economic phenomena. In the 
1990s and early years of the new century grew the conviction that 
knowledge increasingly was the engine of industrial and economic 
development, as shown by the much used and perhaps abused terms 
‘knowledge-based economy’ or ‘knowledge society’. As shown in 
Chapter 6, the European Union realised the challenge in 2000 
by defi ning the Lisbon Strategy, which was however not fully 
implemented. 
Knowledge essentially means people, who are rooted in specifi c 
territories, characterised by institutions and rules. Public action can 
accelerate knowledge creation and application by acting on two 
policy axes, innovation and territory on the one hand and entitle-
ments and provisions on the other. In the globalised world charac-
terised by unbundling, these two axes are important and especially 
the combination of entitlements and innovation, namely providing 
education in a sense of valorising people’s rights. It is today neces-
sary to fi nd a new morality of the economy, as an instrument to 
favour the growth of resources, rights, participation and the respon-
sibility of people, particularly in their labour, which remains the 
main engine of the “wealth of nations”. 
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